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ABSTRACT 
To prevent the biasing influence of information obtained outside of the courtroom courts often 
issue instructions to jurors that limit or prohibit certain activities and the use of information 
during the trial and when making verdict decisions. (i.e., prohibitive instructions). However, 
research indicates that mock jurors tend to ignore such instructions. Additionally, advances in 
mobile technology give today’s jurors easier access to potentially biasing information obtained 
through the internet and digital communication (e.g., social media, blogs, email, and texting). 
This raises the question not yet addressed by extant research, whether jurors access this 
information during a case, even when judges issue instructions prohibiting such activities. To 
investigate this question 208 mock jurors participated in a two-stage mock jury trial. They 
viewed and listened to narrated transcripts from a real murder case and deliberated as a jury. 
Mock jurors were given one of three judicial instructions that either prohibited internet-based 
juror misconduct (IBJM) with reasons and consequences (strong), only prohibited IBJM (weak), 
or did not mention IBJM (control). The results show that instructions currently recommended in 
Federal courts (weak) did not prevent IBJM more effectively than those without the 
admonishment. However, significantly lower rates of IBJM were found among mock jurors 
administered the strong instructions than the weak or control instructions. Last, the Juror Internet 
Research Scale (JIRS) did not identify or predict non-compliant mock jurors who engaged in 
IBJM. Implications of these findings for instruction literature and theory are discussed as well as 
potential impacts on the court system.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring defendants’ 6th Amendment right to an impartial jury is becoming increasingly 
more challenging in recent years. Advances in computer and mobile technology has made it 
easier and faster for jurors to engage in internet-based misconduct, (i.e., communicate and 
conduct research about the case on social media and the internet) exposing them to potentially 
biasing information (Morrison, 2011; St. Eve, Burns, & Zuckerman, 2014; Zimmerman, 2013).  
One of the ways courts attempt to reduce juror bias is by issuing jury instructions that prohibit 
these behaviors, although the efficacy of jury instructions is unclear (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, 
Seying, & Pryce, 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Posner, 2016; St. Eve et al., 2014; St. Eve & 
Zuckerman, 2012). Field surveys of jurors found that 89% of respondents self-reported 
compliance with judge’s instructions to refrain from communicating on social media (St. Eve et 
al., 2012, 2014). Conversely, laboratory research shows that limiting instructions are not always 
effective and can have opposite effects with jurors engaging in prohibited behavior more often 
(Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). However, laboratory studies have not yet 
investigated the effectiveness of jury instructions that explicitly prohibit social media 
communication and internet research (i.e., internet-based juror misconduct; IBJM).  
Another promising means of reducing potential IBJM would be to identify and dismiss 
those jurors most likely to ignore prohibitive jury instructions prior to the trial (i.e., during voir 
dire – pretrial questioning and selection of potential jurors). Knutson, Greene, and Durham 
(2016) developed the Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS), a self-report measure intended to 
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predict which individuals will not comply with instructions forbidding internet research. While 
the JIRS is promising, its predictive validity is yet to be established. These facts illustrate the 
importance of investigating if prohibitive instructions and the JIRS can help to ensure an 
impartial jury. 
 The proposed study aims to 1) test the efficacy of instructions prohibiting social media 
communication and internet research, and 2) determine if the JIRS (Knutson et al., 2016) can 
predict compliance with prohibitive instructions.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Review of Legal Literature and Cases 
Jury Instructions and Technology Use During Trials 
 Communicating via social media sites and searching for information on the Internet are 
common practices. According to a recent survey, people spend approximately six (6) hours a day 
online; with 28% of those hours spent on social media such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, 
and 13% of the time micro-blogging on sites like Twitter (Mander, 2015). Additionally, these 
numbers have increased from 1.7 hours a day in 2014 (Mander, 2015) to 1.8 in 2015 and almost 
2 hours per day (1.96 hours) in 2016 (Mander, 2016). A more recent study conducted by the Pew 
Research Center revealed that 77% of Americans go online each day and 26% report that they go 
online “almost constantly” (Perrin & Jiang, 2018). This number is even higher among younger 
Americans, with 39% of 18 – 29 year olds, and 36% of 30 – 49 year olds reporting that they are 
“almost constantly” online (Perrin & Jiang, 2018). Furthermore, those who have Internet access 
through their mobile devices (i.e., iPhone, smartphones, tablets) are online more. Thirty-one 
(31%) of mobile device users (i.e., individuals who access the Internet with mobile devices), but 
only 5% of non-mobile device users (i.e., individuals who use other means to access the internet) 
reported going online almost constantly (Perrin & Jiang, 2018). These facts demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of technology, the Internet, and going online in American culture. 
 Professionals and scholars within the legal system recognize this growing trend and have 
expressed justifiable concerns about the influence of internet-based misconduct on juror 
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decisions (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Artigliere, 2010; Morrison, 2011; Posner, 2016; 
Simpler, 2012; St. Eve et al., 2012, 2014; Zimmerman, 2013). A primary concern is that social 
media communication and online research can have a biasing effect by making potentially 
irrelevant or inaccurate information available to an individual juror that is not known or available 
to others involved in the case (Morrison, 2011; Posner, 2016; Simpler, 2012). In turn, this 
prevents validation and cross-examination of the information (i.e., evidence) by court, which 
violates the Sixth Amendment rules of evidence and due process. Another concern is that if 
jurors leak information about a case on social media it could reduce public faith in the justice 
system. In turn, detrimentally affecting the parties involved in the case by increasing the risk of 
mistrials or conviction of innocent persons (Simpler, 2012; Zimmerman, 2013). 
 Financial consequences of jurors communicating and seeking information online are yet 
another concern. When it is discovered that a juror commits IBJM the court is obliged to 
investigate and determine whether or not the actions or information gained has biased the juror 
and the jury. If the court determines that the juror’s or jury’s impartiality has been compromised 
a mistrial is called for and a new trial is required. This is an addition time and financial expense 
on the courts and taxpayers thus impeding defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013). According to a 2017 study it costs 
approximately $25,800 to $51,700 (adjusted for 2019 dollars; Inflation Rate between 2010-2019, 
2019) to prosecute a homicide (Hunt, Anderson, & Saunders, 2017) and it could cost even more 
for high profile cases. For example, in the first-degree murder trial of Victor Diaz a juror, Phillip 
Elliot, conducted online research and communicated on social media with another juror. Elliot 
was subsequently found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to serve eight days in jail. A 
mistrial was declared thus the guilty verdict was vacated and a new trial ordered. During her 
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reprimand of Elliot in court, Justice Marx estimated that taxpayers had already paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to prosecute Diaz whose conviction was put in jeopardy by his (Elliot’s) 
misconduct (Freeman, 2016). Arguably, taxpayers ended up paying tens if not hundreds of 
thousands of dollars more for the new trial based on the cost of the original trial.    
Internet-Based Juror Misconduct and Potential Remedies 
Several court cases have been impacted by jurors communicating on social media or 
conducting internet research. An investigation by Reuters Legal found that between 1999 and 
2009 jurors’ internet-based misconduct lead to the challenging of 90 verdicts nationwide; 
resulting in new trials or overturned verdicts in 28 criminal and civil trials (Grow, 2010). To 
further verify that internet-based misconduct among jurors is not just anecdotal, Hoffmeister 
(2012) conducted a survey of federal judges, prosecuting attorneys, and public defenders. The 
survey asked about jurors conducting internet research as well as recommendations for remedies 
and reforms. About 10% of the respondents reported personal knowledge of instances of 
internet-based juror misconduct showing it is a problem experienced in some federal courts.  
Sequestration and monitoring remedies. Historically the courts have attempted to 
prevent juror bias in high profile cases by sequestering the jury. Sequestration involves keeping 
jurors away from the biasing influence of the media by requiring them to stay in court provided 
accommodations, away from family, friends and the media, for the duration of the trial. 
Sequestration is expensive, requiring the court to pay for food and lodging for the jurors in 
addition to paying their daily compensation, therefore it is usually reserved for high-profile 
cases. Sequestering the jury to prevent jurors from committing internet-based juror misconduct 
would require the sequestration of all juries in all trials which would greatly increase the cost of 
prosecuting jury trials. Furthermore, sequestration of the jury often increases the length of a trial 
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putting the defendants’ rights to a speedy trial in jeopardy. In addition, it is likely that total 
sequestration of jurors might increase individuals’ attempts to avoid serving jury duty (Morrison, 
2011).  The high cost of sequestering the jury, the potential of a lengthy trial, as well as the 
inconvenience to the jurors of being sequestered make sequestration impractical for preventing 
internet-based juror misconduct (Morrison, 2011).       
Another potential remedy is monitoring jurors’ use of electronic devices and the Internet. 
On the surface monitoring jurors’ online activities appears as a logical and effective solution, 
reducing or maybe even preventing internet-based juror misconduct. However, such monitoring 
infringes on jurors’ fourth amendment right to privacy and unwarranted searches. The American 
Bar Association (ABA) addressed this issue ruling that attorneys can view jurors’ social media 
activity but can only view electronic media (e.g., social media, blogs, and websites) that are 
available to the general public. Attorneys cannot request access to jurors’ private online presence 
meaning that attorneys cannot ‘friend’ or ‘follow’ jurors to gain access to their private profiles 
(ABA formal opinion, 2014). Even if such monitoring was allowed by the ABA it would likely 
be labor intensive and expensive which would likely limit its use. 
 Although most courts use various forms of sequestration and monitoring that are within 
the rules of the ABA such as restricting jurors’ possession and/or use of electronic devices and 
searching social media during the trial and deliberations (Hoffmeister, 2015; Morrison, 2011), it 
is clearly not enough to prevent internet-based juror misconduct. Internet-based juror misconduct 
can occur for a multitude of reasons, both intentional and unintentional. Thus, different remedies 
are needed to address numerous reasons internet-based juror misconduct occurs. Hoffmeister’s 
(2012) survey revealed three remedies supported by the participants from the court; 1) juror 
penalties, 2) improving judicial instructions, and 3) investigating jurors.  
 
 
7 
 
Juror penalties.  While it is plausible that instances of juror misconduct occur 
unintentionally, due to a lack of understanding or misunderstanding the prohibitive instructions. 
Nonetheless, not all incidents are readily dismissed as misunderstandings. The jurors in 
Tennessee v. Smith (2013) were instructed that it would be improper to conduct online research 
or communicate with anyone about the case in person, on cell phones or via text, due to such 
activities being problematic. However, jurors were not explicitly prohibited from communicating 
on social media provided or given a detailed explanation why such actions are a problem. 
Despite the prohibitive instructions one juror contacted the State’s medical expert witness via 
Facebook. The state medical expert informed the juror that the contact could lead to a mistrial 
and the juror indicated he already knew and understood the risk. Although the judge did not 
explicitly admonish the jury from communicating via social media or other electronic 
communication, this juror admitted knowing that such communication was forbidden and could 
lead to a mistrial. This type of juror misconduct is clearly intentional and in violation of the 
judge’s instructions. This juror engaged in the misconduct knowing it was in violation of the 
court rules. To address these direct and purposeful misconduct some legal scholars and 
professionals (e.g., Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Hoffmeister, 2012; Simpler, 2012) suggest that 
a potentially effective remedy would be implementing penalties on non-compliant jurors.   
Respondents of Hoffmeister’s (2012) survey and other legal scholars (Aaronson & 
Patterson, 2013; Simpler, 2012) support imposing penalties on jurors who engage in internet-
based juror misconduct. Although not common, some courts have begun implementing this 
remedy. For instance, in United States v. Juror Number One (2011), despite a general 
admonishment against communicating with other jurors during a criminal trial, Juror Number 
One sent emails to fellow jurors about the case after being excused from service due to employer 
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issues. One of the jurors, Juror Number Eight, responded saying she agreed with Juror Number 
One and would forward the message to the rest of the jury. This action resulted in the dismissal 
of Juror Number Eight. Subsequently the court referred the matter to the US Eastern District 
Court of Pennsylvania who filed charges against Juror Number One, finding her guilty of 
contempt of court and issuing a $1,000 fine.   
Even when admonishment of internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM) is specific, it still 
occurs. Courts in Palm Beach County, FL have also begun charging jurors who engage internet-
based misconduct with contempt of court with potential penalties that include jail time. In 2010, 
Florida courts began using judicial instructions that specifically forbid internet communication 
and research. Yet, Alexander Sutton, a juror on an automobile negligence case, did not comply 
and faced up to six months in jail for making posts on Facebook that indicated he was not 
impartial (Musgrave, 2014). Though Sutton was escorted from the courtroom in handcuffs when 
charged with contempt, he was let go with a warning (Freeman, 2014). Philip Elliott, a juror on a 
high-profile murder trial, also faced jail time for conducting research online and sharing it with 
other jurors as well as communicating in private messages on Facebook with another juror 
(Freeman, 2016). Elliot was lectured by the judge at a two-hour hearing when he was convicted 
and sentenced to eight days in jail for contempt of court (Musgrave, 2016). 
Though imposing penalties on jurors is favorable to some judges and attorneys (e.g., 
Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Hoffmeister, 2012; Simpler, 2012), Morrison (2011) contends that 
such action could be more detrimental than helpful by increasing mistrust and resentment in 
jurors. Another drawback is the potential discouragement of people engaging in jury duty. Many 
individuals already have reservations about serving jury duty considering it takes time away 
from other aspects of their lives (i.e., work and family). Serving jury duty can also cost them 
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financially through the loss of wages or paying for day care (Bornstein & Greene, 2017; 
Diamond, 1993; King, 1993; Losh, Wasserman, & Wasserman, 2000). These drawbacks often 
influence such individuals to make efforts to avoid serving jury duty by failing to appear or 
petitioning the court to postpone or excuse/exempt service (Losh et al., 2000). Adding the threat 
of severe penalties for engaging activities that might habitual (i.e., researching and 
communicating online) could make it more difficult to find willing, unbiased jurors. Although 
there are good arguments for and against penalizing jurors for IBJM, such behavior is a violation 
of the law and is currently being penalized in some courts. Thus, it could be beneficial to inform 
jurors of the potential ramifications of engaging in IBJM if there can be a balance between 
penalties that are strong enough to deter the misconduct but not so strong so as to deter people 
from jury service.  
Judicial instructions.  One of the more utilized means of preventing juror misconduct is 
the use of limiting instructions that prohibit specific activities (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; 
Artigliere, 2010; Posner, 2016; St. Eve et al., 2014; Simpler, 2012; Zimmerman, 2013). 
Instructions from the judge inform jurors about the rules of law and their responsibilities in 
interpreting and applying them. Instructions also inform jurors which evidence they can consider 
and restrict or prohibit specific behaviors. Therefore, it is important that jurors receive clear, 
understandable instruction. A lack of proper and clear instruction explicitly prohibiting online 
communication and research could contribute to increased instances of IBJM.  
In some instances, jurors engaged in online communication and/or research when there 
was no specific prohibition of IBJM from the court. Instances of IBJM could be unintentional if 
jurors only received a general admonishment against communicating or researching about the 
case. Which could be the case in the appeal trial Chambers v. Georgia (2013). During 
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deliberations, a juror conducted internet research on Georgia law seeking the meaning of legal 
terms, subsequently sharing it with the other jurors. Shortly after rendering a guilty verdict the 
juror admitted to conducting research. She claimed the purpose of her research was to clearly 
understand the legal terms and share that information with fellow jurors. It was determined that 
part of the jury decided the case based upon the legal definition provided by juror instead of the 
one provided by the court. Although the juror claimed to have good intentions of rendering an 
appropriate verdict, the fact remains that she clearly violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights of due process. The court did not specify how the jury was instructed, hence, at the 
minimum the jury likely received a standard instruction prohibiting outside research, but not a 
specific admonishment of IBJM. It is possible the juror was unaware that her actions violated the 
defendant’s rights.  She may not have realized her research was in violation of standard 
instructions because of a lack of specific admonishment of internet research. 
 When IBJM occurs without a specific admonishment from the judge, penalizing jurors 
with the costs of a new trial or serving jail time might be considered excessive and 
counterproductive. A potentially more effective remedy would be to ensure that instructions to 
the jury include a clear and specific admonishment of IBJM and warn jurors of potential 
consequences. Courts have begun administering juror instructions specifically prohibiting jurors 
from engaging in IBJM (Simpler, 2012). However, the content and administration of such 
instructions varies across jurisdictions which can impact their effectiveness (Posner, 2016). 
Judges are not required to use any particular instructions. Some use instructions drafted by 
committees of judges and attorneys (e.g., pattern, standardized or model instructions) such as the 
proposed model jury instructions prepared in 2012 by the Judicial Conference Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management (CACM) that include specific admonishment of 
 
 
11 
 
IBJM (see Appendix A for the CACM model instructions). Whereas other judges might write 
and use their own instructions that may or may not include specific prohibition of IBJM. Such 
discrepancies in content could increase the likelihood of the variability in the efficacy of 
instructions in preventing or reducing IBJM. Perhaps courtrooms which administer instructions 
that specifically prohibit online communication and research are more likely to have fewer 
instances of IBJM than those that do not. For example, in a sexual assault case, Vermont v. Abdi 
(2012), a juror conducted internet research about Somali culture and shared the information with 
fellow jurors. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled that the information obtained 
online had the capacity to prejudice the jurors’ verdict and played a significant role in the trial. In 
the court’s ruling, Justice Johnson noted that the IBJM might have been prevented if Vermont 
used revised instructions that included specific restrictions on internet-based research or social 
media use. Furthermore, to improve the effectiveness of instructions and prevent or reduce future 
instances of IBJM, Justice Johnson suggested the state of Vermont consider using revised 
instructions like those used by the state of Colorado that include specific admonishment of 
technology-based research and communication (Vermont v. Abdi, 2012).  
 Morrison (2011), Justice Posner (2016), and others (e.g., Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; 
Simpler, 2012; Zimmerman, 2013) advocate for early and repetitive instruction of jurors and 
recommend informing jurors of the reasons for the admonishment. For instance, they suggest 
informing jurors that internet research of the case can make jurors aware of information that 
other jurors, attorneys and the judge may not know or is irrelevant to the case thus inhibiting due 
process (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Morrison, 2011; Posner, 2016; Simpler, 2012; 
Zimmerman, 2013). Posner (2016) attests to the effectiveness of informing jurors of the reasons 
for the limitations from experience in his own courtroom. Yet, IBJM occurs even when 
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instructions are clear, given early and repeated often as in the capital murder and aggravated 
assault case of Dimas-Martinez v. Arkansas (2011). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
and death sentence of Dimas-Martinez and remanded the case for a new trial due to internet-
based juror misconduct. At the beginning of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to never 
discuss the case with anyone, specifically admonishing the use of Twitter to communicate (i.e., 
tweet through a micro-blog) about the case. The judge also informed the jury of a prior case that 
was compromised as a reason for his instruction. In addition to the opening instructions, jurors 
were also given the prohibitive instructions at every break. Even with the early and repeated 
warnings against tweeting the court discovered that Juror 2 tweeted throughout the trial. The 
court questioned the juror, who admitted the indiscretion, informing him that such actions were 
in direct violation of the judge’s instructions. Despite the personal warning the juror ignored the 
judge’s instructions and continued to tweet, even during deliberation. This is a clear 
demonstration that IBJM can occur even when instructions include due process reasons for the 
instruction with early and frequent administration.  
 Juror comprehension of instructions. As illustrated, administering jury instructions 
early and often, with reasons for the admonishment of online communication and research does 
not always prevent IBJM. This points to yet another problem with jury instructions, they are 
difficult for jurors to understand (Bartels & Lee, 2013; Lieberman & Sales, 1997; Morrison, 
2011; Posner, 2016). Without a clear comprehension of instructions, it is difficult for jurors to 
comply (Baguley, McKimmie, & Masser, 2017; Lieberman & Sales, 1997). Therefore, it is 
conceivable that making instructions easier for jurors to comprehend might increase their 
efficacy in reducing IBJM. Posner (2016) notes that many judges use pattern instructions 
composed by committees of legal professionals who use complicated legal jargon instead of 
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plain language that is more easily understood by jurors. Empirical research supports Posner’s 
critique of standardized instructions. Typically, mock jurors have trouble understanding key 
aspects and only comprehend 50% to 70% of the instructions given (Baguley, et al., 2017). 
Though Posner (2016) and others (e.g., Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Bartels & Lee, 2013) 
advocate for more simple wording, that is not necessarily enough to increase jurors’ 
understanding of the instructions. Research shows that merely simplifying the wording (i.e., 
linguistic complexity) of instructions does not always increase juror comprehension and 
compliance, instead simplifying conceptual complexity is necessary (Baguley et al., 2017).  
Baguley and colleagues (2017) conducted a systematic review of 121 independent 
instructions from 75 studies on the influence of simplifying aspects of complexity on juror 
comprehension and application (i.e., compliance) of instructions. They coded the studies for 
linguistic complexity (i.e., simplification of sentence structure and use of familiar/common 
words to enhance readability), conceptual complexity (i.e., simplification of legal concepts and 
use of factual examples of legal concepts), amount of information (i.e., total amount of words in 
instruction), presentation format (i.e., providing jurors with written instructions with or after oral 
and/or decision-aids like pictorial flow charts or question-trial), and proportion of supplementary 
information (i.e., number of words used to convey information that is key to the principles of the 
instruction vs. non-key information). Then they measured how each aspect of complexity affects 
jurors’ application of the instruction. Baguley and colleagues (2017) found that jurors applied the 
instructions more often (i.e., complied) when conceptual complexity was simplified, and the 
proportion of supplementary information was reduced, but not when linguistic complexity was 
simplified.  
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These results could explain why IBJM occurs despite adding specific admonishment of 
online communication and research, reasons for the admonishment, and the early and repetitive 
administration of instructions. Furthermore, these results might explain Posner’s (2016) personal 
experience of increased compliance with the use of his simply worded instruction. It could be 
that when the simplifying linguistic complexity of his instructions, Posner also simplified the 
conceptual complexity by transforming complex legal concepts into language and terms that are 
easier for jurors to understand.  These results provide apparent evidence that jurors’ 
comprehension and application of instructions can be increased by simplifying legal concepts 
and reducing supplemental, unnecessary, information; thus, improving the efficacy of 
instructions. Nonetheless, it is possible that no matter the quality and clarity of the instructions, 
or how they are administered, jurors will not be deterred from seeking information or 
communicating online. Perhaps another viable remedy for this type of misconduct would be 
identification and removal of potentially non-compliant jurors during voir dire.  
Investigating jurors during voir dire. One of the potential remedies presented by 
Hoffmeister (2012) is to investigate jurors’ online activities prior to the trial and monitor them 
throughout the trial. Though investigating jurors was a remedy widely supported by judges and 
attorneys who took the survey, it would require more time and resources to accomplish in 
addition to the potential issues of juror privacy. An easier and less expensive means of 
investigating jurors prior to trial would be through voir dire questioning. Voir dire is the 
preliminary questioning of jurors and witnesses by the judge or attorneys to identify whether 
individuals are suitable to serve on the jury. Jurors are often excused from jury service for 
various reasons including those who are likely to be biased or otherwise deemed unable to 
adequately fulfil their duties. Attorneys are beginning to use voir dire to identify those who may 
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be more likely to commit internet-based misconduct by questioning potential jurors about their 
social media and internet use (Simpler, 2012). However, if voir dire questioning is not systematic 
a type of selection bias could occur that dismisses jurors who are tech savvy or highly familiar 
with social networks, thereby putting the diversity of juries at risk (Bartels & Lee, 2013). Voir 
dire questioning of potential jurors may be a viable aid in reducing IBJM if conducted in a 
systematic, consistent and objective manner, especially if used in conjunction with limiting 
instructions. This would require a tool that accurately and reliably identifies people who are most 
likely to engage in IBJM.  
 Knutson, Greene, and Durham (2016) have taken the first steps toward the realization of 
such a tool, the Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS). The JIRS is a self-report measure 
developed to predict individuals who are more likely to ignore instructions forbidding internet 
research (Knutson et al., 2016). Knutson and colleagues (2016) theorized that because jurors 
vary in their level of obligation to obey the law it is likely that this level of compliance with 
authority can predict who will violate judicial instructions that prohibit internet research. The 
scale was administered to college students and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participants in two 
studies establishing convergent validity and theoretical support with measures of self-control and 
perceived obligation to obey the law. The final JIRS consists of 10 items that appear to be a 
promising, valid, and reliable measure. However, the predictive validity of the JIRS scale has not 
yet been established.  
Review of Empirical Literature: Efficacy of Instructions 
Field Research of Juror Compliance with Instructions 
  Professionals and scholars in the legal system recognize that limiting instructions are 
sometimes ignored and actively seek ways to increase the effectiveness of instructions. In 2011 
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the Federal Judicial Committee (FJC) conducted a survey at the request of the Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management (CACM) to investigate jurors’ use of social media 
during trials and to identify effective means of reducing this behavior (Dunn, 2011). The FJC 
surveyed federal district judges finding that 94% used prohibitive instructions explicitly 
prohibiting social media use. Only 6% of judges reported known instances of jurors using social 
media during a trial and only 0.3% personally witnessed the misconduct, but whether these 
judges administered social media specific instructions was not reported (Dunn, 2011). 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of issuing instructions specifically prohibiting jurors from 
engaging in social media communication, two federal judges, St. Eve and Zimmerman (2012), 
conducted their own survey. The two judges issued CACM recommended model instructions 
that prohibit social media communication about the case. The CACM instructions were issued 
during opening and closing of trials in both federal criminal and civil courts as well as each time 
the court broke for the day on multiday trials. After each trial, jurors were sent a survey that 
asked two questions 1) whether he or she was tempted to engage in social media communication 
and 2) why he/she not engage in the prohibited behavior. Of the jurors who responded 
anonymously to the survey (N = 140), 92% reported no temptation and only 1% of jurors 
admitted being tempted to violate the judges’ instructions reporting they ultimately refrained 
because of the admonishment.   
 St. Eve, Burns, and Zimmerman (2014) continued St. Eve and Zimmerman’s (2012) 
survey of jurors, utilizing the same instructions, administration of the instructions and survey 
questions. The survey responses were combined and analyzed with those obtained by St. Eve and 
Zimmerman (2012) finding that 89% of the jurors that responded to the surveys (N = 583) 
reported they were not tempted to engage in social media communication. Eight percent (8%) 
 
 
17 
 
admitted they were tempted but did not violate the judges’ admonishment, again citing the 
instructions as the primary reason for restraint. Based on these results the justices offered three 
recommendations for reducing IBJM: 1) use instructions that specifically prohibit the use of 
social media communication, 2) issue the instructions early (e.g., as part of the judge’s opening 
instructions) and often (e.g., when the court breaks for the day and as a part of the judge’s 
closing instructions before deliberation), and 3) ensure the content of instructions is effective by 
using broad enough language to include all potential social media and digital communications, 
including a meaningful explanation for the instruction, reminding jurors of their oath and its 
importance, and including the basics such as prohibition of conducting outside research. 
Mock Juror Compliance with Jury Instructions 
 In contrast to the results found by St. Eve and colleagues (2012, 2014), empirical 
research shows that jury instructions are not always effective and can even have opposite effects 
with jurors engaging in prohibited behavior more often (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & 
Pryce, 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). In their review of research investigating biasing effects 
of pretrial publicity and inadmissible evidence, Lieberman and Arndt (2000) examined the 
effectiveness and boundaries of remedies the court uses to reduce the impact of potentially 
biasing information, most relevant being limiting instructions and voir dire. They revealed that 
the literature converges on the finding that jurors are unable or unwilling to comply with judge’s 
instructions admonishing the use of prohibited information. Although initial research found that 
juror instructions were effective, the methodologies were questionable with small sample sizes, 
no control conditions and potential demand characteristics making the results difficult to 
interpret (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). Conversely, more recent research consistently illustrates 
that jurors were not able (or willing) to ignore biasing information when making verdict 
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decisions even when jury instructions were issued (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). Lieberman and 
Arndt’s (2000) examination of voir dire research repeatedly found that even though jurors 
claimed to be unbiased when questioned during voir dire, attorneys were not able to successfully 
identify those who were biased by the information. Due to the self-report nature of voir dire it is 
likely that jurors are unable (or unwilling) to acknowledge influential effects from biasing 
information.  
A review of 45 years of jury decision-making research mirrors the findings of Lieberman 
and Arndt (2000) deeming limiting instructions ineffective. Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, 
and Pryce (2001) completed a comprehensive review of research on jury decision-making 
published between 1955 and 1999, totaling 206 studies. An emergent theme strongly supported 
in the literature is that regardless of the law and the issuance of prohibitive instructions, jurors 
will not, or possibly cannot, ignore information they deem relevant to the case (Devine et al., 
2001). 
 Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) provide further support that jurors take prohibited 
information into consideration when making verdict judgements despite instructions to ignore it. 
Participants engaged in a mock jury trial in which they were first exposed to pretrial information 
then were given either limiting instructions to disregard any pretrial information (instructed 
group) or standard closing instructions only (uninstructed group) before deliberating and 
rendering verdicts. The results revealed that verdicts were the same regardless of the instruction 
jurors received (Kramer et al., 1990). Furthermore, counter-intuitively, limiting instructions had 
an opposite effect on jurors’ evaluation of the defendant, which was more negative in response to 
factual information but only when they were instructed to ignore any pretrial publicity. These 
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results clearly demonstrate that limiting instructions are ineffective and can potentially lead to 
even more biased views.  
Selective compliance with instructions. Although research shows that jurors seem to 
ignore limiting instructions some research reveals that jurors do not entirely disregard the judge 
but selectively comply with limiting instructions. Fein, McCloskey, and Tomlinson (1997) 
examined whether jurors comply with instructions to disregard pretrial publicity if they are 
suspicious about the motives behind the release of the incriminating information. Despite the 
judge’s instructions to ignore any inadmissible information when making verdict judgements, 
mock jurors who were exposed to incriminating but inadmissible information (incriminating 
condition) about the defendant were biased. Mock jurors in the incriminating condition reported 
significantly more guilty verdicts than those in the control condition who received no such 
information. Yet, jurors who were exposed to information that raised suspicions about the 
motives (suspicious condition) behind the introduction of the incriminating information were no 
more likely to render guilty verdicts than those in the control condition. Furthermore, they were 
less likely to render guilty verdicts than those in the incriminating information condition (Fein et 
al., 1997). These findings indicate that jurors comply with the judge’s limiting instructions when 
they are given a compelling reason to do so, such as the information may be biased, false or 
misleading thus having the potential to bias the juror. These results support legal scholars’ 
suggestions to administer instructions that not only instruct jurors to refrain from social media 
communication and internet research (i.e., internet-based misconduct) but also include reasons 
for the admonishment. Strong jury instructions (i.e. instructions with empirically supported 
reasons for the admonishment) should clearly inform jurors that compliance is essential because 
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information they obtain through internet-based misconduct could be false, inaccurate, misleading 
or outright biased, which could bias them and influence their verdict decisions.  
 Kassin and Sommers (1997) provide further empirical support for the use of strong 
instructions as a means of increasing the effectiveness of limiting instructions, finding that juror 
compliance was moderated by the reasoning behind the admonishment. Mock jurors selectively 
complied with instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence but only when it was deemed 
unreliable but not when it was inadmissible because of due process violations. Mock jurors who 
were given an instruction to disregard inadmissible information because it was unreliable chose 
to convict the defendant less often (24%) than those who were given a due process reason for the 
admonishment (55%), and those who were told the information was admissible (79%; Kassin & 
Sommers, 1997). These findings, coupled with those of Fein et al. (1997), provide strong 
evidence that limiting instructions can be more effective if jurors are informed that compliance 
protects against the influence of potentially biasing information thus ensuring a just outcome.  
Limitations  
 The empirical literature appears to converge on the conclusion that overall, jurors tend to 
ignore judicial instructions, especially when the prohibited information or behavior is relevant to 
making a good decision. This seems to conflict with the results of St. Eve and colleagues’ (2014) 
field research which found that 90% of jurors surveyed reported compliance with judge’s 
limiting instructions. However, St. Eve and colleagues’ (2014) findings would be in line with the 
results of selective compliance found by Fein and colleagues (1997), as well as Kassin and 
Sommers (1997), if the limiting instructions they used provided jurors with sufficient 
explanation for the instruction. Yet, St. Eve and colleagues (2014) used the Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management (CACM) model social media instructions that only offer 
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jurors an explanation for the admonishment of social media communication in the post-trial 
instructions administered just before deliberation. Furthermore, the reasons given are very brief 
and limited, only informing jurors that internet-based misconduct could impede due process and 
the information is not vetted by the courts, so it may be inaccurate. Neither of these reasons are 
empirically shown to improve compliance with the instructions.   
There are a few other possible explanations for the conflicting findings. To begin, St. Eve 
and colleagues’ (2012, 2014) surveys were conducted in the field where the consequences of 
jurors’ decisions are higher. Real jurors make decisions that impact the lives of others, in 
contrast to in the laboratory whereas the decisions of mock jurors are inconsequential. Second, 
there is a possibility that St. Eve and colleagues’ (2012, 2014) findings are subject to response 
biases such as, non-response or social desirability. The survey was given to all jurors but 
participation in the survey was not required, leaving room for the possibility of non-response 
bias. Selection effects pose another potential problem. It is possible that only those jurors who 
complied with the instruction responded to the survey. Those who did not respond may not have 
wanted to admit to violating the judge’s instructions because it is not socially desirable or may 
have legal consequences.  A third possible reason St. Eve and colleagues’ (2012, 2014) 
prohibitive instructions appear to be more effective than in empirical research is they were 
specific to social media communication, whereas empirical research has not yet examined the 
effectiveness of prohibitive instructions that specifically admonish internet-based misconduct.   
Jury Deliberation, Social Influence, and Use of Confederates 
 An important component of a jury trial is the deliberation of the jurors in deciding the 
verdict of a case. During the jury deliberation phase, jurors are cloistered from other people 
while tasked with evaluating the evidence presented during the trial and reaching a verdict 
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decision. They are to converse only with other jurors about the case at the end of the trial and no 
one else besides the jurors are allowed in the jury room during deliberation (Diamond & Casper, 
1992; Jury deliberation, 2008). The seclusion of the jury during deliberation is imperative with 
the purpose of ensuring that jurors are not unduly influenced by extraneous information and 
people. Jurors’ verdict decisions need to be based only on the evidence presented in the 
courtroom that has been vetted by the court (Courselle, 2005; Hoffmeister, 2012; Morrison, 
2011; Patterson v. Colorado, 1907; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966). Moreover, the isolation and 
privacy of the jury during deliberation allows for free debate and discussion of the case, without 
fear of judgement, condemnation, or persecution of others (Bartels & Lee, 2013; Clark v. United 
States, 1933; Courselle, 2005; Morrison, 2011).   
Though efforts are made to ensure jurors are not subjected to potentially biasing 
influences when making verdict decisions, some aspects of the jury and deliberation itself can 
influence the final outcome, such as the size of the jury (e.g., Davis, Hulbert, Au, Chen, & 
Zarnoth, 1997; Horowitz, & Bordens, 2002), foreperson characteristics (e.g. Diamond & Casper, 
1992; Foley & Pigott, 1997), and initial verdict preference (e.g., Tanford & Cox, 1988; Tanford 
& Penrod, 1986), to name a few (Devine et al, 2001). Jury decision-making research shows that 
six-person (vs. 12-person) juries are hung less often, recall less case information, have less 
accurate discussions about trial information, take less time to deliberate, award larger damages in 
civil cases and their verdicts are more variable (Bornstein & Greene, 2017; Davis et al., 1997; 
Devine et al., 2001; Horowitz, & Bordens, 2002; Saks & Marti, 1997). The characteristics of the 
foreperson is another aspect of deliberation that can impact the final verdict. Jury forepersons 
tends to be more confident, higher status, better educated, have jury duty experience, 
speak/participate more and are often more influential than other jurors (Diamond & Casper, 
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1992; Devine et al., 2001; Foley & Pigott, 1997).  Lastly, jury decision-making research 
indicates that initial verdict preferences tend to predict final verdicts. More precisely, when the 
majority of jurors’ initial (individual) preference favors a particular verdict (guilty/not guilty), 
the final (group) verdict matches most of the time (Devine et al., 2001; MacCoun, 1989; 
MacCoun & Kerr, 1989; Tanford & Penrod, 1986). However, this is only seen when a strong 
majority of at least two-thirds of jurors’ initial verdict preferences are the same. If less than two-
thirds of jurors vote to convict initially (i.e., more than one-third of the jurors dissent from the 
majority) the jury tends to split, are hung or vote to acquit (Devine et al., 2001; Tanford & 
Penrod, 1986), herein referred to as majority persuasion effects (Tanford & Cox, 1988). These 
majority persuasion effects are even more influential when the majority favors acquittal. When 
the jury’s initial vote results in a split of 8 to 4 (or 4 to 2 in 6-person juries) for acquittal, the final 
verdict matches more often than the same initial vote ratio in favor of conviction (Devine et al., 
2001; MacCoun, 1989; MacCoun & Kerr, 1989). 
These aspects of deliberations have a highly influential factor in common, the impact of 
social influence. Social influence is the process in which a person’s cognitions, opinions, 
attitudes, beliefs, behavior and judgements are changed by another individual or group (Asch, 
1956; Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010; Harkins & Williams, 2015; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). 
Social influence is often exacted through conformity in which individuals change their views to 
be more in-line with others in a group (e.g., Asch 1955; 1956), and through compliance in which 
they change at the request of another (e.g., Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010). Early foundational 
research demonstrated conformity and group influence effects in the judgement of the length of 
lines (Asch’s 1955; 1956). Each participant was grouped with five to six confederates, (e.g., 
individuals who are trained to pretend to be participants in a study and respond in a predisposed 
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manner) to judge the length of lines. One at a time, in the order seated, each confederate 
provided an incorrect answer ending with the participants who were the last to vocalize an 
answer. When all confederates provided an incorrect answer, the participants tended to go along 
with the judgment of the group over 63% of the time. Yet when one confederate in the group 
dissented participants only agreed with the group 25% of the time (Asch 1955). Thus, conformity 
was reduced by over half (25% vs 63%).  
Asch’s (1955, 1956) research demonstrates that people will conform to the judgement of 
a group majority, even when the majority is clearly incorrect and/or biased. However, these 
results also show that sometimes individuals will adhere to their own correct judgement in the 
face of an incorrect majority. It only took one single dissenter from the group to influence 
participants to report his/her accurate judgement of the line. Though often individuals tend to go 
with the majority, a single ally can provide enough support for them to resist being swayed by 
the rest of group.  
Social influence and the use of confederates in research.  As occurred in Asch’s (1955, 
1956) studies, social influence or more specifically conformity, is often utilized in psychological 
research by using confederates who are trained to act and respond in pre-specified ways, usually 
following a script. Confederates usually encourage a specific response or judgement from the 
participant though the exertion of pressures to conform to the judgement, opinion, and/or 
behaviors of the group, as demonstrated in Asch’s (1955, 1956) studies.  Confederates have been 
used in past research to elicit false memories (e.g., Herndon, Myers, Mitchell, Kehn, & Henry, 
2014), false confessions (e.g., Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 
2005), and jury decision-making (e.g., Goodwin, 1978; Snortum, Klein, & Sherman, 1976) for 
example. Researchers used higher confederate to participant ratios to exert strong influence on 
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individuals to investigate conditions that contribute to the creation of false memories and false 
confessions (e.g., Herdon et al., 2014; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Russano et al., 2005). Likewise, 
they used lower ratios to exert weak influence to investigate the influence of a divergent minority 
on group decisions and dynamics (e.g., Goodwin, 1978; Kaplan & Atkins, 1982; Snortum et al., 
1976).  
Herndon, Myers, Mitchell, Kehn, and Henry (2014) used a 3:1 ratio to exert strong 
influence on research participants. In groups of four (three confederates and one participant) 
confederates falsely claimed to remember experiencing a painful and traumatic medical 
procedure in early childhood to investigate group influence on the individual memory of the 
participant. Of the participants exposed to group influence, 41% succumbed to the strong social 
influence and reported false memories of experiencing the medical procedure. Strong social 
influence effects are also found even when confederate to participant ratios are lower, 1:1 as seen 
in false confession research. Kassin and Kiechel (1996) used a 1:1 ratio to investigate whether 
participants will falsely confess to crashing a computer by hitting the ALT key when a 
confederate falsely claimed to witness the action. Faced with false evidence of guilt provided by 
the confederate, 69% of participants signed false confessions. Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & 
Kassin (2005) used confederates in a 1:1 ratio to incite participants to cheat in an experimental 
paradigm investigating true and false confessions. The confederate and participant were asked to 
solve a problem individually and in teams on indicated problems. When the researcher left the 
room, the confederate asked the participant for help on one of the individual problems. Though 
helping on the individual problems was a prohibited behavior and was considered cheating, an 
overwhelming 94% of the participants complied with the request for help.   
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Research on jury decision-making and group dynamics have used smaller confederate to 
participant ratios (thus exerting weak social influence) to examine the impact of persuasive, 
assertive, and aggressive jurors on group verdict decisions. Kaplan and Atkins (1982), 
investigated jury groups of 9-12 mock jurors. Half of the mock juries were composed of two 
biased confederates and 7 to 10 participants and the other half had no confederates. During 
deliberation, the confederates tried to persuade the other mock jurors to vote guilty. The 
persuasion was effective such that 56% of the participants in the mock juries with two 
confederates were in favor of a guilty verdict. In contrast, only 29% of participants in the control 
condition (i.e., jury groups that had no confederates) were in favor of a guilty verdict.  These 
results show that even weak influence exerted in groups with a 2:7-10 confederate to participant 
ratio can persuade mock jurors to align their verdicts with a vocal minority.   
Other research shows that a minority of one can also be persuasive. Snortum, Klein, and 
Sherman (1976) investigated the influence of a single assertive juror in 6- and 12-person juries 
(i.e., 1:5 vs. 1:11 confederate to participant ratio). One assertive confederate trained to argue 
forcefully for a guilty verdict during deliberation of an ambiguous case was inserted in each 
mock jury group with either 5 or 11 participants. In both, the 6- and 12-person juries, participants 
exposed to the assertive juror were more likely to vote for guilty than mock juries without the 
confederate. However, it was in the smaller groups that the confederate exerted the greatest 
influence, a larger proportion of the mock jurors rendered a final verdict of guilty in the 6-person 
juries (72%) than in the 12-person juries (45%).   
Goodwin (1978) also used a 1:5 confederate to participant ratio to probe the influence of 
a single jury member by using an aggressive instead of a merely assertive juror (confederate). A 
confederate posing as a biased juror was trained to advocate for a guilty verdict in either an 
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aggressive or non-aggressive manner during mock jury deliberations. The biased confederate 
was most persuasive when acting aggressively. The mock jury voted guilty 75% of the time 
when the confederate acted aggressively but only 25% of the time when non-aggressive.  These 
results demonstrate that, in addition to the confederate to participant ratio, the manner in which 
the confederate behaves also influences the voting behavior of other jury members. Taken 
together the results of research using confederates show that even a minority of one confederate 
can exert influence on other individuals to respond or behave in specific ways.   
Social influence and conformity in jury deliberation. Jurors are subject to two specific 
types of social influences during deliberation. More precisely, jurors can face normative 
pressures to conform to the judgements of the majority, and informational influences to accept or 
believe information and arguments from others as truthful evidence about reality (MacCoun, 
1989; Tanford & Cox, 1988; Tanford & Penrod, 1986). When normative and informational 
influences are exacted on jurors, their verdict decisions can be swayed in favor of or against the 
defendant (MacCoun, 1989; Tanford & Cox, 1988; Tanford & Penrod, 1986). This is potentially 
detrimental to the administration of justice (i.e., resulting in a wrongfully convicting an innocent 
or acquitting a guilty defendant) if the information purported by the majority or their opinions 
are prejudiced or biased (Kaplan & Atkins, 1982; Snortum et al, 1976; Tanford & Cox, 1988).  
Jury decision-making research shows that pressure to conform to the group can be 
stronger than judicial instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence (Kaplan & Atkins, 1982; 
Tanford & Cox, 1988). Tanford and Cox (1988) conducted two civil mock jury trials in which 
the authors tested the influence of impeachment evidence (prior convictions and character 
evidence) on juror decisions as well as the effects of deliberation. Jurors were either exposed to 
impeachment evidence consisting prior conviction and character evidence or not. Those exposed 
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to the impeachment evidence and in the instruction condition were directed to only use the 
evidence to assess the defendant’s credibility but not to assign blame or determine liability. 
However, in both studies, regardless of instruction condition, mock jurors given knowledge of 
the defendant’s prior conviction and evidence of dishonesty rated the defendant as less credible 
and more likely to have a propensity for negligence. Though jurors correctly used the 
impeachment evidence to assess the defendant’s character they also appeared to be unlawfully 
prejudiced by it, thus only partially complying with the judicial instructions. Additionally, the 
researchers found majority persuasion effects such that the majority of mock jurors’ individual 
pre-deliberation and final verdict decisions matched. Furthermore, Tanford and Cox (1988) 
found that deliberation increased individual bias. Post-deliberation ratings of the defendant 
revealed that jurors made prejudicial propensity and character inferences after deliberation, 
indicating increased individual bias. These results demonstrate that although individual bias 
against the defendant increased deliberation, the influence of the majority proved to be stronger 
than individual biases.  
In contrast, other research shows that sometimes a dissenting minority can sway the 
majority during deliberations. In some instances, normative and informational influences of the 
dissenting minority that occur during deliberation can reduce the influence of inadmissible 
evidence thus reduce bias but does not necessarily nullify majority persuasion effects (London & 
Nunez, 2000). In two mock jury trial experiments, participants read case summaries that either 
included incriminating information about the defendant (or no such information) which the judge 
ruled as either admissible, inadmissible. Next, jurors indicated pre-deliberation verdict 
preferences followed by jury deliberation and verdict decisions.  
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 In both experiments, London and Nunez (2000) found that jurors who received the 
inadmissible instruction demonstrated less bias rendering fewer guilty verdicts (28% and 23%, 
respectively) than those in the admissible condition (100% and 98%) but more than those who 
were not exposed to the incriminating information (17% in both experiments). Furthermore, 
deliberation and an inadmissible instruction seemed to reduce initial bias. Guilty verdicts went 
from 60% and 55% at pre-deliberation to 28% and 23% at post-deliberation verdict. In contrast, 
the guilty verdicts (i.e., bias) of those in the admissible condition increased slightly going from 
96% to 100% in experiment 1 and 94% to 96% in experiment 2. Ultimately, in the inadmissible 
conditions of both experiments jury opinions changed from a majority of jurors favoring a guilty 
verdict at initial individual vote to a majority favoring a not-guilty verdict after deliberation.  
On the surface these results seem to conflict with the literature that demonstrates majority 
persuasion effects (e.g., Devine et al, 2001; MacCoun, 1989; Tanford & Cox, 1988; Tanford & 
Penrod, 1986), in that a majority of mock jurors favored a guilty verdict at pre-deliberation vote 
and a not-guilty verdict after deliberation. However, in both experiments, the actual pre-verdict 
guilty percentages provide support for majority persuasion effects. Jury decision-making 
research repeatedly reveals that a two-thirds majority (66.66%) is necessary for conformity 
pressures to predict final verdicts (Devine et al., 2001; Tanford & Penrod, 1986). The two-thirds 
(66.66%) threshold which was not achieved in either of London and Nunez’s (2000) experiments 
(60% and 55% respectively). These results support the findings of Asch’s conformity studies 
(1955, 1956) and jury decision-making research (Devine et al, 2001; Tanford & Penrod, 1986), 
that the more dissenters in a group, the more likely those who disagree will resist the pressure to 
conform. In juries, this often results in a split or hung jury and/or they vote to acquit.  
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Social influence and compliance. As the literature demonstrates, social influence can 
affect jury level decisions through conformity (e.g., Kaplan & Atkins, 1982; London & Nunez, 
2000; Snortum et al, 1976; Tanford & Cox, 1988; Tanford & Penrod, 1986) but at the individual 
level, social influence is likely to manifest in the form of compliance (Cialdini & Griskevicius, 
2010). Where conformity is influence of a group on an individual, compliance is the influence of 
individuals on an individual (Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010). Therefore, though jurors (or mock 
jurors) are often faced with pressures to conform to the group majority during deliberations, they 
are also faced with pressures to comply with the requests of influential individuals throughout 
the entirety of the trial. Six principles influence individual compliance resulting in changes of 
behavior, judgements and decisions (Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010), three of which are most 
likely to affect jurors’ decisions to comply with judicial instructions; authority, liking, and social 
validation.  
Judicial instructions are likely to exert pressure on jurors to comply through the principle 
of authority which is to obey or comply with the directives of an authority figure. When the 
judge is present and salient in the courtroom the likelihood of juror compliance with instructions 
is likely increased. However, when the judge is not present, such as during court breaks or 
deliberation, the absence of a salient authority might increase the probability of jurors 
succumbing to competing sources of influence (such as, personal prejudice and biases, extra-
legal information, or other individuals) resulting in failure to comply with judicial instructions. 
This is reflected in research that shows that jurors often do not comply with judicial instructions 
to disregard inadmissible information (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). It is 
possible that when jurors disregard judicial instructions they are persuaded by other influential 
jurors who themselves are biased, prejudiced or otherwise influenced by competing sources of 
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influence. These influential others may be the foreperson (i.e., a perceived authority), other 
people/jurors whom the juror likes (i.e., liking), or deems as similar to him or herself (i.e., social 
validation; Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010).  
Compliance has often been examined in relation to obedience of authority (Burger, 2009; 
Dambrun & Vatine, 2010; Milgram, 1963, 1965; Richardson & Kelly, 2002), interrogative 
suggestibility and false confessions (Gudjonsson, 1989; 1991). Milgram (1963, 1965) conducted 
foundational research on obedience to authority in a series of studies. In Milgram’s (1963; 1965) 
classic studies he told participants the experiment was about teaching and learning. Then 
participants were assigned to be the teacher and a confederate (who was pretending to be another 
participant) was assigned to be the learner and were sent into separate rooms. The participant 
(i.e., teacher) asked the confederate (i.e., learner) a question over an intercom and administered 
shocks when the learner gave the wrong answer, though the learner did not really receive any 
shocks. When the participants shocked the confederate, a recording of the learner’s responses 
was played over the intercom to make the participants think the responses were genuine. 
Participants were instructed to increase the intensity of the shocks with each incorrect answer. As 
the shocks increased in intensity the learner expressed extreme pain, protested against receiving 
the shocks and demanded to be released from the experiment claiming he had a heart condition. 
Near the top of the shock intensity the learner finally went silent. An experimenter was in the 
room with the teacher insisting the participant continue the shocks no matter how the learner 
responded. Across all the studies, an average of 65% of participants complied with the 
experimenter’s requests to administer shocks to the top intensity despite visible anguish 
displayed by the participants at continuing the shocks.   
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These striking results reveal the strength of authority on individual obedience. These 
results are not localized to Milgram’s well-known experiments, but have been replicated in 
experiments (e.g., Burger 2009; Dambrun & Vatine, 2010). Evidence of obedience to authority is 
also found in real life with such events such as the Holocaust during World War II Germany 
which inspired Milgram’s experiments (1963; 1965). Another example from history are the 
events that took place at Abu Ghraib prison during the second Iraq War. United States soldiers 
committed horrific, inhumane acts of torture and mistreatment of prisoners at the bequest of 
higher ranking officers. Research on obedience to authority in relation to the legal system, has 
primarily revolved around interrogation and false confessions of crime suspects instead of jury 
decision-making. It is likely that the reason for this is because jury decision-making involves 
group dynamics which is more likely to be influenced by normative social influence and 
conformity, than compliance or obedience which are influences exerted by individuals. However, 
a group of researchers have recently proposed that obedience to authority may play a role in 
jurors’ compliance with judicial instructions.  
The Juror Internet Research Scale. The Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS; Knutson, 
Green, & Durham, 2016) was developed with the idea that jurors vary in their level of obligation 
to obey the law and this level of compliance with authority can predict who will violate judicial 
instructions that prohibit internet research. The scale was found to be negatively correlated with 
measures of obedience to authority and self-control; specifically, those who scored high on the 
JIRS were low in obedience to authority and self-control. Though the predictive ability of the 
JIRS has not yet been tested with a true experiment, from a theoretical standpoint, it is likely that 
it would be predictive of who will use the internet for information gathering during a trial 
because of its inverse relationship with obedience to authority.  
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The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale. The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; 
Gudjonsson, 1989) is a measure of compliance with authority that captures a concept more 
similar to Milgram’s construct of obedience to authority than to Asch’s conformity to group 
pressure. It has been tested on a variety of individuals including; university undergraduates, 
nursing students, university staff, criminal suspects, convicted criminals who made incriminating 
confessions and those who did not. The GCS was found to correlate strongly with social 
conformity, interrogative suggestibility, and social desirably.  
Subsequent research indicates that the GCS reliably predicts who will obey authority in 
false confession research (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1991, Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1990). In a case 
study, Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1990) interviewed a 17-year-old young man who falsely 
confessed to the rape and murder of two elderly women. About a year after the young man’s 
acquittal the authors administered the GCS to him. They young man’s parents also completed the 
GCS about him. According to the young man’s self-report and the report of his parents he was 
high in compliance. Gudjonsson (1991) provides further support that the GCS accurately 
measures obedience to authority in interrogations. The GCS was administered to two groups of 
individuals charged with crimes who either claimed they falsely confessed or persistently denied 
any involvement. Those who claimed to have falsely confessed had significantly higher 
compliance scores on the GCS than those who vehemently denied any involvement in the crime.  
In addition, the GCS has also been shown to reliably correlate with compliant behavior of 
incarcerated adolescents. Richardson and Kelly, (2004) administered the GCS to a group of 
adolescent males who had a history of criminal and delinquent behavior and resided in a facility 
for children with difficult behaviors. The social workers who worked with the children observed 
and recorded the participants’ behaviors and interactions daily. A strong positive correlation was 
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found. Specifically, those who scored higher on the GCS demonstrated more compliant behavior 
and obedience to authority. The research suggests that GCS is a good indicator of those most 
likely to demonstrate compliant behavior. As such it is possible that jurors who are more 
compliant will be more likely to follow judicial instructions prohibiting social media 
communication and internet research.  
The Current Study: Improving and Testing Instruction Efficacy 
 It is not surprising that the legal system is experiencing increased internet-based juror 
misconduct considering the growing prevalence of technology and the internet in individuals’ 
lives as well as their propensity to go online almost habitually. Although dealing with the biasing 
influences of the media (e.g., television, movies, and news reports) is not new for U.S. courts, 
internet-based misconduct is potentially more detrimental due to its interactivity and personal 
nature (Zimmerman, 2013). Since individuals’ use of social media and the Internet continues to 
increase (Mander, 2015, 2016) and people are likely unaware that they are biased by internet-
based misconduct (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), it is imperative that jury instructions prohibiting 
such behavior are the most effective possible. However, the efficacy of such instructions is in 
question. As discussed above, laboratory research repeatedly shows that jurors often disregard 
judicial instructions (Devine, 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000), though extant empirical studies 
have not specifically addressed prohibition of IBJM. In contrast, field research that specifically 
prohibits IBJM (St. Eve et al., 2012; 2014) indicates that jurors do comply with prohibitive 
instructions. The conflicting results of laboratory and field research illuminates the need to 
expand upon the existing judicial instruction literature, specifically investigating the efficacy of 
instructions aimed at reducing IBJM.   
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Objectives and Hypotheses. The primary goal of the current study is to empirically test 
the efficacy of prohibitive instructions admonishing IBJM, (i.e., social media communication 
and internet research) and if efficacy can be increased. A secondary goal is to investigate the 
predictive ability of the Juror Internet Research Scale (JIR; Knutson et al., 2016) to identify 
those who do not comply with prohibitive instructions. Further validation of the JIRS was 
provided by comparing its results with those of the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; 
Gudjonsson, 1989). The GCS measures the degree to which people obey authority and 
instructions, thus should identify jurors who are likely to comply with prohibitive instructions to 
refrain from IBJM and should negatively correlate with the JIRS. The combination of using more 
effective judicial instructions and JIRS may help reduce instances of IBJM. There are two 
primary objectives of this project. 
Objective 1: Empirically test the efficacy of prohibitive instructions intended to reduce 
online communication and research.  To validate the efficacy of jury instructions that prohibit 
social media communication and internet research (i.e., internet-based juror misconduct; IBJM), 
comparisons were made among jurors in three instruction conditions, (control vs. weak vs. 
strong). The field and empirical research conflict about the efficacy of limiting instructions. 
Limited field research supports the prediction that instructed jurors will comply with instructions 
prohibiting IBJM (i.e., prohibitive instructions; Dunn, 2011; St. Eve et al., 2012, 2014). 
Although laboratory research fails to support a prediction that prohibitive instructions will 
moderate juror misconduct (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000); it does show that 
jurors will comply when given specific reasons for the instruction (Diamond & Casper, 1992; 
Fein et al., 1997; Kassin & Sommers, 1997). This supports a prediction that jurors are 
significantly more likely to comply with prohibitive instructions in which empirically supported 
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reasoning for the admonishment of IBJM has been added (i.e., strong instruction), than one with 
only the admonishment of IBJM but no empirically supported reasoning (i.e., weak instruction) 
or instructions with no admonishment of IBJM (i.e., control instructions). As such, it is 
reasonable to make the following predictions: 
Hypothesis 1a: There will be fewer self-reports of social media communication and 
internet research about the case (i.e., internet-based juror misconduct; IBJM) among jurors who 
receive the strong prohibitive instructions than those who receive weak or control instructions.  
Hypothesis 1b: There will be fewer self-reports of IBJM among jurors who receive the 
weak prohibitive instructions than those who receive control instructions.  
Hypothesis 1c: There will be fewer admissions of IBJM during deliberation among jurors 
who receive the strong prohibitive instructions than those who receive weak or control 
instructions.  
Hypothesis 1d: There will be fewer admissions of IBJM during deliberation among jurors 
who receive the weak prohibitive instructions than those who receive control instructions.  
Hypothesis 1e: Jurors who receive the strong prohibitive instructions will demonstrate 
less outside knowledge about the case, i.e. knowledge that could only be obtained by engaging in 
IBJM than those who received weak or control instructions. 
Hypothesis 1f: Jurors who receive the weak prohibitive instructions will demonstrate less 
outside knowledge about the case, i.e. knowledge that could only be obtained by engaging in 
IBJM than those who received control instructions. 
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Objective 2: Investigate whether the Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS; Knutson et 
al., 2016) predicts those who will not comply with prohibitive instructions that admonish 
internet-based misconduct, i.e., online communication and research. To validate the predictive 
ability of the JIRS (Knutson et al., 2016) the scores on the JIRS were compared to the dependent 
measures of social media communication and internet research. Higher scores on the JIRS 
indicate that participants are more likely to engage in internet-based juror misconduct thus 
violating prohibitive instructions. The JIRS scores were also compared to scores on the 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989) for additional support by assessing 
compliant behavior which is predicted to be negatively related to the JIRS. 
Hypothesis 2a: Scores on the JIRS will positively correlate with self-reports of engaging 
in IBJM. 
Hypothesis 2b: Scores on the JIRS will positively correlate with the Case Knowledge 
Questionnaire that measures outside knowledge about the case, i.e. knowledge that could only be 
obtained by engaging in IBJM. 
Hypothesis 2c: Scores on the JIRS will positively correlate with the admissions of IBJM 
made during deliberation. 
Hypothesis 2d: The JIRS and GCS will be negatively related such that jurors with high 
scores on the JIRS will have low scores on the GCS.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
 A common methodology used in the jury instruction literature manipulates extra-legal 
information such as pretrial publicity or the introduction of inadmissible evidence such that some 
participants receive the extra-legal information, and some do not. Then, participants read or 
watch a trial summary that has been pretested to be neutral, i.e., eliciting equal amounts of guilty 
and not guilty verdicts. The current experiment utilized a similar methodology. However, this 
experiment did not manipulate mock jurors’ exposure to extra-legal information. Instead this 
experiment sought to create a realistic temptation for mock jurors to engage in internet-based 
misconduct (IBJM; i.e., seek extra-legal information though communicating on social media and 
conducting internet research) that is commensurate with the allure faced by jurors in real trials. 
Instead of manipulating exposure to extra-legal information, the current experiment manipulated 
jury instructions to determine if changing the wording would improve the likelihood of mock 
juror compliance. Because of the lack of control over mock juror’s exposure to extra-legal 
information, verdict decisions are not a reliable measure of exposure to the information so other 
dependent measures were used in the current experiment and are detailed below.  
Participants 
 For the current study an a priori power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1.9 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) determined that at least 156 mock jurors (52 per condition) 
were needed to detect a small to medium sized effect. A total of 216 (Mage = 19.43, SD = 2.45; 
61.57% female) undergraduate psychology students at the University of North Dakota who 
 
 
39 
 
received class credit for their participation were recruited as participants for the current study. 
Data from eight of the participants was excluded from the analysis due to not being United States 
citizens and therefore not eligible to serve jury duty.  
The final sample for analyses was comprised of 208 jury-eligible participants (Mage = 
19.45, SD = 2.48; 62.50% female; see Table 1 for full demographic information). Eighty-one 
mock juries were comprised of 1-6 participants plus one confederate (MJurySizeAll = 3.69, SD = 
1.64). After removing non-US citizen and the confederates from the mock jury groups 80 mock 
juries remained (MJurySize = 2.59, SD = 1.60; see Table 2 for jury size descriptive statistics). Each 
mock jury was randomly assigned to one of three instruction conditions, (control vs. weak 
instruction vs. strong instruction). The current experiment did not make jury-level comparisons 
because the role of confederates during deliberation could impact jury-level verdicts. However, 
to increase external validity and realism, participants engaged in a two-stage mock jury trial, in 
the laboratory, that included deliberation and rendering of jury-level verdict decisions.  
Table 1 
 
Participant Demographics 
 
Variable Mean/Frequency (SD/%) 
Age (18-46) 
 
19.45 (2.48) 
Gender (% women) 
 
130 (62.5%) 
Strength of Religious Beliefs (1-7)    4.28 (1.86) 
Political Orientation (1-7)    3.85 (1.47) 
Served on a Jury? (% Yes) 
 
   5 (2.40%) 
Been a Victim of a Crime? (% Yes)   19 (9.10%) 
Witnessed a Crime? (% Yes)   37 (17.80%) 
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Table 2 
 
Jury Size Descriptive Statistics 
 
Jury Size Frequency (%) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
26 (32.50%) 
19 (23.75%) 
11 (13.75%) 
13 (16.25%) 
5 (6.2%) 
6 (7.4%) 
Note – Jury size frequencies are reported for mock jurors only. Confederates and non-US 
citizens have been removed.  
 
Trial Stimulus  
 Extant research has not examined the influence of limiting instructions on IBJM so there 
are no previously tested trial stimuli. In addition, the current study attempted to present mock 
jurors with a realistic temptation and opportunity to seek additional information and 
communicate about the case on social media or engage IBJM. Therefore, the trial stimuli for 
current experiment required the use of a notorious real-life trial that has information which is 
easily found online. The case of Georgia v. Harris was used.  
In September of 2014, Justin Ross Harris was charged with the malicious murder 
(premeditated) of his 2-year old son and other crimes against female minors from whom he 
solicited sexual relationships. On June 18, 2014, Harris left his son strapped in a car seat in the 
family vehicle for about eight hours in 92-degree weather. Harris’s son died of hyperthermia and 
dehydration from being left in a hot car on one of the hottest days of the summer. The 
prosecution claimed that Harris planned and executed the murder of his son to get out of his 
unhappy marriage and the responsibilities of family life so that he could pursue sexual 
relationships with other women and underage girls. The defense claimed that the death was just a 
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mistake made due to automated responses and memory errors. According to the defense, Harris 
simply forgot to drop his son off at day care and did not realize the boy was still in the car seat 
when Harris arrived at work, thus leaving the 2-year old in the car. In November of 2017, Harris 
was convicted on all counts and the case is now under appeal. This case received an abundance 
of local media attention. Georgia v. Harris received so much local media coverage that the trial 
had to be relocated to another county. Yet, the case got minimal national attention suggesting 
that Georgia v. Harris has an ideal balance of easily accessible online information without being 
so well-known that participants outside of Georgia would have knowledge of the case. 
Videos of the 23-day Georgia v. Harris trial were transcribed, edited and pilot tested in a 
similar manner employed by Kramer and colleagues (1990). Kramer et al. (1990) created a 
neutral trial stimulus video that elicited nearly equal numbers of guilty vs. not guilty verdicts. In 
the current experiment however, the trial stimulus is summarized in written transcript form 
because it is not feasible to produce a suitable video from the actual trial videos due to; 1) length 
of the trial (23 days), and 2) the fact that the instructions will be manipulated. The final trial 
transcript included jury instructions (based on randomized condition), attorneys’ and judge’s 
opening statements, a summary of witnesses’ testimony and case facts, edited and shortened 
testimony and cross-examination of one key witness for the prosecution (the lead detective) and 
the defense (memory expert witness) and the attorneys’ closing statements (see Appendix B for 
the trial transcript).  
The transcripts were narrated by a Text To Speech (TTS) software called Balabolka 
(http://www.cross-plus-a.com/balabolka.htm). Balabolka allows the text to be read by 
various male and female voices at varying speed (-10 to 10) and pitch (-10 to 10). The trial 
transcripts were narrated using the male voice of Paul (VW Paul [English (United States)]) at a 
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speed of two (2) and pitch of zero (0). This voice, speed and pitch was used because it produced 
the most natural sounding voice of those available according to three independent raters. Each 
rater listened to the first five pages of the transcript narrated by each of the free voices (David, 
Mary, Michael, Michelle, Mike, Paul, and Zira) at a speed and pitch of zero (0) and ranked them 
from most to least natural sounding. All raters chose Paul as the most natural sounding voice. 
Next, the raters listened to the first five pages of the transcript narrated by Paul in pitches ranging 
from -3 to 3 and ranked them from most to least natural sounding. All raters ranked the middle 
pitch of zero (0) as the most natural sounding pitch of Paul’s voice. Last, the raters listened to the 
first five pages of the transcript narrated by Paul with a pitch of zero (0) at speeds ranging from -
3 to 3 and ranked them from most to least natural sounding. All raters ranked the speed of two 
(0) as the most natural sounding speed of Paul’s voice. 
The narrated transcript for Part 1 of the trial without the instruction condition added was 
41.5 minutes long. When the instructions were added the narrated Part 1 transcripts range in 
length according to the instruction condition, (control = 44.92 minutes, weak = 44.28 minutes, 
and strong = 46.5 minutes). The narrated transcript for Part 2 of the trial without the instruction 
condition added was 16.57 minutes long. When the instructions were added the narrated Part 2 
transcripts range in length according to the instruction condition, (control = 19.57 minutes, weak 
= 19.52 minutes, and strong = 20.28 minutes).  
Pilot Testing Trial Transcript. To ensure the neutrality and balance of the trial 
transcript, a sample of (136) participants (Mage = 37.36, SD = 13.51, 27.2% female) were 
recruited and compensated one dollar ($1.00) through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to pilot test 
the trial transcript. The data from 101 individuals was removed because it was either incomplete 
(n = 61), participants failed the attention check question (n = 39) or took an excessive amount of 
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time to complete (n = 1) leaving a final sample of 35 participants (Mage = 40, SD = 15.69, 54.3% 
female).   
First, the participants read the trial transcripts without the judicial instructions. Then they 
completed the following verdict preference questions: “Please indicate your verdict in the present 
case against the defendant for the charge of malice murder.” (-1 = Not Guilty, 1 = Guilty); 
“Using the scale below, how confident are you in your verdict?” (1 = Not at all confident, 7 = 
Completely confident); and “Using the scale below, how guilty do you believe the defendant is?” 
(1 = Not at all guilty, 7 = Completely guilty). Then participants answered the following questions 
about the strength of the case: “Using the scale below, how strong was the prosecution’s case?” 
(1 = Very Weak, 7 = Very Strong); and “Using the scale below, how strong was the defense’s 
case?” (1 = Very Weak, 7 = Very Strong). Next, the participants completed the Case Knowledge 
Questionnaire to ensure that specific case information was successfully omitted from the 
transcript. Last, participants completed a basic demographic questionnaire that asked their age, 
gender, citizenship status, ethnicity, strength of religious beliefs, political orientation, if they ever 
served on a jury, if they have ever been a victim of a crime, and if they have ever witnessed a 
crime. 
 This procedure was repeated twice until a trial transcript was produced that was 
sufficiently neutral and balanced such that participants would not be able to clearly determine if 
the defendant is guilty or not. It was expected that when combined with the motivation incentive 
in the cover story (detailed below), mock jurors’ temptation to commit internet-based 
misconduct might more-realistically approximate that of real jurors’. Neutrality and balance of 
the final transcript was determined by analyzing participants’ verdict preferences, confidence in 
their verdict, and measure of likelihood of guilt. Furthermore, participants’ verdict preferences 
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and confidence in their verdicts were combined to create a verdict score to more accurately 
gauge participants’ true verdict decisions. Verdict scores were created by dummy coding 
participants’ verdict preferences (1 = guilty, -1 = not guilty) and multiplying that number by their 
level of confidence in their verdicts. For instance, a guilty verdict (1) and a confidence score of 4 
would produce a verdict score of 4; and a not guilty verdict preference (-1) and confidence score 
of 6 would produce a verdict score of -6, and so on.  
The final transcript elicited an acceptable level of guilty (60%) and not guilty (40%) 
verdicts. Single-sample t-tests were used to analyze the continuous item scores against their mid-
points. Participants seemed to be confident in their verdict decisions as indicated by their 
confidence scores (M = 5.26, SD = 1.50) which significantly differed from the midpoint of four 
(4), t(34) = 4.95, p < .001. However, once combined with verdict preferences participant verdict 
scores (M = 1.54, SD = 5.32) did not significantly differ from the midpoint of zero (0), t(34) = 
1.71, p = .095. Furthermore, analysis of the likelihood of guilt item provides more evidence that 
participants were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt. Participants’ likelihood of guilt scores 
(M = 4.66, SD = 2.04) did not significantly differ from the midpoint of four (4), t(34) = 1.90, p = 
.07. Thus, indicating that though the transcript elicited a higher percentage of guilty verdicts, 
overall participants were not exactly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.  
The final transcript also achieved a balance between the strength of the cases presented 
by the prosecution and defense. Participants indicated that they believed the prosecution’s case 
was strong with the mean score (M = 4.86, SD = 1.70) barely above but significantly different 
from the midpoint of four (4), t(34) = 2.98, p < .005. In contrast, participants rated the defense’s 
case as neutral with the mean score (M = 3.91, SD = 1.56) falling just below, but not 
significantly different from the midpoint of four (4), t(34) = -.33, p = .747. Although a perfect 
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balance was not achieved, a paired samples t-test revealed that the prosecution’s case (M = 4.86, 
SD = 1.70) and defense’s case (M = 3.91, SD = 1.56) do not significantly differ from each other, 
t(34) = 1.94, p = .06. Thus, indicating that the goal of a balance between the strength of the cases 
was achieved. 
Realistic Temptation & Motivation 
 The proposed study involved a mock jury trial rather than a real one, therefore the level 
of temptation to communicate on social media or conduct internet research was likely to be 
lower for mock jurors than real jurors. In addition, the consequences of one’s decisions during a 
real trial are much higher than during a mock jury trial because individuals’ lives are impacted 
by jurors’ verdict decisions which could potentially reduce mock jurors’ motivation to render a 
just or accurate verdict in comparison to real jurors. These issues were addressed in two ways. 
First, to create a realistic temptation and opportunity to engage in IBJM, the study used an actual 
criminal trial. The criteria for the stimuli trial was one that received heavy media attention 
locally or statewide, that had plentiful information available online but was not nationally 
publicized. As mentioned, and detailed above, the case chosen for the current study was Georgia 
vs. Harris.  
To create a realistic temptation the researcher conducting the research session informed 
mock jurors that the trial and verdict was controversial and gained considerable local media 
attention and was a trending topic on local social media networks. Mock jurors were then asked 
if they had any knowledge about the trial, those who did were dismissed. No mock jurors 
admitted to having any knowledge of the Harris trial or the verdict reached so none were 
dismissed. To provide mock jurors a realistic opportunity to engage in IBJM, the current study 
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was conducted in two stages with 18- to 73-hours between presentation of the trial stimuli in the 
first stage and deliberation of the mock juries in the second stage.  
Second, to increase the motivation to come to a just verdict and thus the temptation to go 
online, the mock jurors were given a cover story and offered an incentive for arriving at a 
“correct” verdict (i.e., a verdict that matches the real one; see Appendix C for the cover story). 
Motivation literature shows that performance is enhanced when people have both a goal and 
monetary incentive if the goal (e.g., a “correct” verdict) is at least moderately difficult to achieve 
and when the monetary incentive is a combination of a piece/base rate and a bonus (Bonner & 
Sprinkle, 2002; Campbell, 1984; Mowen, Middlemist, & Luther, 1981). The mock jurors were 
informed that if their jury verdict matches that of the original jury they would be entered into a 
drawing to win one of several gift cards in addition to receiving the standard class credit. 
However, all participants that complete the study were entered into the drawing regardless of 
their verdict. 
Independent Variable  
Instruction conditions and manipulation. Mock juries were randomly assigned to one 
of three instruction conditions (control instructions vs. weak instructions vs. strong instructions; 
see Table 3 for instruction condition descriptive statistics). Instructions in all conditions (control 
vs. weak vs. strong) were administered as recommended by the CACM (Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management); at the beginning of the trial, at the end of the day (part 
1), at the beginning of the day (part 2), and at the close of the trial before deliberations (part 2).  
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Instruction Conditions 
 
Variable N Frequency (%) 
Participants 
Control Instructions 
Female (%) 
Weak Instructions 
Female (%) 
Strong Instructions 
Female (%) 
208  
67 (32.21%) 
47 (70.15%) 
62 (29.81%) 
38 (61.29%) 
79 (37.98%) 
45 (56.96%) 
 
Juries 
Control Instructions 
Weak Instructions  
Strong Instructions 
 
 
80 
 
 
27 (33.75%) 
24 (30.0%) 
29 (36.25%) 
 
 CACM Model Instructions. Jury instructions vary from courtroom to courtroom 
because judges can write and use his or her own or pattern instructions. This study will use the 
model social media instructions created by the Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management (CACM) that were used by St. Eve and colleagues (2012, 2014) as a base of 
reference to create and compare the instruction conditions. The CACM model jury instructions 
have two sections. The first section is a pre-trial instruction, given to the jury before the trial 
begins and whenever court breaks for lunch or goes home at the end of the day. The second 
section is a post-trial instruction given after closing arguments, before deliberation. Each section 
of the CACM model jury instructions were evaluated for grade level readability with an online 
calculator (http://www.readabilityformulas.com/free-readability-formula-tests.php, n.d.) that 
determines the grade level of the text according to the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability 
Test (Flesch, 1979). The Flesch-Kincaid Readability Test uses a formula to determine a score of 
the minimal grade level that is required for people to read and understand the text in question. 
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The pre-trial instructions were determined to be at a 12th grade reading level (17-18 years of 
age). The post-trial instructions were determined to be at a college reading level (21-22 years of 
age). Both sections of the CACM model jury instructions were edited to create pre-trial and post-
trial instructions for each condition (control instruction vs. weak instruction vs. strong 
instruction).  
 Control Instruction Condition. In the control instruction condition juries received a 
version of the CACM model instructions in which the specific prohibition of IBJM and reasons 
for the admonishment were removed. The control instructions were carefully edited with the 
objective of being as similar as possible to the CACM model instructions in length and 
readability with the only differences being the removal and replacement of the IBJM 
admonishment. Therefore, the control instructions prohibit traditional juror misconduct such as 
independent research, consultation of media or reference materials, and communicating with any 
other people except other jurors during deliberation. In addition, the control instructions do not 
give reasons for the admonishment of traditional juror misconduct (see Appendix D for control 
instructions). 
 The pre-trial and post-trial sections of the control instructions were evaluated for grade 
level readability using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability Test (Flesch, 1979) described 
above. Readability of the control instructions was assessed to ensure that they are at the same 
grade level as the amended CACM instructions used in the weak instruction condition described 
below. This helps to ensure that any differences in IBJM between the control and weak 
conditions are due to the prohibitive instruction and not differences in readability. Differences in 
readability could affect jurors’ comprehension and application of the instructions (Baguley et al., 
2017). The pre-trial control instructions were determined to be at the same 12th grade reading 
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level (17-18 years of age) as the CACM model instructions and weak instructions. The post-trial 
control instructions were determined to be at the same college reading level (21-22 years of age) 
as the CACM model instructions and weak instructions. 
Weak Instruction Condition. In the weak instruction condition juries received an 
updated version of the CACM model instructions utilized by St. Eve and colleagues (2012, 
2014). The CACM model instructions refer to outdated technology and websites that are no 
longer used or popular (i.e., Blackberries and Myspace) so have been removed and replaced with 
technologies and websites that are more current and popular (i.e., smart phones, iPhones, and 
Facebook). Therefore, in addition to containing traditional admonishment against traditional 
juror misconduct, the weak instructions specifically prohibit IBJM described as: the use of 
electronic tools and devices to engage in internet-based research and communication; 
consultation of internet-based media or reference materials; and communicating on social media 
about the case. Furthermore, the weak instructions give specific examples of prohibited 
technology and means of communication (e.g., the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, 
tablet, computer, the Internet, any Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any 
Internet chat room, blog, or website) as well as prohibited social media websites (e.g., Facebook, 
Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube). Lastly, the weak instructions include two brief 
reasons for the admonishment of IBJM in the post-trial instruction given just before jury 
deliberates; 1) that the information might be wrong, incomplete, or inaccurate, and 2) that the 
information would not be known to other jurors or parties in the case, and thus could unfairly and 
adversely impact the judicial process (e.g. due-process, fair treatment; see Appendix E for weak 
instructions). 
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 After editing pre-trial and post-trial sections of the weak instructions they were evaluated 
for grade level readability using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability Test (Flesch, 1979) 
described above. The pre-trial weak instructions were determined to be at the same 12th grade 
reading level (17-18 years of age) as the CACM model instructions and control instructions. The 
post-trial weak instructions were determined to be at the same college reading level (21-22 years 
of age) as the CACM model instructions and control instructions. 
Strong Instruction Condition. In the strong instruction condition the juries received 
amended and updated CACM instructions that prohibit IBJM with simplified language and legal 
concepts, as well as specific examples of prohibited technology and activities. The amended and 
updated strong instruction also give empirically supported reasons for the instruction including 
the potential consequences of violating the admonishment. Research shows that the easier 
instructions are for jurors to understand the more likely it is that they will comply (Baguley et al., 
2017). Therefore, the language and legal concepts in the CACM model instructions were 
simplified for the strong instruction condition. Legal terms were replaced with common words or 
explained for the jurors in non-legal language. Also, more examples of prohibited activities, 
technologies, devices and websites were added as recommended by research and legal scholars 
alike (Baguley et al., 2017; Posner, 2016). 
The CACM model instructions include two brief and limited reasons for prohibiting 
IBJM, 1) that the information might be wrong, incomplete, or inaccurate, and 2) that the 
information would not be known to other jurors or parties in the case so could unfairly and 
adversely impact the judicial process. These reasons are only in the post-trial instruction given 
right before deliberation, not every time the instructions are given (e.g., before the trial and when 
the jury goes home for the day). Therefore, empirically supported reasoning was added to the 
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strong instructions given at the beginning of the trial, at the end of part 1 of the experiment - 
before jurors break for 24-48 hours (i.e., after witness testimony), and at the close of a case (i.e., 
before jurors deliberate). Empirically supported reasons are defined herein as reasons for the 
admonishment that empirical research (Fein et al., 1997; Kassin & Sommers, 1997) indicates are 
likely to increase the likelihood of juror compliance. These empirically based reasons include 
informing jurors that information obtained online might be unreliable, false, incomplete or biased 
(Kassin & Sommers, 1997), and there might be ulterior motives behind its publication such as a 
desire to bias public opinion (Fein et al., 1997).   
In addition, legal scholars (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Hoffmeister, 2012; Simpler, 
2012), recommend informing jurors of potential consequences of IBJM. Therefore, the strong 
instructions also inform jurors that if they violate the instructions; 1) it could lead to a mistrial 
which would require a new trial; 2) a mistrial would be expensive to the parties, the court, and 
taxpayers; and 3) the juror could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as 
fines, jail time, and paying the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be 
declared (see Appendix F for strong instructions). 
 To ensure that the objectives of creating strong instructions that are less complex and 
easier for jurors to read, understand, and follow as recommended by research (Baguley et al., 
2017) were achieved the pre-trial and post-trial sections were evaluated for grade level 
readability using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability Test (Flesch, 1979) described 
above. Less complex instructions should result in lower readability scores meaning that they 
should be easier for jurors to read, comprehend, and apply. Therefore, the strong instructions 
were edited to be less complex and have lower readability levels than the control instructions and 
weak instructions. The lower the minimal grade level of the instructions means the information is 
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easier for people to read and understand. The pre-trial strong instructions were determined to be 
at an 11th grade reading level (15-17 years of age), one grade level lower than the other 
instructions (CACM model instructions, control instructions, and weak instructions), indicating 
that they are easier to read and understand. The post-trial control instructions were determined to 
be at a 12th grade reading level (17-18 years of age), two grade levels lower than the other 
instructions (CACM model instructions, control instructions, and weak instructions), also 
indicating that they are easier to read and understand. 
 Instruction content validity. To ensure the content validity (i.e., accurate 
operationalization) of the control, weak, and strong instructions, a sample of 173 participants 
(Mage = 33.32, SD = 12.34, 32.4% female) were recruited and compensated one dollar ($1.00) 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to categorize each set (pre- and post-trial instructions) into 
one of the three operational definitions. Forty-nine incomplete responses were removed from the 
data. The responses from 64 participants were removed for failing the attention check question. 
The data from another 29 participants was removed for completing the survey too quickly (15 
minutes or less) thus indicating that they did not take ample time to thoroughly read and classify 
the instructions. The final sample consisted of 31 participants (Mage = 35, SD = 12.736, 54.8% 
female) who took between 15.06 minutes and 52.1 minutes (Mminutes = 26.31, SD = 9.59) to 
complete the survey. 
  First, participants read each set of instructions (control, weak, and strong) and then were 
instructed to choose one of three operational definitions that best matches the instruction set. 
More participants (35.5%) correctly classified the control instructions to the correct operational 
definition than to the weak instruction operational definition (25.8%) and the strong instruction 
operational definition (19.4%). Furthermore, 19.4% claimed there was no operational definition 
 
 
53 
 
that matched. When classifying the weak instructions the majority of the participants (58.1%) 
correctly classified the weak instructions to the correct operational definition. Sixteen percent 
(16.1%) incorrectly classified the weak instructions to the control instruction operational 
definition, 25.8% to the Strong instruction operational definition, and no participants (0%) said 
the operational definition was not there. The majority of the participants (54.8%) also correctly 
classified the strong instructions to the correct operational definition. Only 9.7% of the 
participants incorrectly classified the strong instructions to the control instructions operational 
definition, 29% to the weak instructions operational definition, and 6.5% said there was no 
operational definition that matched.  
 Typically, content validity is completed by a panel of experts in the field who judge how 
well or if item content matches operational definitions of the construct using formalized 
processes and criteria (Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 1995). However, researchers and legal 
scholars agree that part of the problem with jury instructions and why jurors do not follow them 
is that they are written by legal experts who use technical legal terms that people outside of the 
legal realm have difficulty understanding and applying (Baguley, et al., 2017; Posner, 2016; 
Morrison, 2011). Because the current study aimed to make instructions easier for lay people, 
(i.e., non-experts) to understand and follow, a sample from the general population was used and 
the judging process was simplified (matching instructions to operational definitions). The content 
validity of the instruction for each condition was determined to be acceptable if the correct 
operational definition was chosen by more participants than the other definitions, and if that 
percentage was 10% above chance (25%). Each instruction condition had four answer options 
with a 25% chance of being chosen by each participant so the minimum percentage criterion for 
acceptable content validity was 35%. All instructions (control, weak, and strong) met the 
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classification criteria having been correctly classified by 35% or more of the participants and the 
correct operational definition chosen more than other answer options (see Appendix G for jury 
instruction pilot test materials).  
Predictor Variables 
 Propensity to conduct internet research. In a prescreen survey administered online 
through Sona Systems before the experiment, participants completed the Juror Internet Research 
Scale (JIRS; Knutson, et al. 2016), a self-report measure of individuals’ tendency to violate 
judicial instructions prohibiting internet research (α = .95). The 10 items of the JIRS are 
measured using a 6-point scale of agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) that are 
added together to form an overall composite score ranging from 10 – 60. Higher scores indicate 
higher likelihood of engaging in online research, i.e., violating prohibitive instructions (see 
Appendix H for JIRS items and Table 4 for JIRS descriptive statistics).  
 Compliant behavior. During the same prescreen survey, participants also completed the 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989) that identifies compliant individuals 
who are more likely to obey authority (α = .71). The scale consists of 20 true/false statements, 
with 17 items coded such that “True” answers indicate a compliance response and three (3) are 
reverse scored such that “False” answers indicate a compliance response. Compliant responses 
are given a score of one (1) then added together to form an overall composite score ranging from 
0-20, with higher scores indicating higher likelihood of compliant behavior (see Appendix I for 
GCS items and Table 4 for GCS descriptive statistics).  
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Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for JIRS and GCS 
 
Variable N Mean (SD) 
JIRS (10-60) 
Control Instructions 
Weak Instructions 
Strong Instructions 
155 
48 
60 
47 
35.86 (9.77) 
36.44 (8.61) 
35.31 (10.17) 
35.98 (10.49) 
 
GCS (0-20) 
Control Instructions 
Weak Instructions  
Strong Instructions 
 
161 
48 
60 
47 
 
 10.01 (3.54) 
10.38 (3.56) 
10.28 (3.64) 
  9.36 (3.49) 
 
Dependent Variables 
Internet-based juror misconduct: Confederate reports. Admitting to violations of the 
judge’s instructions is likely to be socially undesirable therefore mock jurors may under report 
their own misconduct on self-report measures. To overcome socially desirable responding each 
mock jury included one trained confederate who, during deliberation in Part 2, admitted to 
engaging in the prohibited activities. Three male confederates were extensively trained to 
casually engage mock jurors in conversation that centered on the topic of going online to conduct 
research and/or communicate about the case, admit to searching online for additional information 
including the real verdict, and then evaluate and report mock jurors’ responses. More precisely, 
the confederates were trained to get other mock jurors to admit they went online and/or 
demonstrate knowledge or details about the case that were not presented in the trial transcript, by 
first admitting he (the confederate) went online and allowing the mock jurors to respond. If mock 
jurors did not confess the confederates would then ask the group if anyone else went online to try 
to elicit a conversation in which details of the case were discussed. After the deliberation 
participants completed questionnaire packets in which the confederate reported which mock 
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jurors, if any, admitted to going online (coded as “1”), or demonstrated knowledge (guilty 
knowledge) about the case (coded as “2”) that could have only been known if they engaged in 
internet-based juror misconduct. Confederate reports of mock jurors’ deliberation behavior were 
coded as “0” if there was no evidence (admissions or guilty knowledge) of IBJM. An overall 
measure of confederate reports of IBJM was created (IBJM-CR) in which all mock jurors who 
were reported to have conducted IBJM through either admissions or guilty knowledge were 
dummy coded as “1” and mock jurors who were not were coded as “0” (see Table 5 for IBJM-
CR descriptive statistics).  
Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for IBJM-CR 
 
Variable n Frequency (%) 
IBJM-CR 
None 
Admissions 
Guilty Knowledge 
208  
195 (93.80%) 
    6 (2.90%) 
    7 (3.40%) 
 
IBJM-CR events by condition  
Control (% of reported IBJM) 
Weak (% of reported IBJM) 
Strong (% of reported IBJM) 
 
13 
 
  13 (0.06%) 
6 (46.15%) 
6 (46.15%) 
1 (7.00%) 
 
A ratio of one confederate admission in a group of 4-6 participants was set as a goal ratio 
because social influence research indicates that a ratio (1:4-6) should change the group dynamic 
making it more socially acceptable for participants to confess to engaging in IBJM (Tanford & 
Penrod, 1994). This ratio of confederates to participants was predicted to create a sufficient level 
of social influence to create an atmosphere in which it is more socially acceptable for 
participants to admit to engaging in IBJM without being too influential as to induce false 
admissions. The goal ratio was not always achieved (MParticpants-per-Jury = 2.63, SD = 1.577; MConf-
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to-MockJurorRatio = 1:2.63) with 32.1% (n = 26) of the mock juries containing one confederate and 
only one participant (1:1); 23.5% (n = 19) containing one confederate and two participants (1:2); 
and 14.8% (n = 12) containing one confederate and three participants (1:3). The goal ratio of one 
confederate to 4-6 mock jurors was achieved in 29.6% (n = 24) of the mock juries. In 
anticipation of smaller than desired mock juries, confederates were trained to be sensitive to 
eliciting false confessions when the jury groups were smaller. Therefore, the confederates were 
trained to be less assertive when mock juries had fewer than four participants, engaging in 
discussion of the case details and mentioning they went online but not directly asking the other 
mock jurors for confessions if they did not offer one. 
 Internet-based juror misconduct: Case knowledge questionnaire. After completing 
deliberations mock jurors completed a Case Knowledge Questionnaire (CKQ) that they were told 
is a test of their memory for facts about the case. Research indicates that individuals often 
confuse the source of their memories, making source monitoring errors in which they mistakenly 
attribute information they remember to the wrong source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Lindsey, 1994; Ruva, McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007). In addition, Ruva et al., (2007) found 
that mock jurors confuse the sources of information presented in pretrial publicity as evidence 
present in court subsequently using it in verdict decisions. As such it is probable that participants 
who seek information about the case online will confuse the source of their memory, failing to 
remember whether they saw it in the trial transcript or online. Memory research shows that 
memory for facts and events deteriorate over time so the chances of mock jurors committing 
source monitoring errors were also increased by the 17- to 73-hour delay between part 1 and part 
2 of this experiment (Ebbinghaus, 1885; Murre & Dros, 2015; Schacter. 1999). Therefore, to 
determine whether participants complied with prohibitive instructions admonishing social media 
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communication and internet research the Case Knowledge Questionnaire included questions 
about the case that were excluded from the trial summary, thus mock jurors could only know this 
information if they engaged in IBJM.   
 The Case Knowledge Questionnaire (CKQ) consisted of 20 True/False items, 10 target 
items and 10 memory items. To create the items for the CKQ, eight (8) volunteers were recruited 
through Facebook and conducted 20 searches of the case using four popular Internet search 
engines, Google Chrome, Yahoo, Firefox, and Bing/Microsoft Edge. The volunteers searched the 
terms, “Georgia v. Justin Ross Harris”, “Justin Ross Harris verdict”, “Justin Ross Harris”, and 
“Cooper Harris” and reported the information found in the sources on the first page of the search 
results. The 10 target items for the CKQ were created from the information found in at least 70% 
of the searches (range: 70% - 100%). The 10 memory items were created using information that 
is in the trial testimony and was found in at least 65% of the internet searches (range: 65% - 
100]. Then, the trial transcript summary was edited to ensure that it contained the case facts from 
the 10 memory items but none of the information from the 10 target items (see Appendix J for 
CKQ items).  
 The 10 target items of the CKQ (CKQ-IBJM; 1 – 10) were scored as follows, “True” 
responses were given a score of one (1) and “False” responses were scored zero (0). Then the 
scores were added together to form an overall composite score that will range from 0-10.  The 
information in the  10 target items has been left out of the trial summary stimulus so more ‘True’ 
answers resulted in a higher overall score thus indicating that the individual likely obtained 
information online (i.e., more “True” answers the higher the score and the more likely the 
individual engaged in IBJM).  
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 The 10 memory items of the CKQ (CKQ-Memory; 11 – 20) were also scored such that 
“True” responses were given a score of one (1) and “False” responses were scored zero (0). Then 
the scores were added to form an overall composite score of memory for the case information 
that ranged from 0-10. The information in the 10 distractor items were facts taken from the final 
trial transcript summary so more ‘True’ answers resulted in a higher overall score and higher 
scores indicated better memory for the facts of the case (see Table 6 for CKQ-IBJM and CKQ-
Memory descriptive statistics). 
Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for CKQ-IBJM and CKQ-Memory 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
CKQ-IBJM (0-10) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
193 
61 
54 
78 
2.12 (1.45) 
2.03 (1.39) 
2.09 (1.36) 
2.21 (1.56) 
 
CKQ-Memory (0-10) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
 
202 
65 
59 
78 
 
9.36 (0.85) 
9.42 (0.77) 
9.59 (0.65) 
9.13 (1.00) 
 
CKQ pilot test. The CKQ was pilot tested with the trial transcript summary to establish a 
base for memory errors and to test reliability of the 10 target items. A sample of (136) 
participants Mage = 37.36, SD = 13.51, 27.2% female) were recruited and compensated one dollar 
($1.00) through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The data from 101 individuals was removed 
because it was either incomplete (61), the participant failed the attention check question (39) or 
took an excessive amount of time to complete (1) leaving a final sample of 35 participants (Mage 
= 40, SD = 15.69, 54.3% female).   First, participants read the trial transcript summary, then they 
recorded their verdicts on the trial verdict form and then they completed the CKQ.  
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Scores on the CKQ target items ranged from 0 to 9 (M = 3.71, SD = 2.88). The 10 target 
items were highly reliable, α = .80. It is presumed that participants did not have time to conduct 
internet research about the case during the pilot test. Therefore, participants should not have had 
knowledge of the 10 target items and should have marked them as “False”. The mean score of 
CKQ target items could be indicative of memory errors. This supposition seems to be supported 
by the fact that the mean score of the distractor items of the CKQ (M = 8.71, SD = 1.637) is not 
10 which would indicate perfect memory for the case. The 10 memory items scores ranged from 
5 to 10 and were moderately reliable, α = .641. When considering the means of the CKQ 
memory item mean of 8.71 and the mode of 10 (n = 17, 48.6%) it appears that overall, 
participants seemed to have a fairly good memory for the facts of the case.  
Another possible reason for the CKQ target items mean of 3.713 instead of zero, could be 
that some participants failed to take the time to thoroughly read and understand the transcript. 
Correlation analysis of the CKQ target item scores and the time taken to complete the survey 
reveal a small to medium negative relationship (though not significant), r = -.225, p = .195. This 
pattern is repeated in the results of a correlation analysis of the CKQ memory items and time 
taken to complete the survey that reveal a small positive relationship (though not significant), r = 
.156, p = .370. These patterns indicate that the longer participants’ took to read and complete the 
survey the lower they scored on the CKQ target items and the higher they scored on the 
distractor items, thus were more accurate in their knowledge about the case. The final transcripts 
were narrated and presented to the participants of the current study such that all took the same 
amount of time to listen to (and read) parts 1 and 2 of the trial transcript, which was longer 
(Mminutes = 58.07) than the average time of the pilot test participants (Mminutes = 46.52). Therefore, 
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is likely that participants of the current study are may have more complete and accurate 
knowledge of the Harris case than the pilot test participants. 
Internet-based juror misconduct: Self-reports. After completing the Case Knowledge 
Questionnaire participants completed the Internet-based Juror Misconduct Questionnaire 
(IBJMQ), a self-report measure of social media communication and internet research. The 
IBJMQ was developed by expanding upon the items used by St. Eve et al. (2012, 2013) that 
asked jurors; 1) “Were you tempted to communicate about the case through any social networks, 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube?”, and 2) “If so, 
what prevented you from doing so?”. These items were amended to better capture the constructs 
of interest; social media communication, general internet-based research, internet-based legal 
research and general communication (discussing the case with others). Two items were created 
for each of the four constructs of interest for a total of 8 items asking about participants’ social 
media communication (items 1 and 2), general internet-based research (items 3 and 4), internet-
based legal research (items 5 and 6) and general communication (discussing the case with others; 
items 7 and 8) about the case (see Appendix K for IBJMQ items).  
The first question was amended from a dichotomous response option that asks about 
being tempted to communicate on social media to a continuous response measured using a 7-
point scale (1 = Not at all tempted, 7 = Very tempted) that asks “How tempted were you to 
communicate about the case through any social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, 
Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube?”  
The second question asks participants outright if they engaged in the prohibited behavior, 
“Did you communicate about the case through any social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube?”, measured with a dichotomous “Yes” or 
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“No” response with follow up questions. The follow up questions ask, “If yes, why?”; and “If no, 
what prevented you from doing so?”, measured with four forced choice (and one open ended 
choice, “other”) answer options that were reported by St. Eve et al., (2012; 2014) as the most 
common reasons participants stated for adhering the judicial instructions: “I did not want to 
violate the Judge’s instructions.”; 2) “I did not want to take the time.”; 3) “I did not want to be 
biased.”; and 4) “It would not be right or legal.”.  
IBJMQ variables: Internet-based and traditional juror misconduct temptation.  
Internet-based juror misconduct temptation (IBJM-tempt). The answers to the continuous 
items asking about participants’ level of temptation to communicate on social media (item 1), 
conduct general internet-based research (item 3), and internet-based legal research (item 5) were 
averaged together to form a variable (IBJM-tempt) measuring participants’ overall temptation to 
engage in internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM) on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all tempted, 7 = 
Very tempted).  
Traditional juror misconduct temptation. The continuous item asking about participants 
level of temptation to engage in general communication (discussing the case with others; item 7) 
was interpreted as a measure of participants’ overall temptation to engage in traditional juror 
misconduct (TJM-tempt) on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all tempted, 7 = Very tempted).  
Juror misconduct temptation (JM-tempt). A continuous variable of participants’ overall 
temptation to engage in juror misconduct (JM-tempt) was created from self-reports of levels of 
temptation to engage in internet-based (IBJM-tempt, items 1, 3, and 5) and traditional 
misconduct (TJM-tempt, item 7) on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all tempted, 7 = Very tempted; see 
Table 7 for IBJM-tempt, TJM-tempt, and JM-tempt descriptive statistics).  
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Table 7 
 
Descriptive Statistics for IBJMQ-Temptation Variables 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
IBJMQ-1 (1-7) – Temptation to 
communicate on Social Media  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
2.21 (1.67) 
 
2.60 (1.90) 
2.13 (1.54) 
1.94 (1.51) 
IBJMQ-3 (1-7) – Temptation to conduct 
Internet research  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
3.25 (2.00) 
 
3.81 (1.95) 
2.85 (1.92) 
3.08 (2.02) 
 
IBJMQ-5 (1-7) – Temptation to conduct 
Internet research  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
2.04 (1.50) 
 
2.24 (1.72) 
1.73 (1.10) 
2.03 (1.53) 
 
IBJM-tempt (1-7) – Temptation to 
engage in IBJM  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
2.50 (1.44) 
 
2.92 (1.54) 
2.24 (1.29) 
2.35 (1.41) 
 
IBJMQ-7 / TJM-tempt (1-7) Temptation 
to communicate about the case (engage 
in TJM) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
 
67 
62 
79 
2.66 (1.94) 
 
 
2.75 (2.04) 
2.35 (1.56) 
2.84 (2.10) 
 
JM-tempt (1-7) – Temptation to engage 
in JM  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
2.55 (1.44) 
 
2.87 (1.51) 
2.27 (1.28) 
2.47 (1.47) 
 
 IBJMQ variables: Internet-based and traditional juror misconduct self-reports.  
Internet-based juror misconduct self-reports (IBJM-SR). The answers to the dichotomous 
items asking about social media communication (item 2), general internet-based research (item 
 
 
64 
 
4), and internet-based legal research (item 6) were scored such that “Yes” answers were dummy 
coded as one (1) and “No” answers as zero (0) and summed to form a composite variable of self-
reported internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM-SR) potentially ranging from 0 to 3. However, 
no participants self-reported more than one type of IBJM so this variable (IBJM-SR) was 
analyzed as a dichotomous variable. The IBJM-SR variable was dummy coded such that self-
reports of IBJM (“Yes” answers) were coded as one (1) and “No” answers as zero (0) (see Table 
4 of IBJM-SR descriptive statistics).  
Internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM): Combined confederate and self-reports.  A 
dichotomous composite variable of overall internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM) was created 
from confederate reports and self-reports of going online to communicate or research the case 
(IBJM-CR and IBJM-SR). Internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM) was determined to have 
occurred and was coded as a one (1) if participants answered “Yes” to self-reports and/or if 
confederate reports indicated that the participant admitted to the misconduct or demonstrated 
knowledge about the case. Responses were coded as zero (0) if there were no self-reports or 
confederate reports of IBJM (see Table 4 for IBJM descriptive statics). 
Traditional juror misconduct (TJM). The dichotomous item asking about general 
communication (discussing the case with others; item 8) was also dummy coded such that “Yes” 
answers were coded as one (1) and “No” answers as zero (0) and was interpreted as a measure of 
traditional juror misconduct (TJM; see Table 4 for TJM descriptive statistics).  
 Juror misconduct (JM). A dichotomous composite variable of overall juror misconduct 
(JM) was created from confederate reports and self-reports of internet-based (IBJM) and 
traditional misconduct (TJM). Internet-based juror misconduct was determined to have occurred 
and was coded as a one (1) if participants answered “Yes” to self-reports and/or if confederate 
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reports indicated that the participant admitted to the misconduct or demonstrated knowledge 
about the case. Responses were coded as zero (0) if there were no self-reports or confederate 
reports of IBJM. Traditional juror misconduct (TJM) was determined to have occurred and was 
coded as one (1) if participants answered “Yes” to self-reports of communicating about the case. 
Responses were coded as zero (0) if there were no self-reports of communicating about the case. 
Juror misconduct (JM) was determined to have occurred and was coded as one (1) if participants 
engaged in either IBJM or the TJM and were coded as zero (0) if participants did not engage in 
IBJM or the TJM. All participants who engaged in JM only engaged in one type of JM, either 
IBJM or TJM, except for one participant who engaged both (see Table 8 for JM and all IBJMQ 
self-report variable descriptive statistics). 
Table 8 
 
Descriptive Statistics for IBJMQ Self-report Juror Misconduct Variables 
 
Variable n Frequency Yes (% Yes) 
IBJMQ-2  – Social Media 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
0 (0.00%) 
  0 (0.00%) 
  0 (0.00%) 
  0 (0.00%) 
 
IBJMQ-4 –Internet research 
Control  
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
4 (1.92%) 
3 (4.48%) 
1 (1.61%) 
0 (0.00%) 
 
IBJMQ-6 – Legal research  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
2 (0.96%) 
1 (1.49%) 
0 (0.00%) 
1 (1.27%) 
 
IBJM-SR – Self-report of IBJM  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
6 (2.89%) 
4 (5.97%) 
1 (1.61%) 
1 (1.27%) 
 
IBJM – Engaged in IBJM 
Control 
208 
67 
15 (7.21%) 
7 (10.45%) 
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Weak 
Strong 
62 
79 
6 (9.68%) 
2 (2.53%) 
 
IBJMQ-8 (TJM) – Communication 
about the case 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
 
67 
62 
79 
9 (4.33%) 
 
4 (5.97%) 
1 (1.61%) 
4 (5.06%) 
 
JM – Engaged in JM a 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
23 (11.06%) 
10 (14.93%) 
7 (11.29%) 
6 (7.59%) 
a
 : One participant engaged in both IBJM and TJM in the control condition. 
 
Possible Covariates 
 Need for cognition. To further verify participants’ understanding of the trial transcript 
and judicial instructions a short form measure of need for cognition (NFC-SF; Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984) was added to the current study. The need for cognition (NFC) is defined as “an 
individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, p. 1). Cacioppo et al.’s (1996) review of need for cognition research 
shows that individuals high in NFC are more likely than those low in NFC to be able to focus 
attention solely on an on-going cognitive task; develop complex attributions; base their beliefs 
and judgements on empirical evidence and logic; and tend to search for and critically evaluate 
relevant information for use in making decisions and solving problems. Furthermore, those high 
in NFC are also able to recall more information, especially when the information is complex and 
relevant to the task (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  
 The Need for Cognition – Short Form (NFC; Cacioppo et al., 1996), consists of 18 
statements related to thinking and problem solving such as, “I would prefer complex to simple 
problems.”, and “I only think as hard as I have to.” The 18 items of the NFC-SF are measured 
using a 5-point scale of how characteristic each statement is of the individual (1 = Extremely 
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Uncharacteristic, 5 = Extremely Characteristic) and 9 of those items are reverse scored. The 
scores each item are added together to form an overall NFC score that ranges from 18 - 90. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of need for cognition (see Appendix L for NFC items). 
 Individual differences in these tendencies and the NFC are likely to influence 
participants’ engagement in the mock jury task and whether they exert enough cognitive effort to 
fully understand the transcripts and judicial instructions. More specifically, those who are high in 
NFC are more likely to pay closer attention to the trial transcript and judicial instructions by 
reading the text as well as listening to the narration. Thus, higher scores on the NFC-SF should 
indicate greater understanding of the transcripts and judicial instructions (see Table 9 for NFC 
descriptive statistics). 
Table 9 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Covariates: NFC 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
NFC (18-90) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
208 
67 
62 
79 
62.87 (9.26) 
62.01 (8.76) 
64.45 (9.40) 
62.35 (9.52) 
 
 
Daily social media and internet use. It is possible that the prevalence and content of 
social media, internet, and technology use could exert a biasing influence on jurors’ decision-
making by influencing one’s social constructs of reality. According to the Social Cognitive 
Theory of Mass Communication (SCTMC; Bandura, 2009) people construct their reality through 
what they perceive in their social realm. Media (and arguably social media and the internet) is an 
important component of one’s social realm. Furthermore, SCTMC states that the content of 
media viewing is more influential than the number of hours viewed, and people are more apt to 
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adopt new ideas from brief contacts with casual acquaintances than intensive contact with close 
associates. Research on media influences on jury verdicts indicates that more media exposure 
biases jurors against defendants with jurors issuing more guilty verdicts and being more punitive 
in sentencing even when the media is not related to the case (Greene, 1990). Although to date 
research has not looked at the influence of social and internet-based media on juror decisions, it 
is likely the same principles of influence apply. Whereas traditional media (TV, radio, 
newspapers, etc.) is one sided and often presents limited viewpoints it is possible that social and 
internet media may be even more biasing on jurors due to its interactive nature and the potential 
to expose the user to multiple people and viewpoints (Zimmerman, 2012).  
Because individuals’ social realm (via media exposure) can influence juror decision-
making, specifically verdict decisions, it is conceivable that exposure to media through social 
media communication or internet research might also influence other juror decisions such as 
whether or not to comply with prohibitive instructions. Research shows that increased exposure 
to biasing media results in more biased verdict decisions (Greene, 1990). As such, it could be the 
more individuals use tools of technology (e.g., smart phones, iPhones, tables, computers) to 
engage in internet-based research, obtain information and news online, or communicate with 
people electronically (e.g., email, text, social media), the more likely their construct of reality 
(SCTMC; Bandura, 2009) might differ. Thus, they might perceive such activities as normal, and 
therefore justified. In turn such altered perspectives could make it more likely for those 
individuals to violate prohibitive instructions.  
To account for the possibility that jurors’ decision to comply prohibitive instructions 
could be influenced by their use of social media, technology and the Internet, participants 
completed the Media and Technology Usage and Attitudes Scale (MTUAS; Rosen, Whaling, 
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Carrier, Cheever, & Rokkum, 2013) a 60-item measure of media and technology involvement 
(see Appendix M for MTUAS items).  
The MTUAS measures media and technology use with 44 items that create 11 subscales: 
smartphone usage (9 items), general social media usage (9 items), internet searching (4 items), e-
mailing (4 items), media sharing (4 items), text messaging (4 items), video gaming (3 items), 
online friendships (2 items), Facebook friendships (2 items), phone calling (2 items) and TV 
viewing (2 items). Items 1–40 are measured on a 10-point frequency scale for items (with 
scoring in parentheses): “Never (1), Once a month (2), Several times a month (3), Once a week 
(4), Several times a week (5), Once a day (6), Several times a day (7), Once an hour (8), Several 
times an hour (9), All the time (10)”. Answers on the items for each of these sub-scales are 
averaged together to create an average use score that ranges from 1-10 with higher numbers 
indicating more use of media and technology (see Table 10 for MTUAS media and technology 
use subscale descriptive statistics). 
Table 10 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Covariates: MTUAS Technology and Media Use Subscales 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
MTUAS Email Subscale (1-10)  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
207 
67 
62 
78 
6.07 (1.16) 
6.01 (1.02) 
6.16 (1.16) 
6.04 (1.27) 
 
MTUAS Phone Use Subscale (1-10)  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
207 
66 
62 
79 
5.60 (1.62) 
5.62 (1.61) 
5.56 (1.77) 
5.27 (1.52) 
 
MTUAS Texting Subscale (1-10)  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
207 
67 
62 
78 
7.93 (1.42) 
8.02 (1.43) 
7.78 (1.56) 
7.96 (1.28) 
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MTUAS Smartphone Use Subscale (1-10) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
203 
66 
62 
75 
6.56 (1.31) 
6.53 (1.51) 
6.40 (1.32) 
6.72 (1.11) 
 
MTUAS TV Viewing Subscale (1-10)  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
207 
67 
62 
78 
4.75 (2.18) 
4.53 (2.17) 
4.59 (2.19) 
5.08 (2.17) 
 
MTUAS Media Sharing Subscale (1-10)  
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
204 
66 
62 
76 
3.97 (1.63) 
3.63 (1.58) 
3.98 (1.64) 
4.24 (1.64) 
 
MTUAS Internet Searching Subscale (1-10) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
206 
67 
61 
78 
5.59 (1.84) 
5.32 (1.51) 
5.73 (2.00) 
5.71 (1.97) 
 
MTUAS Social Media Use Subscale (1-10) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
179 
59 
54 
66 
5.26 (1.34) 
5.24 (1.44) 
5.14 (1.41) 
5.37 (1.20) 
 
 
Items 41 – 44 are measured on a 9-point scale indicating number ranges of online and 
social media friends (with scoring in parentheses): “0 (1), 1–50 (2), 51–100 (3), 101–175 (4), 
176–250 (5), 251–375 (6), 376–500 (7), 501–750 (8), 751 or more (9)”. Answers on the items 
for each of these sub-scales are averaged together to create an average number range of online 
and social media friends that ranges from 1-9 with higher numbers indicating more online and 
social media friends (see Table 11 for MTUAS social media and online friends descriptive 
statistics). 
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Table 11 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Covariates: MTUAS Facebook and Online Friends Subscales 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
MTUAS Facebook Friends Subscale (1-9) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
201 
65 
58 
78 
6.16 (1.71) 
6.05 (1.70) 
6.25 (1.74) 
6.18 (1.71) 
 
MTUAS Online Friends Subscale (1-9) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
197 
63 
58 
76 
2.04 (1.03) 
2.14 (0.97) 
1.81 (0.89) 
2.14 (1.17) 
 
 
 
The MTUAS also measures individuals’ attitudes about media and technology with 16 
items that create four subscales: positive attitudes toward technology (6 items), anxiety about 
being without technology or dependence on technology (3 items), negative attitudes toward 
technology (3 items) and preference for task switching (4 items). Items 45-60 are measured on a 
5-point Likert scale for all items (with scoring in parentheses): “Strongly agree (5), Agree (4), 
Neither agree nor disagree (3), Disagree (2), Strongly disagree (1)”. Answers on the items for 
each of these sub-scales are averaged together to create an average attitude score that ranges 
from 1-5 with higher numbers indicating more agreement with the sub-scale (see Table 12 for 
MTUAS attitudes subscale descriptive statistics).  
The Video Gaming and Task Switching subscales of the MTUAS are not relevant to the 
current investigation so were not analyzed. All other subscales of the MTUAS were examined as 
potential covariates. 
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Table 12 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Covariates: MTUAS Attitudes Subscales 
 
Variable n Mean (SD) 
MTUAS Positive Attitude Subscale (1-5) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
184 
61 
55 
68 
3.79 (0.63) 
3.70 (0.65) 
3.89 (0.65)  
3.78 (0.60) 
 
MTUAS Anxiety/Dependence on Technology 
Subscale (1-5) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
183 
 
60 
55 
68 
2.98 (0.93) 
 
3.13 (0.88) 
2.94 (0.96) 
2.88 (0.95) 
 
MTUAS Negative Attitude Subscale (1-5) 
Control 
Weak 
Strong 
183 
60 
55 
68 
3.19 (0.90) 
3.12 (0.79) 
2.89 (0.95) 
3.50 (0.87) 
 
 
Procedure 
The current study was a two-part mock jury trial in which 208 participants (Mage = 19.45, 
SD = 2.482; 62.5% female) were grouped into 80 mock juries of 1-6, plus one confederate 
(MJurySize = 2.59, SD = 1.60, and randomly assigned to one of three instruction type conditions 
(control vs. weak vs. strong). Participants completed the JIRS and GCS during the departmental 
prescreen at least one week prior to participating in the mock jury trial. In part one, participants 
were initially asked if they had any knowledge of the Georgia v. Harris case or the verdict 
reached. No participants claimed to know about the Harris case. If any participants had admitted 
prior knowledge of the case, they would have been dismissed. After completing and signing 
informed consent and unique identification forms, participants received a cover story and bonus 
incentive (e.g., entry in a drawing to win one of ten $50 Amazon gift cards) intended to create a 
realistic temptation to engage in online communication and research about the case (Campbell, 
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1984; Mowen, Middlemist, & Luther, 1981). Next, participants listened to and read the narrated 
trial transcript of the Georgia v. Harris murder. The transcript began with opening instructions 
(per random assignment), followed by the prosecutor’s and defense’s opening statements and 
then the witness testimony. The session ended with the randomly assigned pre-trial instruction.  
In part two, after an 18- to 73-hour delay (Mhours = 44.43, SD = 9.98), the session began 
with randomly assigned judicial instruction, additional witness testimony followed by the 
prosecutor’s and defense’s closing arguments. The trial transcript ended with the randomly 
assigned final post-trial instruction (control vs. weak vs. strong). Once the trial transcript 
summary concluded, the juries were instructed that juror #1 was pre-selected to be the foreperson 
whose duties were to oversee deliberation. The foreperson was to conduct an initial vote of 
juror’s individual pre-deliberation verdict preferences. Then open the floor for deliberation. The 
juries were asked to deliberate for 20 minutes or until all jurors agreed they were ready for the 
final vote. Mock juries (n = 80) deliberated from 2 to 20 minutes (MDelib_Mins) = 8.78, SD = 4.92).  
The foreperson then conducted a second vote of juror’s verdict preferences and reported 
the group’s verdict (guilty, not guilty or hung) to the researcher conducting the experimental 
session. Each mock jury included one confederate who, during deliberation, admitted to 
engaging in the prohibited behavior and tried to elicit confessions from participants (Tanford & 
Penrod, 1984). Although jury verdicts were not compared across the three instruction conditions, 
rendering a group verdict was included in this experiment to realistically simulate a real trial 
scenario. Last, the participants completed a questionnaire packet that included the case 
knowledge questionnaire (CKQ), self-report of internet-based misconduct (IBJM-SR), MTUAS, 
NFC, and a post-trial questionnaire that collected demographic information (i.e., age, gender, 
ethnicity/race, strength of religious beliefs, political orientation, prior jury service, prior crime 
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victimization, prior crime witness, and comments). The confederates completed their report of 
internet-based juror misconduct on the last page of the post-trial questionnaire. Last, participants 
were fully debriefed about the true purpose of the study and the addition of a confederate in the 
mock jury groups. Then they were thanked for their participation and excused. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Preliminary analysis of the data was conducted prior to hypotheses testing to ensure the 
accuracy of the data, that the data met model assumptions, that the demographic variables did not 
have a meaningful impact on the dependent variables, and that the correlations among the 
covariates and the dependent variables were at acceptable levels. Preliminary analysis was 
conducted in accordance to recommended procedures outlined in Field (2013), and Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001). The statistical program Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS 
version 26) was used for all preliminary analyses. 
Data transfer and accuracy. First, participant responses were transferred from paper to 
electronic spreadsheet and triple checked for accuracy. Then, measure items were combined, and 
variables created as detailed above to create scores for analysis. Next, the data were screened for 
impossible values and response sets. Any impossible values were double checked against the 
paper measure and corrected.  
Missing values. The data was examined for missing values according to procedures 
outlined in Field (2013) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2001).  
Missing data due to technical/experimenter errors. The data from 47 participants 
(22.6%) was missing from Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS; Knutson, et al. 2016) and the 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989) because they did not complete the 
prescreen survey that included these items and therefore were excluded from analyses of these 
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scales using pairwise deletion. Data from another seven participants (3.37%) were missing from 
the MTUAS Social Media Use, MUTAS Facebook Friends, and MTUAS Online Friends 
subscales because they do not have social media accounts and therefore were excluded from 
analyses of these subscales using pairwise deletion. In addition, 17 responses (8.17%) to 
MTUAS item 36, and thus the MTUAS Social Media Use subscale, were missing due to an error 
on the paper questionnaire and were replaced with expectation maximization (EM) values 
derived using SPSS Missing Values Analysis (SPSS MVA). 
 Missing values analysis and treatment. SPSS Missing Value Analysis (SPSS MVA) 
was conducted on all variables. After accounting for data missing because of 
technical/experimenter errors, missing data were minimal. All variables were missing less than 
5% of the data except the CKQ-IBJM, n = 15, 7.20%. Little’s MCAR (1988) analysis of 
variables showed that data was missing completely at random (MCAR), 2 = 789.74, df = 818, p 
= .76. Any participant who completed at least one item on each of questionnaires was included 
and missing values were treated at item level. Missing data on continuous items of the JIRS and 
MTUAS questionnaires were replaced using expectation maximization (EM) method with SPSS 
MVA. Missing data on dichotomous items of the GCS and CKQ questionnaires were assumed to 
be the modal response, CKQ-IBJM, Mo = 0, CKQ-Memory, Mo = 1. Completely missing values 
(i.e., no items completed on the questionnaire) were excluded from analyses using pairwise 
deletion, including the items from the JIRS and GCS missing due to the incomplete prescreen 
data; JIRS, nmissing = 6; MTUAS Smartphone Use, nmissing = 1; MTUAS TV Viewing, nmissing = 1; 
MTUAS Media Sharing, nmissing = 1; MTUAS Internet Searching, nmissing = 1; MTUAS Positive 
Attitude, nmissing = 2; MTUAS Positive Attitudes, nmissing = 2; MTUAS Anxiety/Dependence, 
nmissing = 2; and MTUAS Negative Attitudes, nmissing = 2.  
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Outliers. All continuous variables were analyzed for univariate outliers using z-score 
statistics with a cut-off point of z = ± 3.29, histograms, and boxplots (Field, 2013; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). One dependent variable and four covariate (MTUAS) subscales had extreme 
outliers (i.e., z > ± 3.29), the CKQ-IBJM, noutliers = 1, 0.5%; MTUAS Emailing, noutliers = 3, 
1.44%; MTUAS Smartphone Use, noutliers = 1, 0.5%; MTUAS Social Media Use, noutliers = 1, 
0.5%; and MTUAS Positive Attitudes, noutliers = 1, 0.5%. Outliers were transformed using 
Winsorization (Field, 2013). 
Normality. Skewness and kurtosis. The distributions of all continuous predictor, 
dependent and potential covariate variables were screened for normality by assessing skewness 
and kurtosis statistics and visually analyzing histograms and probability plots. All variable 
skewness and kurtosis statistics were converted to z-scores for analysis and those with skewness 
or kurtosis z-scores over ± 2.58, p = .01 (n = 7) were considered significantly skewed (Field, 
2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). All non-normal variables were subjected to log 10, reciprocal 
and square root transformations to find the best fitting solution to bring the all skewed variables 
into normal range.  
 Three variables were negatively skewed thus underwent reverse score transformation 
before log 10, reciprocal and square root transformations to find the best fitting solution: the 
JIRS, Zskew = -3.95, Zkurtosis = 1.74; MTUAS Texting Subscales, Zskew = -3.12, Zkurtosis = -0.13; and 
MTUAS Social Media Use Subscale, Zskew = -5.76, Zkurtosis = 0.97. No solution resolved both 
skewness and kurtosis to normal levels but square root transformation provided the best solution 
to resolving skewness, thus providing the most normal distribution of the JIRS, Zskew = -1.10, 
Zkurtosis = 2.20 and MTUAS Texting subscale, Zskew = 0.21, Zkurtosis = -2.04 and the most improved 
distribution of the MTUAS Social Medial Use Subscale, Zskew = -2.74, Zkurtosis = 4.16.  
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Four variables were positively skewed thus underwent log 10, reciprocal and square root 
transformations to find the best fitting solution: CKQ-IBJM, Zskew = 3.44, Zkurtosis = 0.90; 
MTUAS Email, Zskew = 3.56, Zkurtosis = 4.14; MTUAS TV Viewing, Zskew = 2.63, Zkurtosis = 0.18; 
and MTUAS Online Friends, Zskew =10.14, Zkurtosis = 9.83. No solution resolved both skewness 
and kurtosis to normal levels on all variables but square root transformation provided the best 
solution to resolving skewness, thus providing the most normal distribution of the CKQ-IBJM, 
Zskew = -0.12, Zkurtosis = -1.08; MTUAS Email Subscales, Zskew = -1.10, Zkurtosis = 2.16; and 
MTUAS TV Viewing, Zskew = -1.40, Zkurtosis = 0.33.  Reciprocal transformation provided the best 
fitting solution, resolving both skewness and kurtosis and thus providing the most normal 
distribution of the MTUAS Online Friends, Zskew =1.99, Zkurtosis = -1.58. 
Linearity. Bivariate scatter plots were used to visually assess the linearity of all 
continuous variables as recommended by Field (2013) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). All 
scatter plots looked normal after transformation; hence linearity is assumed.  
Homogeneity of Variance. Homogeneity of variances of continuous predictor, dependent 
and potential covariate variables was assessed using Levene’s test. The variances of all variables 
(except one) were equal among conditions: FJIRS(2, 152) = .60, p = .550; FGCS(2, 158) = .31, p = 
.74; FCKQ-ibjm(2, 205) = .90, p = .74; FNFC(2. 205) = .49, p = .62; FMTUASemail(2, 205) = 1.22, p = 
.30; FMTUASphoneUse(2, 205) = .78, p = .46; FMTUAStexting(2, 205) = .96, p = .38; FMTUASsmartphone(2, 
204) = 1.94, p = .15; FMTUAStv(2, 204) = 0.09, p = .92; FMTUASmediasharing(2, 204) = .11, p = .90; 
FMTUASinternetseraching(2, 204) = 1.80, p = .17; FMTUASsocialmediause(2, 198) = .14, p = .87; FMTUAS-
FBfriends(2, 198) = .05, p = .95; FMTUASpositiveattitude(2, 203) = 1.52, p = .22; FMTUASanxiety/dependency(2, 
203) = .59, p = .55; FMTUASnegativeatitude(2, 203) = 1.26, p = .29.  
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Evidence of heterogeneity of variance was found for the MTUAS online friends subscale, 
FMTUASonlineFriends(2, 198) = 4.40, p = .012. Log 10, square root, and reciprocal transformations 
failed to correct the problem of heterogeneity of variance, hence the reciprocal transformed 
variable was used in analyses because it provided the best solution to the skewness of the 
variable. Due to the results of the Leven’s test any analyses involving this variable should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Demographic analyses. Chi-square and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were 
conducted to ensure that demographic characteristics were equivalent across all instruction 
conditions. Results indicated no significant differences across conditions based on age, F(2, 205) 
= .20, p = .82; gender, χ2(2) = 2.75, p = .25; strength of religious beliefs, F(2, 205) = 1.02, p = 
.36; political orientation, F(2, 205) = .30, p = .74; jury service, χ2(2) = 2.28, p = .32; or 
witnessing a crime, χ2(2) = .611, p = .74. There were significantly more participants in the weak 
instruction condition (n = 12) who reported being victim of a crime, than in the control (n = 3) or 
strong (n = 4) conditions χ2(2) = 11.13, p = .004,.  
Relationships between demographic characteristics and dependent variables were 
analyzed. Non-significant relationships were found between age and all DVs: FIBJM-SR(1, 206) = 
.15, p = .70; FIBJM-CRadmissions(1, 206) = .15, p = .70; FIBJM-CRguilty-knowledge(1, 206) = .03, p = .86; 
and FCKQ-IBJM(11, 196) = .71, p = .73. Non-significant relationships were found between gender 
and all DVs: χ2IBJM-SR(1) = 2.24, p = .13; χ2IBJM-CRadmissions(1) = .41, p = .52; χ2IBJM-CRguilty-
knowledge(1) = .25, p = .86, and FCKQ-IBJM(1, 206) = .01, p = .92. Non-significant relationships were 
found between strength of religious beliefs and all DVs: FIBJM-SR(1, 206) = 1.1, p = .30; FIBJM-
CRadmissions(1, 206) = .14, p = .71; FIBJM-CRguilty-knowledge(1, 206) = .04, p = .84; and FCKQ-IBJM(6, 
201) = .68, p = .67. Non-significant relationships were found between political orientation and 
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all DVs: FIBJM-SR(1, 206) = 1.30, p = .25; FIBJM-CRadmissions(1, 206) = .09, p = .76; FIBJM-CRguilty-
knowledge(1, 206) = .25, p = .61; and FCKQ-IBJM(6, 201) = .65, p = .69. Non-significant relationships 
were found between jury service and all DVs: χ2IBJM-SR(1) = .15, p = .70; χ2IBJM-CRadmissions(1) = 
.15, p = .70; χ2IBJM-CRguilty-knowledge(1) = .18, p = .67 and FCKQ-IBJM(1, 206) = 2.67, p = .10. Non-
significant relationships were found between reports of being a victim of a crime and all DVs: 
χ2IBJM-SR(1) = .62, p = .43; χ2IBJM-CRadmissions(1) = .42, p = .52; χ2IBJM-CRguilty-knowledge(1) = .23, p = 
.63 and FCKQ-IBJM(1, 206) = .07, p = .79. Non-significant relationships were found between 
reports of witnessing a crime and all DVs: χ2IBJM-SR(1) = 1.34, p = .25; χ2IBJM-CRadmissions(1) = 1.02, 
p = .31; χ2IBJM-CRguilty-knowledge(1) = 1.57, p = .21 and FCKQ-IBJM(1, 206) = 1.87, p = .17. 
Potential covariates. Correlation analyses of the continuous depended variable (CKQ-
IBJM Guilty Knowledge) and the potential covariates (NFC and MTUAS Subscales) were 
conducted to determine whether the covariates needed to be accounted for in the main analyses. 
Knowledge of case facts not provided in the transcript (CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge) 
and thus found only online significantly correlated with four of the MTUAS subscales. Three 
weak positive relationships were found between the CKQ-IBJM and the MTUAS Phone Use 
subscale, r(206) = .17, p = .02; the MTUAS Internet Searching subscale, r(206) = .14, p = .04; 
and the MTUAS Social Media Use subscale, r(206) = .18, p < .01. One weak negative 
relationship was found between the CKQ-IBJM and the MTUAS Smartphone Use subscale, 
r(206) = -.18, p = .01. All other correlations ranged from, r(206) = .02 to r(206)= .09, indicating 
that there are no relationships among CKQ-IBJM and the NFC or the remaining MTUAS 
subscales.  
Significant relationships of the CKQ-IBJM and the MTUAS subscales underwent further 
additional analyses to investigate if the subscales should be accounted for in the main analyses. 
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First, one-way ANOVAs were conducted with the instruction conditions as a factor and each of 
the potential covariates (MTUAS Phone Use, Internet Searching, Social Media Use, and 
Smartphone Use) as the outcome variable to determine independence potential covariate and 
instruction condition groups. Results indicate that all MTUAS subscales are independent of the 
instruction condition and should be accounted for in the main analysis of the CKQ-IBJM; 
MTUAS Phone Use, F(2, 205) = .03, p = .97; MTUAS Internet Searching, , F(2, 204) = 1.69, p 
= .34; MTUAS Social Media Use, , F(2, 198) = .09, p = .92; and MTUAS Smartphone Use, , 
F(2, 204) = .87, p = .42. 
Main Analyses 
 The main objectives of the proposed project were addressed with the analyses described 
below using the statistical program Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS 
version 26), Vassar Stats’ Fisher’s Exact 2x3 calculator (http://vassarstats.net/fisher2x3.html; 
Lowery, 2019a), and Vassar Stats’ 2x2 contingency table calculator 
(http://vassarstats.net/tab2x2.html; Lowery, 2019b). All hypotheses are directional and therefore 
one-tailed tests of significance were conducted and reported.  
Objective 1: Hypotheses 1a – 1f 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. To test hypotheses 1a and 1b of the first objective, Fisher’s exact 
2x3 test was used to assess the effect of the independent variable, instruction type (control vs. 
weak instructions vs. strong instructions) on the dichotomous dependent variable IBJM-SR. 
Although there were more self-reports of IBJM in the control instructions condition (n = 4) than 
the weak (n = 1), and strong (n = 1) conditions, results indicate that these differences were not 
significant, p = .14. 
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Hypotheses 1c and 1d. To test hypotheses 1c and 1d of the first objective, Fisher’s exact 
2x3 test was used to assess the effect of the independent variable, instruction type (control vs. 
weak instructions vs. strong instructions) on the dichotomous dependent variable IBJM-CR 
Admissions. Results indicate significant differences among confederate reports of IBJM in the 
control instructions condition (n = 5) compared to the weak (n = 1), and strong (n = 0) instruction 
conditions, p < .01 (see Figure 1). 
Post hoc analyses were conducted using Fisher’s exact 2x2 to identify which conditions 
significantly differ from each other. Hypothesis 1c predicts fewer instances of IBJM-CR 
admissions in the strong instruction condition than in the weak or control conditions. Although 
there were fewer confederate reports of admission of IBJM in the strong instruction condition (n 
= 0) than in the weak instruction condition (n = 1), results indicate that these differences were 
not significantly different, p = .44. There were, however, significantly fewer confederate reports 
of admission of IBJM in the strong instruction condition (n = 0) than in the control instruction 
condition (n = 5), p = .019 (see Figure 1). Hypothesis 1d predicts fewer instances of IBJM-CR 
admissions in the weak instruction condition than in the control condition. Although there were 
fewer confederate reports of admission of IBJM in the weak instruction condition (n = 1) than in 
the control instruction condition (n = 5), results indicate that these differences were not 
significantly different, p = .12. 
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Hypotheses 1e and 1f. To test hypotheses 1e and 1f of the first objective, analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were used to assess the effect of the 
instruction type (IV) on the continuous DV, CKQ-IBJM, a measure of guilty knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge of case facts not presented in the trial transcript) with the MTUAS subscale items 
determined as potential covariates (i.e., MTUAS phone use, internet searching, social media use 
and smart phone use). There were no significant differences of CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge 
among conditions, (Control, M = 1.69, SD = .4; Weak, M = 1.72, SD = .39; Strong, M = 1.74, SD 
= .44), both before adding covariates to the model, F(2, 205) = .19, p = .83, ηp2 = .002 ., and 
after, F(2, 193) = 1.69, p = .12, ηp2 = .05. 
Fisher’s exact 2x3 test was used to assess the effect of the independent variable, 
instruction type (control vs. weak instructions vs. strong instructions) on the dichotomous 
dependent variable IBJM-CR Guilty Knowledge (i.e., confederate reports of mock jurors 
knowledge of case facts left out of the trial transcripts so could only be known by going online). 
Results indicate that there are significant differences among confederate reports of guilty 
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knowledge of case facts (IBJM-CR knowledge) in the control instructions condition (n = 1) than 
the weak (n = 5), and strong (n = 1) instruction conditions, p < .04 (see Figure 2).  
Post hoc analyses were conducted using Fisher’s exact 2x2 to identify which conditions 
significantly differed from each other. Hypothesis 1e predicts fewer instances of IBJM-CR 
Guilty Knowledge in the strong instruction condition than in the weak or control conditions. 
There were fewer confederate reports of guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR knowledge) in the strong 
instruction condition (n = 1) than in the weak instruction condition (n = 5), results indicate that 
these differences approached significance, p = .058. There were an equal number of confederate 
reports of guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR knowledge) in the strong instruction condition (n = 1) 
and in the control instruction condition (n = 1), results indicate that these differences were not 
significantly different, p = .71. Hypothesis 1d predicts fewer instances of IBJM-CR guilty 
knowledge in the weak instruction condition than in the control condition. Although there were 
more confederate reports of guilty knowledge in the weak instruction condition (n = 5) compared 
to the control instruction condition (n = 1), results indicate that these differences were not 
significantly different, p = .09 (see Figure 2). 
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Objective 2: Hypotheses 2a – 2d. To test the hypotheses of the second objective, 
correlational analyses were used to assess the relationships among the Juror Internet Research 
Scale (JIRS), Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS), and each of the dependent variables: self-
report of misconduct (IBJM-SR), case knowledge questionnaire identifying guilty knowledge 
about the case (CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge), and admissions of internet-based juror 
misconduct during deliberation (IBJM-CR Admissions). The JIRS was negatively skewed and 
was reverse transformed prior to square root transformation therefore correlation coefficients for 
the JIRS are reported in the non-transformed direction for easier interpretation.  
Hypothesis 2a. To test hypotheses 2a of the first objective, a correlation analysis was 
conducted to investigate the relationship of the JIRS and self-reports of engaging in internet-
based juror misconduct (IBJM-SR). Results indicate that there was not a significant relationship 
between the JIRS and the IBJM-SR, r(153) = -.09, p = .13.  
Hypothesis 2b. To test hypotheses 2b of the first objective, a correlation analysis was 
conducted to investigate the relationship of the JIRS and outside knowledge about the case 
measured by CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge measure. Results indicate that there was not a 
significant relationship between the JIRS and the CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge, r(153)  = .06, p 
= .22.  
Hypothesis 2c. To test hypotheses 2c of the first objective, correlation analysis was 
conducted to investigate the relationship of the JIRS and confederate reports of admissions of 
engaging in internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM-CR Admissions). Results indicate that there 
is a significant weak negative relationship between the JIRS and IBJM-CR admissions, r(153)  = 
-.18, p = .01.  
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Hypothesis 2d. To test hypotheses 2d of the first objective, a correlation analysis was 
conducted to investigate the relationship of the JIRS and GCS. Results indicate that there was a 
significantly weak negative relationship between the JIRS and the GCS, r(153)  = -.17, p = .02.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted on variables for which no hypotheses were made. 
Exploratory analyses described below were conducted using the statistical program Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS version 26), Vassar Stats’ Fisher’s Exact 2x3 
calculator (http://vassarstats.net/fisher2x3.html; Lowery, 2019a), and Vassar Stats’ 2x2 
contingency table calculator (http://vassarstats.net/tab2x2.html; Lowery, 2019b). All Fisher’s 
exact tests are directional and therefore one-tailed tests of significance were conducted and 
reported.  
 CKQ-Memory and NFC. Correlation analysis was used to investigate the relationship of 
the CKQ-Memory and the Need for Cognition (NFC) questionnaires. The CKQ-Memory is 
measure of mock jurors’ memory of case facts and thus their understanding of the trial 
transcripts, (M = 9.37, SD = .80, range: 6.56 - 10.00). The NFC is a measure of individuals’ need 
for cognition, i.e. how likely they are to pay close attention to and understand the trial transcript 
and judicial instructions, (M = 62.87, SD = 9.26, range: 40.00 – 87.00). Results indicate that 
there is a significant weak positive relationship between memory for case facts and need for 
cognition, r(206) = .16, p = .03. 
 IBJM: combined confederate and self-reports. Fisher’s exact 2x3 test was used to 
assess the effect of the independent variable, instruction type (control vs. weak instructions vs. 
strong instructions) on the dichotomous composite variable IBJM. The IBJM is the combined 
measure of IBJM-SR, IBJM-CR Admissions, and IBJM-CR Knowledge. Results indicate near 
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significant differences among reports of IBJM in the control instructions condition (n = 7) 
compared to the weak (n = 6), and strong (n = 2) instruction conditions, p = .056 (see Figure 3). 
Post hoc analyses were conducted using Fisher’s exact 2x2 to identify if any conditions 
significantly differ from each other. There were fewer reports of IBJM in the strong instruction 
condition (n = 2) than in the weak instruction condition (n = 6), results indicate that these 
differences were approaching significance but not significantly different, p = .07. There were, 
however, significantly fewer reports of IBJM in the strong instruction condition (n = 2) than in 
the control instruction condition (n = 7), p = .05 (see Figure 3). Although there were fewer 
reports of IBJM in the weak instruction condition (n = 6) than in the control instruction condition 
(n = 7), results indicate that these differences were not significantly different, p = .12. 
 
 Traditional juror misconduct: Communicating with others. Fisher’s exact 2x3 test 
was used to assess the effect of the independent variable, instruction type (control vs. weak 
instructions vs. strong instructions) on the dichotomous variable measuring traditional juror 
misconduct (i.e., communication with others about the case; TJM). Results indicate no 
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significant differences among TJM in the control instructions condition (n = 4) compared to the 
weak (n = 1), and strong (n = 4) instruction conditions, p = .48. 
Juror Misconduct: Total instances of IBJM and TJM.  A chi-square test was used to 
assess the effect of the independent variable, instruction type (control vs. weak instructions vs. 
strong instructions) on the dichotomous composite variable measuring overall instances of juror 
misconduct, both internet-based and traditional (JM). Results indicate no significant differences 
among confederate reports of IBJM in the control instructions condition (n = 10) compared to the 
weak (n = 7), and strong (n = 6) instruction conditions, χ2(2) = 1.99, p = .37.  
Exploratory GCS Correlations. Correlational analyses were used to explore the 
relationships among the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS), and each of the dependent 
variables: self-report of misconduct (IBJM-SR), case knowledge questionnaire identifying guilty 
knowledge about the case (CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge), admissions of internet-based juror 
misconduct during deliberation (IBJM-CR Admissions) and the exploratory variables, internet-
based juror misconduct (IBJM), traditional juror misconduct (TJM), and total juror misconduct 
(JM). Results indicate that there is a significant weak negative relationship between the GCS and 
the CKQ-IBJM Guilty Knowledge, r(206) = -.16, p < .05. Additionally, results revealed 
significant weak positive relationships between the GCS and IBJM, r(206) = .16, p < .05, and 
JM, r(206) = .16, p < .05. All other relationships were not significant, all ps > .05. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 The primary purpose of this dissertation was to explore the efficacy of judicial 
instructions prohibiting internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM). Specifically, I tested if instances 
of IBJM can be reduced by enhancing judicial instructions with changes shown empirically to 
increase the likelihood of compliance as well as additions recommended by legal scholars. The 
secondary purpose was to investigate whether the Juror Internet Research Scale (JIRS; Knutson 
et al., 2016) predicts those who are more likely to disregard prohibitive jury instructions that 
admonish IBJM.  
 This study was conducted to fill a gap in judicial instruction research literature to address 
a growing problem faced by the U.S. court system, internet-based juror misconduct (IBJM; i.e., 
jurors going online during a case to communicate and/or conduct research about the case). This 
behavior exposes jurors to potentially biasing people and information. The information gained 
though IBJM may not be accurate and could negatively impact the outcome of trials (Morrison, 
2011; St. Eve et al., 2012, 2014; Zimmerman, 2013). This problem is exacerbated by advances in 
computer and mobile technology making it easier and faster for jurors to engage in IBJM. Courts 
often attempt to prevent potential juror bias by issuing jury instructions prohibiting IBJM 
(Posner, 2016; St. Eve et al., 2012, 2014; Zimmerman, 2013). However, the efficacy of limiting 
instructions is questionable (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Posner, 2016; St. 
Eve et al., 2012, 2014; Zimmerman, 2013). Field research shows that jurors tend to adhere to 
judicial restrictions (St. Eve et al., 2012, 2014). Contrary, laboratory research shows that jurors 
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tend to disregard prohibitive judicial instructions (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000: 
Steblay, Hosch, & Culhane, 2006). However, to date laboratory research has not yet examined if 
jurors will comply with judicial instructions that prohibit IBJM (vs. inadmissible evidence). To 
fill this gap in the instruction literature, the current study was conducted to help clarify the extent 
of the problem of IBJM and how to potentially reduce the behavior.    
 The current experiment examined two ways of reducing IBJM, empirically enhanced 
instructions and the JIRS, in a two-stage mock jury trial. The mock trial utilized a real murder 
case and gave mock jurors a realistic temptation and opportunity to engage in IBJM. Mock 
jurors’ IBJM was measured with confederate reports of admissions (IBJM-CR admission) and 
demonstrations of knowledge intentionally left out of the trial transcript; case knowledge that 
could exclusively be known only if a juror went online (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge). Mock 
jurors were also asked for self-reports of IBJM (IBJM-SR) and completed a case knowledge 
questionnaire (CKQ-IBJM). The CKQ-IBJM designed to measure individuals’ knowledge of 
case facts intentionally left out of the trial transcript and found only online. These measures of 
IBJM were then used to investigate the first objective of this dissertation, namely, to empirically 
test the efficacy of prohibitive instructions intended to reduce IBJM. To investigate the second 
objective (i.e., testing if the JIRS can identify individuals who will engage in IBJM despite 
prohibitive judicial instructions) the JIRS was administered to mock jurors in a prescreen survey 
prior to the mock trial.  
Main Findings 
Objective 1: Hypotheses 1a – 1f. Objective one to empirically test the efficacy of 
prohibitive instructions intended to reduce online communication and research (IBJM) was 
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investigated with a series of hypotheses, 1a – 1f, about each of the types of reports of IBJM 
(IBJM-SR, IBJM-CR admissions, IBJM-CR guilty knowledge, and CKQ-IBJM).  
Do the current CACM model instructions (weak) instructions work? Hypotheses 1b, 
1d, and 1f. Hypotheses 1b, 1d, and 1f predicted fewer self-reports of IBJM (IBJM-SR) among 
jurors who received the weak instructions than those who received the control instructions. The 
results of the current experiment do not provide empirical support for this prediction. Hypothesis 
1b, that there would be fewer self-reports (IBJM-SR) in the weak condition than in the control 
condition was not supported. As predicted, there were fewer self-reports of IBJM among those 
who received the weak instructions than those who received the control instructions, however 
that difference was not significant. Hypothesis 1d, that there would be fewer confederate reports 
of mock juror admissions of IBJM (IBJM-CR admissions) in the weak condition than in the 
control condition, also was not supported. Again, the pattern of responding is the same as seen 
for self-reports, there were fewer confederate reports of IBJM admissions among those who 
received the weak instructions than those who received the control instructions, but as before the 
effect was not significant.  
Hypothesis 1f, that there would be fewer confederate reports of mock juror 
demonstrations of guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge) in the weak condition than in 
the control condition, was also not supported. Contrary to the prediction, there were more 
confederate reports of demonstrated guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge) among 
those who received the weak instructions than those who received the control instructions and 
that difference approached significance. This pattern was also seen in the CKQ-IBJM, the mean 
level of guilty knowledge among those who received the weak instructions was higher than those 
who received the control instructions, though not statically significant.  
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While this pattern was not predicted, it is also not a unique outcome. Past research has 
found that under certain circumstances jurors respond in the opposite manner than instructed, 
called a “backfire effect” (Cox & Tanford, 1989; Kramer et al., 1990; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; 
Pickel, 1995). For example, in a civil case, Cox and Tanford (1989) found that mock jurors 
instructed to disregard limited-use evidence against the defendant were more punitive in their 
verdict decisions, award settlements, and negligence and character trait ratings than those not 
given an admonishment. In a criminal case, Kramer and colleagues (1990), found that mock 
jurors evaluated the defendant more negatively after exposure to factual pretrial publicity (PTP) 
but only when instructed to ignore it. Interestingly, this effect was not found when the PTP was 
emotional in nature and as such, did not translate to corresponding verdict decisions. In yet 
another criminal mock trial, Pickel (1995) found a backfire effect when mock jurors were 
instructed to disregard the prior conviction evidence, even when given legal reasoning for the 
admonishment. More specifically, mock jurors instructed to disregard the defendant’s prior 
conviction when determining guilt did not comply resulting in more guilty verdicts than those 
who were not administered the admonishment.  
Although the backfire effect has been found in the instruction literature, I did not predict 
its influence in this study largely because the effect has not been consistently found in past 
research (Devine, et al., 2001; Fein et al., 1997; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kramer, et al., 1990; 
Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). For example, though Pickle (1995) found a backfire effect when 
mock jurors were instructed to disregard prior conviction evidence, it did not happen when the 
instruction was to disregard hearsay evidence. Mock jurors in Pickel’s (1995) study were given 
an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence when making their verdict decisions including 
legal reasons for the admonishment. When the inadmissible evidence was a prior conviction and 
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likely perceived as reliable, mock jurors appeared to make a choice to disregard the prohibitive 
instruction. In contrast, when the inadmissible evidence was hearsay and not very reliable, mock 
jurors complied with the instruction to disregard it. Pickel (1995) supports the conclusion that the 
backfire effect does not always happen and the reliability of the information prohibited may 
influence its manifestation. Because of the inconsistent manifestation of the backfire effect it was 
unclear if the admonishment of IBJM in the weak condition would produce a backfire effect.  
Taken together, the results of the current study seem to demonstrate that the judicial 
instructions currently recommended in federal courts (i.e., CACM model instructions; weak 
condition) are not better at preventing IBJM than judicial instructions that have no 
admonishment against IBJM (control condition). Examination of the differences among 
conditions of self-reports (IBJM-SR) and confederate reports of admissions (IBJM-CR 
admissions) show a clear pattern of responding in the predicted direction, which on the surface 
appear to support the belief that the current CACM model instructions used in the weak 
condition reduce IBJM. However, this difference was not statistically significant and when 
considering the demonstration of guilty knowledge during deliberations as reported by 
confederates along with the information from the CKQ-IBJM, a new pattern emerged. Both 
measures reveal more guilty knowledge when jurors received the weak instructions than when 
they received the control instructions. These conflicting results could be a demonstration of 
social desirability. Mock jurors might have been hesitant to admit committing IBJM during 
deliberations or on the self-report measure because they were instructed against it but were 
unable to hide their guilty knowledge during deliberations and on the CKQ. This possibility is 
discussed in more detail in the limitations section of this study.   
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Analysis of the combined measure of IBJM (IBJM-SR, IBJM-CR admissions, and IBJM-
CR guilty knowledge) provided some clarification about the overall pattern of responding. 
Combined, there was only one fewer instance of IBJM when mock jurors received the weak 
instructions versus the control instructions, which was not significant. Considering this pattern of 
responding and the lack of empirical significance, the results of this study support the conclusion 
that the current CACM model instructions are not more effective at preventing or reducing IBJM 
than instructions with no admonishment of IBJM. 
The fact that CACM instructions used in the weak condition were not more effective at 
reducing IBJM is not surprising when viewed through the lens of extant laboratory research. 
Laboratory research consistently shows that mock jurors often fail to comply with judicial 
instructions limiting juror use of information (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; 
Steblay et al., 2006; Tanford, 1990), therefore, it is not unusual that mock jurors complied with 
the CACM model instructions (weak condition) at the same rate they did when given the 
instructions with no IBJM admonishment (control condition).  
However, only 6% of mock jurors in both conditions reported to have engaged in IBJM, 
which was lower than would have been expected based on past findings. The results of the 
current research found that mock jurors complied with both instructions at higher rates than the 
extant instruction literature suggests is typical (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; 
Steblay et al., 2006; Tanford, 1990). A meta-analysis of judicial instructions found that 
conviction rates (i.e., non-compliance) were about 45% among mock jurors who were exposed to 
inadmissible evidence (IE) and biased toward the prosecution (Steblay et al., 2006).  
In addition, the current results found higher non-compliance rates (more instances of 
IBJM) than field research conducted by St. Eve and colleagues (2012, 2014). St. Eve and 
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colleagues found nearly the same rate of potential non-compliance in real jurors who received 
the CACM model instructions (8%). However, the jurors surveyed stated that though they were 
tempted to engage in social media communication, they did not go online, and 2% did not give a 
response, thus indicating that only 1% of respondents engaged in IBJM. This is a lower rate of 
non-compliance than found in surveys of legal professionals, 6% (Dunn, 2011) and 10% 
(Hoffmeister, 2012).  
Rates of non-compliance as measured with instances of IBJM in the current experiment 
were lower than in laboratory research but seem to match those found in surveys of legal 
professionals field (e.g., Dunn, 2011 and Hoffmeister, 2012). This finding supports the 
conclusion that the low rates of non-compliance found by St. Eve et al. (2012, 2014) is likely not 
an accurate assessment of IBJM and points to the possibility that jurors in their studies were 
responding in a socially desirable way or the presence of a response bias such that only those 
who did not go online responded to the surveys.   
 It is important to note that the extant body of instruction literature (laboratory 
experiments) primarily focuses on admonishment of inadmissible evidence such as pretrial 
publicity and statements made in court (Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Steblay 
et al., 2006; Tanford, 1990) and has not investigated the focus of the current experiment, 
admonishment IBJM. Therefore, the results of the current experiment might provide initial 
evidence that mock jurors are more likely to comply with instructions admonishing juror 
misconduct than those that prohibit the use of inadmissible evidence potentially advancing and 
informing theories of why limiting instructions are ineffective.  
These findings, if reliably replicated, would help to clarify why and when jurors 
disregard prohibitive judicial instructions. The current study found that the CACM instructions 
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prohibiting IBJM performed nearly the same as instructions with no such admonishment. This 
effect seems to be driven by a nearly significant backfire effect. In the current data were more 
confederate reports of guilty knowledge demonstrated by the mock jurors who received the 
CACM model instructions (weak) that admonish IBJM than those who received the control 
instructions that did not mention IBJM. Several theories about the ineffectiveness of prohibitive 
instructions and the backfire effect might explain these results.  
Lieberman and Arndt (2000) theorize that the backfire effect occurs because the 
instructions bring the prohibited information to the front of the mock jurors’ mind making it 
more salient, memorable and influential. This assertion is logical and probably correct 
considering that salient information captures individuals’ attention which is the first step in the 
memory process, perception and encoding of information (Coon, Mitterer, & Martini, 2019). 
However, if it was simple salience driving this backfire effect it should also have affected more 
participants in the weak condition who got the same instruction. Though, salience does seem to 
be a first step in more complex mental processes of other theories. Ironic process theory (IPT; 
Wegner, 1994), flexible correction model (Wegener & Petty, 1997), and reactance theory (RT; 
Brehm, 1966) could provide other explanations of this backfire effect. These three theories 
account for the backfire effect by predicting that individuals will engage in behavior more when 
it is prohibited thus making it salient to the individual. Yet all three differ in their explanations of 
the cause of the backfire effect.  
Ironic process theory posits that when individuals are required to suppress a thought or 
behavior two mental processes are engaged; 1) a conscious operating process promotes the 
intended change by searching for thoughts or behaviors that are congruent with the desired 
mental state; and 2) an unconscious monitoring process tests whether the operating process is 
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successful in controlling thoughts or behaviors (Wegner, 1994). These processes work in tandem 
with the operating process requiring more cognitive effort. When cognitive capacity is taxed for 
any reason the monitoring process is more pronounced making the individual more sensitive to 
the suppressed thoughts or behaviors. Thus, the suppressed thought or behavior is considered or 
expressed more.  
Applied to the current study, it could have been the case that mock jurors instructed to 
not go online were not able to suppress the prohibited behavior and engaged in IBJM more than 
mock jurors who did not receive the admonishment. Ironic process theory suggests that the 
instruction prohibiting IBJM would have made the behavior more salient and gave mock jurors a 
mental goal to suppress it, thus requiring more cognitive resources. Because suppressing IBJM 
takes more cognitive effort, individual differences in cognitive control or increase demands on 
mock jurors’ cognitive resources then allow the suppressed thoughts and behaviors to manifest. 
Further, ironic process theory predicts that mock jurors who did not receive an admonishment of 
IBJM did not go online because they did not activate any potential suppressed behaviors that 
could manifest.   
However, if ironic processes are the cause of the backfire effect in this study, then it 
should have manifested in the strong condition as well. Mock jurors in the strong condition also 
received an admonishment of IBJM, which in theory should have triggered ironic processes 
resulting in more instances of IBJM, (i.e., a backfire effect). This result was not found supporting 
the conclusion that ironic processes probably did not account for this effect in the current study. 
In fact, there were fewer confederate reports of guilty knowledge among mock jurors who 
received the strong instructions than the weak. In addition, there were the same number of 
confederate reports of guilty knowledge among mock jurors who received the strong instructions 
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and the control instructions. However, since we did not examine individual differences in 
working memory capacity, future research should assess such a process driven juror decision. 
Another possible reason for the backfire effect found in this study could be due to mock 
jurors overcorrecting for potential biases implied in the CACM model instructions (weak). 
Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, and Petty (2000) suggest that the flexible correction model (FCM; 
Wegener & Petty, 1997) can explain the phenomena of the ineffectiveness of limiting 
instructions and the backfire effect. The flexible correction model (FCM) of bias correction 
theorizes that individuals hold certain beliefs about the biasing effect of environmental factors on 
their perceptions (i.e., naïve theories). In turn, individuals use these naïve theories to correct 
against a bias if they have the motivation and ability. Sometimes, individuals’ incorrectly 
perceive or believe the biasing effects are stronger and overcorrect against them (Wegener & 
Petty, 1997; Wegener, et al., 2000). If Wegener and colleagues (2000) are correct and FCM 
accounts for juror non-compliance and the backfire effect, the current experiment should support 
this theory.  
For the FMC to explain the results of the current experiment, first individuals need to be 
made aware of a potential bias which might have happened in the current experiment when mock 
jurors received the weak instructions. Those given the weak instructions were prohibited from 
engaging in IBJM. However, there was no reason given for the admonishment. Instead it was 
implied that going online would be undesirable or biasing. Additionally, mock jurors who 
received the control instruction did not receive an admonishment of IBJM. According to FMC, it 
is possible that the admonishment of IBJM made going online salient to the mock jurors in the 
weak condition, potentially activating their naïve theories. Furthermore, FCM predicts that some 
mock jurors may have held naïve theories contrary to the instruction. Thus believing that 
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engaging in IBJM would be helpful instead harmful and subsequently going online. Whereas, for 
mock jurors who did not receive the prohibitive instruction, IBJM was not mentioned and 
therefore not made salient. FCM suggests that the naïve theories of these mock jurors were not 
activated thus there was nothing for them to correct against and they did not engage in IBJM.  
In other words, FCM predicts that mock jurors will violate a judicial admonishment 
prohibiting IBJM if the behavior is made salient thus triggering naïve theories. Though they also 
need to be motivated by those theories (i.e., believe it will help and is not biasing) and able to 
make the effort to engage in IBJM. The FCM seems to account for the nearly significant backfire 
effect observed in the current study. It can also explain why, though in the same instruction 
condition, some mock jurors engaged in IBJM and others did not. Individual differences in naïve 
theories could have resulted in varying levels of motivation to correct against the bias implied in 
the instruction. The FCM provides a possible, yet unlikely, explanation for the presence of the 
backfire effect found in the weak condition. If the FCM is correct and the mere suggestion that 
IBJM is biasing triggered a backfire effect, the same response pattern would be expected in the 
strong condition where it was explicitly stated. Yet, there was no backfire effect found in the 
strong condition thus minimizing support for the FCM.  
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) also predicts the backfire effect and states that 
individuals become psychologically aroused when their behavioral freedom is threatened. As a 
result, individuals are motivated to regain their freedom by engaging in the prohibited behavior 
more than if it was permitted. In relation to the current experiment, reactance theory suggests 
that in the weak condition, some mock jurors may have felt their freedom to engage in a common 
behavior was threatened when told not to go online. Then, according to reactance theory, those 
mock jurors reacted thus engaging in IBJM to regain their freedom. This is a reasonable assertion 
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considering that 77% of Americans go online each day and 26% report that they go online 
“almost constantly” (Perrin & Jiang, 2018). Reactance theory also explains why the backfire 
effect did not occur in the strong condition. Mock jurors in the strong condition were adamantly 
admonished against IBJM but were also given reasons for the admonishment and consequences 
of non-compliance. This explanation for the admonishment may have moderated the threat to 
mock jurors’ behavioral freedom. Said another way, perhaps that by telling mock jurors the 
reasons and consequences, they realized that the intent of the admonishment was not to restrict 
their freedom. Subsequently, assuaging mock jurors’ fears thus curbing the need to react and 
regain their behavioral freedom. Reactance theory is the most parsimonious and seems to be the 
most logical explanation of the backfire effect found in the current experiment. 
Are empirically enhanced (strong) instructions better? Hypotheses 1a, 1c, and 1e. 
Hypothesis 1a, 1c, and 1e predicted that issuing empirically enhanced instructions (strong 
condition) to jurors during the mock trial would result in fewer instances of IBJM compared to 
the CACM model instructions currently recommended in federal courts (weak condition) and 
instructions with no admonishment of IBJM (control condition). This study found mixed support 
for these predictions.  
The first part of hypothesis 1a, that there would be fewer self-reports (IBJM-SR) of IBJM 
in the strong than in the weak condition was not supported. There was an equal number of self-
reports of IBJM in the strong and weak conditions. The second part of hypothesis 1a appears 
valid because there were fewer self-reports (IBJM-SR) in the strong condition than in the control 
condition. However, this difference was not statistically significant.  
The first part of hypothesis 1c, that there would be fewer confederate reports of mock 
juror admissions of IBJM during deliberation (IBJM-CR admissions) in the strong condition than 
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in the weak was also not supported. Although there were no confederate reports of IBJM in the 
strong condition, there was only one in weak condition and that difference was not significant. 
The second part of hypothesis 1c was supported, there were no confederate reports of IBJM 
admission (IBJM-CR admissions) in the strong condition which significantly differed from the 
control condition.  
The first part of hypothesis 1e, that there would be fewer confederate reports of mock 
juror demonstrations of guilty knowledge during deliberation (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge) in 
the strong condition than in the weak was very nearly supported. There was only one confederate 
report of demonstrated guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge) in the strong condition 
and five in weak condition and that difference was almost significant. The second part of 
hypothesis 1c was not supported. There were equal confederate reports of demonstrated guilty 
knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge) in the strong condition and the control condition. The 
first part of hypothesis 1e was also tested with mock jurors’ guilty knowledge measured by the 
CKQ-IBJM questionnaire. It was predicted that mock jurors in the strong condition would score 
lower than those in the weak and control conditions, but no significant differences were found to 
support this hypothesis.  
 Considered collectively, the results of the current study provide initial support that 
empirically enhanced judicial instructions (strong) are more effective at reducing IBJM than the 
CACM model instructions (weak) currently used in federal courts and instructions with no 
admonishment of IBJM (control). Examination of differences among the strong and weak 
conditions of self-reports (IBJM-SR) and confederate reports of admissions (IBJM-CR 
admissions) show a clear pattern of responding which was not predicted; such that they are 
nearly equal and not significantly different. This finding could support the conclusion that the 
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enhanced instructions and CACM model instructions are equally effective at reducing IBJM. 
However, the picture changes when adding the confederate reports of guilty knowledge.  
Confederate reports revealed more demonstrations of guilty knowledge when jurors 
received the weak instructions than when they received the strong instructions and that 
difference is nearly significant. These results could be a demonstration of social desirability such 
that mock jurors might be hesitant to admit committing IBJM in deliberation or on the self-report 
measure but were unable to hide their guilty knowledge in deliberation. Though, if this effect 
was purely driven by social desirability of not wanting others to know that one violated the 
judge’s instructions then this pattern should also have been seen in the strong instruction 
condition but was not. This provides some initial evidence that the empirically enhanced 
instructions (strong) are more effective at reducing IBJM than the CACM model instructions 
(weak) because that is the only difference between these conditions.  
 I postulated that making changes to the instructions currently recommended for use in 
Federal courts might improve juror compliance. This prediction was based on the existing 
instruction literature that reveals that jurors selectively comply with judicial instructions. Past 
research reveals that mock jurors comply with limiting instructions when given reasons for the 
admonishment. For example, the information may be biased, false, misleading (Kassin & 
Sommers, 1997), and there might be ulterior motives behind its publication such as a desire to 
bias public opinion (Fein et al., 1997). Additionally, instructions were amended based on the 
recommendation of legal scholars (e.g., Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Hoffmeister, 2012; 
Simpler, 2012). They speculate that jurors informed of the potential consequences of violating 
judicial instructions would be more inclined to comply. Last, the instructions were made less 
complex and easier to understand to capitalize on research that indicates jurors are more likely to 
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comply with instructions they comprehend (Baguley et al., 2017). It is likely that the above 
changes made to the instructions are the reasons for fewer confederate reports of guilty 
knowledge in the strong condition.  
When examining the differences among the strong and control conditions of self-reports 
(IBJM-SR) and confederate reports of admissions (IBJM-CR admissions) a pattern of responding 
was revealed in the predicted direction, such that there were fewer self-reports and confederate 
reports of IBJM admissions. However, contrary to the predicted pattern, there were equal 
instances of confederate reports of demonstrated knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge). It is 
unclear why there were no more confederate reports of guilty knowledge in the control 
condition. Mock jurors in the control condition did not receive any admonishment of IBJM and 
therefore should have been more likely to go online than those instructed not to. This result is not 
likely due to ironic process or reactant theory because it is not driven by more instances of this 
type of IBJM in the strong condition but by fewer in the control. In other words, in the strong 
condition there was only one instance of self-reported IBJM (IBJM-SR), zero confederate reports 
of admissions (IBJM-CR admissions), and likewise only one confederate report of guilty 
knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge). Conversely, in the control condition there were four 
self-reports of IBJM (IBJM-SR), five confederate reports of admissions (IBJM-CR admissions), 
and only one confederate report of guilty knowledge (IBJM-CR guilty knowledge).  
Analyses of the combined measure of IBJM (IBJM-SR, IBJM-CR admissions, and IBJM-
CR guilty knowledge) revealed that overall, there were fewer instances of IBJM when jurors 
received the strong instructions than weak instructions and that difference was almost significant. 
Furthermore, there were significantly fewer instances of IBJM when jurors received the strong 
instructions than the control instructions. When considering all reports of admissions and guilty 
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knowledge, the pattern of responding and the empirical significance of these patterns, the 
evidence supports the supposition that empirically enhanced instructions are more effective at 
preventing or reducing IBJM than current CACM model instructions and instructions with no 
admonishment of IBJM. 
The current study sought to not only investigate if judicial instructions currently 
recommended in federal courts work to reduce IBJM (hypotheses 1b, 1d, and 1f) but also to 
determine if instructions could be enhanced by making changes that are empirically supported to 
improve likelihood of juror compliance (hypotheses 1a, 1c, and 1e). Said another way, a main 
goal of this research was to make empirically supported changes to the current CACM model 
instruction to improve their efficacy. The extant body of instruction literature converges on the 
finding that jurors do not comply with judicial instructions except under certain conditions 
(Devine et al., 2001; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Steblay et al., 2006; Tanford, 1990).  
The current experiment tested and found initial support for making empirically supported 
changes to the current CACM model instruction recommended in Federal courts. Primary 
alterations include making instructions easier for jurors to understand and giving more examples 
of prohibited activities, technologies, devices and websites (Baguley et al., 2017; Posner, 2016). 
Enhanced instructions also gave jurors reasons for the admonishment. Mock jurors were 
informed that information obtained online might be unreliable, false, incomplete or biased (e.g., 
Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Additionally they were informed that there might be ulterior motives 
behind information published online such as a desire to bias public opinion (Fein et al., 1997).  
The current experiment also supports legal scholars’ recommendation of informing jurors 
of potential consequences of IBJM (Aaronson & Patterson, 2013; Hoffmeister, 2012; Simpler, 
2012). The results of the current study provide initial evidence that such changes appear to be at 
 
 
105 
 
least somewhat effective. The empirically enhanced (strong) instructions were more effective at 
reducing IBJM than both the current CACM model instructions (weak) and the instructions with 
no IBJM admonishment lend support to and extend the current body of instruction literature.   
The finding of fewer instances of IBJM when mock jurors were administered the 
enhanced instructions, compared to the CACM model instructions and control instructions, best 
supports reactance theory (Brehm, 1966). Recall that reactance theory predicts that mock jurors 
will respond in a manner opposite of an instruction if they feel their behavioral freedom is 
threatened (Brehm, 1966). It is likely that giving mock jurors reasons for the admonishment and 
consequences for violations reduced the perceived threat to behavioral freedom thus reducing the 
attractiveness of engaging in IBJM. Ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994) and the flexible 
correction model (Wegener & Petty, 1997) also predict an increase in prohibited behavior also 
but these theories do not explain why the enhanced instructions reduced this tendency. The 
enhanced instructions issued a stronger admonishment which both ironic process and FCM 
theories predict would increase IBJM instead of reducing it. The issuance of an explanation for 
the admonishment and consequences of non-compliance might likely make the instruction and 
IBJM more salient in mock jurors’ thoughts and in the case of ironic processes, harder to 
suppress. In the FCM, if mock jurors hold naïve theories that IBJM is helpful instead of harmful, 
explaining the reasons for the instruction and consequences of non-compliance might help 
reframe naïve theories, it is likely that there would be more IBJM in the strong condition than the 
weak because of the stronger admonishment.  
Objective 2: Hypotheses 2a – 2d. Objective two to investigate whether the Juror Internet 
Research Scale (Knutson et al., 2016) predicts those who will not comply with prohibitive 
instructions that admonish online communication and research (IBJM) was tested with a series of 
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hypotheses, 2a – 2d, that examined the relationship of the JIRS scores with self-reports of IBJM 
(IBJM-SR), mock jurors’ guilty knowledge measured by the Case Knowledge Questionnaire 
(CKQ-IBJM) and confederate reports of mock jurors’ admissions of IBJM (IBJM-CR 
admissions), and mock juror compliance measured by the GCS. If the JIRS is capable of 
identifying non-compliant jurors, then it should positively correlate with measures of IBJM and 
negatively correlate with jurors who are high in compliance with authority. The current study 
found no evidence to support that individuals’ scores on the JIRS will predict who will engage in 
IBJM. No relationship was found between the JIRS and self-reports of IBJM (hypothesis 2a) or 
with scores on the CKQ-IBJM (hypothesis 2b).  
A weak significant relationship was found between the JIRS and confederate reports of 
IBJM admissions (hypothesis 2c) however it is in the opposite direction than predicted. Contrary 
to the stated purpose of the JIRS, lower scores were found to be weakly associated with engaging 
in IBJM. As predicted, the JIRS was negatively related to individual levels of compliance such 
those who scored higher on the JIRS were lower in compliance and scored lower on the GCS 
(hypothesis 2d). This is a curious finding because the JIRS was found to be related to compliance 
and positively related to reports of IBJM and therefore was not found to be a predictor of non-
compliant mock jurors in the current experiment.   
Overall, the current study did not find evidence that the JIRS can identify jurors more 
likely to conduct internet research. In fact, the only significant association was with not engaging 
in IBJM, suggesting the JIRS achieves the opposite of what it was designed. Instead it may 
predict those who are more likely to comply with judicial instructions. This interpretation should 
be considered with extreme caution because this is the first investigation of the JIRS. Further, the 
JIRS was negatively related to the GCS, a measure of compliance with authority, as predicted. 
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This finding indicates that higher scores on the JIRS are related to non-compliance and thus 
supports its theoretical purpose. The negative relationship of the JIRS with reported admissions 
of IBJM is also in direct contrast with negative correlations found by Knutson et al., (2016) when 
developing the JIRS. They found that the JIRS negatively correlated with obedience to authority 
and self-control.  
To follow up this curious finding, correlation analyses were conducted on the GCS and 
IBJM-CR admissions. Results indicated a significant positive relationship, such that higher 
scores on the GCS (more compliance) were associated with reports of engaging in IBJM (non-
compliance). This finding is incongruent with extant research on the GCS which has been shown 
to reliably predict obedience and compliant behavior (vs. non-compliance) (Gudjonsson, 1991; 
Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1990; Richardson & Kelly, 2004). Though not likely, these results 
might demonstrate that high levels of compliant behavior and obedience are not necessarily 
needed for individuals to comply with judicial instructions of this nature. Such a result would be 
incompatible with obedience theory and research (Milgram, 1963; 1965) which demonstrates 
that individuals typically comply with the requests of authority.  
It is possible that the data missing from the JIRS and GCS might be part of the reason for 
the contrary results of the JIRS. Due to a technical issue, 48 participants did not complete the 
JIRS and GCS during the prescreen, and another six completed all measures of the prescreen 
except the JIRS. Though, the overall missing values analysis (MVA) indicated that data missing 
from the experiment is missing completely at random (MCAR), follow-up Little’s MCAR 
analyses were conducted on the JIRS and the GCS individually. These analyses revealed that the 
missing data on the JIRS is not missing completely at random, though it is on the GCS. Perhaps 
part of the reason for the curious results of the JIRS is due to six individuals who took the 
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prescreen but did complete the JIRS. Reactance theory of juror violations of limiting instructions 
might provide a plausible explanation for the why six mock jurors did not complete the JIRS. 
The JIRS asked participants their opinions about engaging in various activities constituting 
IBJM. These items may have triggered a feeling of threat to behavioral freedom about being able 
to use the internet during a trial and in turn prompted these six participants to refuse to answer 
the questions. Because the data missing from these participants may have provided an inaccurate 
assessment of the predictive ability of the JIRS future research should test the JIRS again, 
administering it both before and after a mock trial.   
Finally, the findings regarding the JIRS are not likely due to socially desirable responding 
or influence of the mock trial because participants filled out the JIRS and GCS questionnaires in 
a prescreen survey at least 1 week prior to participation in the current experiment. However, 
there is a possibility that the six individuals who did not complete the JIRS did not want to take a 
chance giving socially undesirable answers so declined to respond. Nonetheless, it is unclear 
why the JIRS did not perform as designed and was actually related to reports of not engaging in 
IBJM, but this result clearly demonstrates that more research is needed on the JIRS. 
Implications, Limitations & Future Directions 
The first to investigate IBJM instructions. The findings of the current study extend the 
current body of instruction research by being the first to experimentally investigate mock juror 
compliance with instructions prohibiting IBJM. The existing instruction research typically 
examines juror compliance with instructions prohibiting the use of inadmissible information 
(Devine et al., 2001; Steblay et al., 2006; Tanford, 1990) but none have investigated instructions 
admonishing IBJM. The results of the current study indicate that mock jurors comply with 
judicial instructions prohibiting IBJM misconduct at lower rates than found in the instruction 
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literature. This could mean that mock jurors evaluate prohibitive instructions differently 
depending on what behavior is being admonished; and mock jurors use that evaluation to decide 
whether or not to comply. This not only provides further support of the instruction literature that 
posits that jurors selectively comply with prohibitive instructions, but it also expands upon the 
conditions for which these exceptions are made.  
Limitation: First investigation of IBJM. A primary limitation of the current experiment 
lies in the fact that no known previous research has attempted to identify and measure IBJM. The 
trial stimuli, materials and methodology used in the current experiment drew upon existing 
methodologies. However, the current experiment did not utilize guilty verdicts as a measure of 
juror misconduct because the use of confederates during deliberations to find instances of IBJM 
and validate self-reports, was expected to bias verdicts. As the first investigation of IBJM and 
how to reduce it, this experiment sought to first determine how to identify and measure IBJM. As 
a result, I had to expand and alter the stimuli, materials, and measurement instruments. The 
current study indicates that self-reports can be used to measure IBJM but need to be validated 
along additional measures. Future research should replicate current findings with additional 
materials and means of measuring IBJM.  
Rates of IBJM. The rates of non-compliance among mock jurors in the current study 
were higher than in St. Eve et al.’s, (2012, 2014) field research, but within the same range as 
found by other field research (e.g., Dunn, 2011; Hoffmeister, 2012). The similar rate of non-
compliance in the current study supports the field research by replicating baseline rates of non-
compliance. The similar non-compliance rates also indicate that the current experiment was 
successful at obtaining a fairly accurate measure of IBJM through confederate- and self-reports. 
It is important to note that mock jurors could have succumbed to socially desirable responding 
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and failed to self-report true rates of IBJM, as seen in St. Eve et al., (2012, 2014). Therefore, 
IBJM could be higher than mock jurors actually self-reported, and non-compliance rates might 
resemble those found in the instruction literature more closely. Future research should 
investigate IBJM with more objective measures such as guilty verdicts and/or polygraph 
examination to validate rates of IBJM as discussed below.   
Limitation: Self-report measures and socially desirable responding. The self-report type 
of measurement in the current study is a limitation because of the potential of juror providing 
socially desirable responses, (i.e., not admitting IBJM). Socially desirable responding occurs 
when participants respond to experimental stimuli and questionnaires in a way that portray 
themselves in an overly positive light, accepting desirable statements and attributions and reject 
undesirable ones which can bias research results (Edwards, 1957; Paulhus, 2002). It was 
anticipated that it would be socially undesirable to admit to violating judicial instructions. In an 
effort to account for socially desirable responding the current study relied on the CKQ guilty 
knowledge questionnaire and confederate reports of guilty knowledge to find and confirm IBJM 
admissions elicited during deliberations or on the self-report questionnaire.  
In an attempt to reduce socially desirable responding this study relied on the principles of 
social influence and conformity theories (Asch, 1956; Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2010) by planting 
one confederate in each jury group of 1-6 participants. During deliberations, the confederates 
admitted to violating the judge’s instructions, thus making it seem more socially acceptable to 
participants to admit wrong doing as well. The elicited confessions of IBJM were then verified 
by self-reports on a questionnaire, thus advancing these theories. However, the confederate 
reports of guilty knowledge found additional instances of IBJM which mock jurors did not admit 
on the questionnaire. These results point to the conclusion that efforts to eliminate socially 
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desirable responding were not entirely successful. Furthermore, the CKQ failed to find these 
socially desirable responses as designed.  
One possible reason that socially desirable responding was not eliminated is that perhaps 
mock jurors did not feel truly anonymous. According to the literature maintaining participant 
anonymity helps to lower social desirability and social anxiety (Joinson, 1999). Although, I tried 
to maintain juror anonymity through unique identifiers, it is not known if these efforts were 
successful in ensuring jurors felt anonymous.  
Verdict decisions. To address these limitations future research should investigate IBJM 
with more objective measures such as mock juror verdicts. Research on limiting instructions 
typically uses verdicts to determine if mock jurors comply with judicial instructions prohibiting 
the use of information deemed inadmissible (Devine et al., 2001; Fein et al., 1997; Kassin & 
Sommers, 1997; Kramer et al., 1990; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Steblay et al., 2006;). Pretrial 
publicity and other information deemed inadmissible by the judge is shown to bias mock jurors 
and subsequently influence their verdict decisions (Devine et al., 201; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; 
Steblay et al, 2006). Furthermore, if the information mock jurors receive is negative or 
prejudiced against the defendant, verdict decisions are biased toward the prosecution, resulting in 
more guilty verdicts and punitive sentences (Kramer et al., 1990; Steblay et al., 2006; Ruva et al., 
2007). Because exposure to negative pretrial publicity tends to bias mock jurors toward guilty 
verdicts it is reasonable to conclude that jurors could also be prejudiced in the same direction by 
information obtained while engaging in IBJM. 
In accordance with cognitive theory that individuals do not or cannot accurately report 
their cognitive processes (Nesbitt & Wilson, 1977), Fein and et al. (1997) found that on self-
reports, mock jurors claimed that the inadmissible evidence had little influence on them. Yet, 
 
 
112 
 
mock juror verdict decisions seemed to be biased against the defendant. This might account for 
the low number of instances of IBJM in the current experiment. Perhaps mock jurors simply did 
not accurately report their thought processes and experiences. While it is difficult to misinterpret 
whether one sought out information or communicated online about the case, mock jurors in the 
current study may have underestimated the influence of such actions and thus not reported them. 
Mock jurors in the current study may not have reported going online because they mistakenly 
thought they were not biased by the obtained information. It is likely that using guilty verdicts as 
a measure of IBJM may produce a more accurate account of the phenomenon.  
Psychophysical detection of deception. Another way to measure whether mock jurors are 
truthfully self-reporting IBJM would be to use psychophysical detection of deception (PDD) 
more commonly known as polygraphy or lie detection. PDD involves the recording of autonomic 
nervous system indices such as respiratory rate, electrodermal conductivity, as well as 
cardiovascular and vasomotor activity while the asking the subject a series of yes/no questions 
about the individual’s credibility (Honts, 1994; National Research Council, 2003). The goal is to 
detect deception through analysis of changes or abnormalities in these indices after individuals 
respond to questions. Changes in these physiological responses are not typically within the 
control of the individual, therefore increases in heart rate, respiration and skin conductivity are 
indicative of heightened emotional arousal and deception (National Research Council, 2003). 
Though some research indicates this is not always the case. PDD measures such as the polygraph 
are not always accurate in detecting deception because the indices can be influenced by factors 
other than lying (Grubin, Kamenskov, Dwyer, & Stephenson, 2019; Honts, 1994; National 
Research Council, 2003; Nelson, 2015). Problems with polygraph accuracy tend to occur when 
the examiner is inexperienced or incompetent (Grubin, et al., 2019; Honts, 1994; National 
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Research Council, 2003; Nelson, 2015). The respiratory rate has been shown to be under the 
most volitional control of the three primary indices; heart rate, skin conductivity and respiratory 
rate. Therefore, rate of respiration the easiest of the indices to manipulate for individuals 
motivated to try to beat the polygraph test (Nelson, 2015). To combat such attempts of 
manipulating polygraphs, skilled examiners have adapted testing techniques making results more 
reliable (Nelson, 2015). 
PDD is commonly used in the criminal justice system by police departments to support 
investigations, in pre-employment screening of law enforcement and national security officers, 
and occasionally as evidence in court (Honts, 1994; National Research Council, 2003). 
Additionally PDD examination is used to screen private sector and government employees in 
security-sensitive positions (National Research Council, 2003). The National Research Council 
(2003) reviewed 57 studies on PDD accuracy in detecting deception and its use as a security 
screening measure. The council concluded that PDD examination can identify deception in 
laboratory studies at higher than chance rates even though its accuracy is below acceptable levels 
needed to identify security threats among government workers (National Research Council, 
2003). Honts (1994) echoes this conclusion that PDD examination is not as accurate in applied 
settings as it is in the laboratory. In addition, individuals are more likely to reveal unknown or 
undisclosed information during a polygraph examination (Grubin, et al., 2019). Because PDD 
examination can detect deception relatively well (i.e., above chance) in laboratory settings and 
individuals disclose previously unknown information during testing, it could be a good measure 
of IBJM. PDD examination could be an effective method for future researchers to identify mock 
jurors who violate judicial instructions prohibiting IBJM. Combined with guilty verdict and self-
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reports, PDD examination might offer a more accurate picture of the level of mock juror 
engagement in IBJM.  
Empirically enhanced instructions. More importantly, the current study extends the 
current body of instruction research by finding initial support for recommending empirically 
enhanced judicial instructions instead of the CACM model instructions currently recommended 
for use in federal courts. The current experiment found that empirically enhanced instructions 
were more effective at reducing IBJM than CACM model instructions and instructions with no 
admonishment of IBJM. Furthermore, CACM model instructions were not found to be any more 
effective than instructions with no admonishment of IBJM. These results provide some initial 
evidence that the efficacy of judicial instructions were improved.  
The enhanced instructions used in the current experiment reduced instances of IBJM to 
less than 1% which could have a much-needed positive impact in the courtroom if this effect is 
found to be reliable. A reduction of IBJM to 1% has the potential to save taxpayers tens of 
thousands of dollars in the cost of retrying cases and help reduce the number of cases needing a 
jury trial in an already clogged court system. According to the most recent Bureau of Justice 
Statistics study on legal expenses, in 2015, taxpayers spent approximately $61.2 billion on court 
costs to prosecute and provide public defense of various types of cases (Bronson, 2018). The 
current study found support for IBJM rates reported field research ranging from 6% (Dunn, 
2011) to 10% (Hoffmeister, 2012). Using the more conservative percentage, if IBJM occurs in 
6% of court cases annually, and those cases had to be retried, that would represent 6% of the 
annual court costs or $3.67 billion annually. A reduction of IBJM to 1% would reduce that 
amount to $612 million annually. Though not all instances of IBJM result in retrials. According 
to a Reuters Legal survey, nationwide about 31% of 90 verdicts challenged due to IBJM were 
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vacated and new trials conducted (Grow, 2010). On the more conservative side, if only 31% of 
the cases in which IBJM occurs (6%) are retried that would conservatively estimate court cost to 
retry cases to be around $1.14 billion annually. Moreover, if the enhanced instructions prove to 
reliably reduce IBJM to 1%, this could result in a reduction in the cost of retrying cases of IBJM 
to $189.7 million, saving U.S. taxpayers $950.3 million annually. 
To put this into perspective, the Georgia v. Harris case used in the current study was a 
murder trial which according to Hunt, Anderson, and Saunders (2017), costs $22,000 to $44,000 
in 2010 dollars to prosecute. Adjusted for inflation that would be $25,800 to $51,700 in 2019 
dollars (Inflation Rate between 2010-2019, 2019). If a retrial would have been needed in the 
Harris case it could have cost tax payers another $51,700 or more considering that the initial trial 
was 23 days long. Luckily for residents in Cobb County, Georgia, this was not the case. Tax 
payers in Nelson County, North Dakota were not so fortunate. 
On March 1, 2019 the conviction of a man from Lisbon, ND was dismissed, and a new 
trial granted (Henson, 2019). The man, Jordan Borland, was convicted of vehicular homicide for 
killing a passenger in a drunk driving accident in 2017. Despite being given judicial instructions 
that prohibited jurors from seeking information from any source outside the courtroom, including 
a specific admonishment forbidding internet research, a juror searched online for the legal 
definition of the term, “Reasonable Doubt” and shared the definition with other jurors during 
deliberations. This seemingly innocent action contaminated the jury. As a result the judge 
vacated the conviction and called for a new trial that started on July 8, 2019 (Williams, 2019). 
Using Hunt and colleagues’ (2017) cost estimate adjusted for inflation, this will likely cost ND 
taxpayers at least another $25,000. 
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Even though these initial results are exciting, they should be interpreted with caution. 
This is the first time IBJM has been measured and tested in an experiment. These results need to 
be replicated for further validation and confidence in the efficacy and reliability of enhanced 
instructions in reducing IBJM.  
Lack of support for the JIRS. The last main finding of the current experiment was the 
lack of support for the JIRS as a tool for predicting non-compliant jurors. In fact, the results of 
the current experiment found initial evidence that it may do the opposite, identify those who are 
compliant. These results should be interpreted with extreme caution for a few reasons. First, this 
is the first known attempt to validate the JIRS in a true experiment. Second, there was a technical 
problem with the prescreen resulting in 48 mock jurors participating in the study without taking 
the JIRS or the GCS. Furthermore, six participants did not answer any items on the JIRS, even 
though they completed all other prescreen measures. A follow-up missing data analysis indicated 
these missing data could be a part of the problem. Because of these limitations it is highly 
recommended that future research replicate the current experiment and findings before a true 
determination of the JIRS’ predictive ability can be made.  
General limitations. Small sample size. Another limitation is the small sample size. 
Though the current experiment determined sample size with an a priori power analysis based on 
a small to medium sized effect, the number of instances of IBJM were fewer than anticipated 
thus limiting the generalizability of the results. Perhaps the small sample size prevented detection 
of differences between the CACM model instructions (weak condition) and instruction with no 
admonishment of IBJM. Additionally, the small sample size may have also contributed to not 
finding support of the JIRS as a predictor of non-compliance with instructions. It is likely that 
there would be more instances of IBJM in a larger sample which might be needed to find the true 
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effect of the JIRS. Future research should recruit a larger sample of participants to better assess 
the efficacy of the instructions and the predictive ability of the JIRS.  
College-aged convenience sample. A final limitation is the college-aged convenience 
sample used in this experiment. Mock jurors in this experiment were recruited from 
undergraduate psychology majors at the University of North Dakota. It is reasonable to conclude 
that this sample and the population it was drawn from, are likely not representative of jurors 
pulled from the community which potentially could restrict generalizability of the current results. 
Yet, research comparing student and community mock juror samples demonstrate that they do 
not differ in their comprehension of or the effect of judicial instructions (Bornstein, 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is possible that college-aged psychology students could differ in their propensity 
to conduct IBJM, especially considering that age group tends to spend more time online than 
their older, community counterparts (Perrin & Jiang, 2018). 
Furthermore, the use of a university student sample is likely to increase the chances of 
participant crosstalk in which participants who have been through the experiment discuss it with 
other potential participants (Edlund, Sagarin, Skowronski, Johnson, & Kutter, 2009). However, 
in accordance with recommendations of Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, and Gonzales (1990) 
and Cialdini, (2001) participants in this study were warned of the detrimental effect of sharing 
details of the experiment and asked to verbally commit to not discussing information about the 
study with other people. Research shows that precautions reduce participant crosstalk (Edlund et 
al., 1990) thus the likelihood of this phenomenon effecting the results of this study were 
minimal.          
For these reasons, it is recommended that future research reproduce this experiment with 
a sample of jury-eligible community members to improve generalizability to other populations.  
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation successfully investigated two ways of reducing IBJM, judicial 
instruction prohibiting IBJM and identifying non-compliant juror with the JIRS, thus filling gaps 
in the instruction literature and addressing questions posed in the legal literature. This study 
extends instruction literature being the first to test the efficacy of instructions specifically 
admonishing IBJM. This study is the first to show that judicial instructions that prohibit IBJM 
currently used in federal courts (CACM model instructions) performed no better than instruction 
with no admonishment of IBJM. Furthermore, this experiment demonstrated that judicial 
instructions prohibiting IBJM were improved upon, finding that mock jurors engaged in IBJM 
less often when they received empirically enhanced instructions than those who got the CACM 
model instructions.  
The results of the current study provide initial support for the use of enhanced 
instructions instead of the CACM model instructions currently used. Another interesting finding 
of this study is that mock jurors complied with IBJM prohibitive instructions at higher rates than 
found in the instruction research that prohibit the use of inadmissible information. Moreover, the 
rates of IBJM found in this experiment were in the range of non-compliance found in field 
research, excluding St. Eve et al. (2012; 2014) suggesting that real and mock jurors are likely to 
comply with judicial instructions prohibiting IBJM at a higher rate than instructions prohibiting 
the use of inadmissible information. Additionally, this research was the first to empirically test 
the predictive ability of the JIRS but was unable to find support for its use in identifying jurors 
who are will conduct online research.  
Last, this research informs current theories of limiting instruction ineffectiveness, largely 
supporting reactance theory. Ironic process theory, flexible correction model, and reactance 
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theory all predict that mock jurors would violate prohibitive judicial instructions and engage in 
IBJM. However, reactance theory is the only one that seems able to account for the backfire 
effect found and fact that IBJM was lower in the strong condition. Reactance theory states that 
individuals feel threatened when their behavioral freedom is limited (e.g., prohibiting online 
activities). In turn this threat motivates them to engage in the prohibited behavior more than they 
would if not given the admonishment. It is possible that explaining the reason for the 
admonishment and the consequences of non-compliance reduced the threat to mock jurors’ 
autonomy thus reducing the urge to engage in IBJM.   
Future research should replicate this study and these findings to establish more 
confidence in their validity. Replication and expansion to other populations, locations, and other 
types of cases will help to increase confidence in the ability of enhanced instructions to reduce 
internet-based juror misconduct and support their use in the courtroom.  
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Appendix A 
 
Proposed Model Jury Instructions 
The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a Case 
Prepared by the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management 
June 2012 
[Note: These instructions should be provided to jurors before trial, at the close of a case, at the 
end of each day before jurors return home, and other times, as appropriate.]  
 
Before Trial:  
 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, 
search the internet, websites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about 
this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the 
case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of 
technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use these tools to 
communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends. 
You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, 
Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including 
Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not use any similar technology 
of social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as 
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  
 
At the Close of the Case:  
 
 During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as 
the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website 
such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any 
information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. 
In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone, or 
electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can only discuss the case in the 
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jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 You may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case 
because it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom. Information on the internet or available through social media might be wrong, 
incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors 
during deliberations because they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In our 
judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this 
courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and not 
your fellow jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the 
judicial process.  
 
  
 
 
134 
 
Appendix B 
 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OR COBB COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
 
Indictment No. 14-3124 
 
Plaintiffs: 
  
 THE STATE OF GEORGIA 
 
  vs.       
Defendant: 
 
JUSTIN ROSS HARRIS 
 
GENERAL BILL OF INDICTMENT 
 
The Grand Jurors in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse 
JUSTIN ROSS HARRIS with the offense of MALICE MURDER, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, for that the 
said accused person, in the County of Cobb and State of Georgia, on or about the 18th day of 
June, 2014 did unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, cause the death of Cooper Harris, 
a human being, by placing said Cooper Harris into a child car sear and leaving him alone in 
a hot motor vehicle, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace, and dignity 
thereof.  
 
Dated: _____________________ 
 
__________________________________  __________________________________ 
MARY STALEY, Superior Court Judge   Grand Jury Foreperson  
  
 
___________________________________  ____________________________________ 
D. VICTOR REYNOLDS, District Attorney  Attorney for the Defendant 
 
 
CASE SUMMARY 
 
DAY 1: OPENING STATEMENT BY JUDGE STALEY 
 
I will take a few moments now to give you some initial instructions about this case 
and about your duties as jurors. At the end of the trial, I will give you further instructions. 
Unless I specifically tell you otherwise, all such instructions are equally binding on you and 
must be followed. 
 This is a criminal case, brought against Justin Ross Harris by the State of Georgia. 
The defendant is charged with malice murder. It will be your duty to decide from the 
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evidence whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. You are the 
sole judges of the facts, but you must follow my instructions, whether you agree with them 
or not. You have taken an oath to do so. Please remember that this defendant, not anyone 
else, is on trial here and only on trial for the crime charged.  
 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE GIVEN BY JUDGE STALEY 
 
I will now give you a summary of the elements of the crime charged, which the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to make its case: 
• One, the defendant did act with malice aforethought; 
• Two, the defendant did act intentionally; 
• Three, when the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to realize that his act, by its nature, would directly and 
probably result in the death of his child; 
• Four, the defendant did not act in error or commit the act by accident. 
 The prosecution has the burden of proof in this case. The defendant should not be 
convicted unless there is evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant intentionally committed the crime charged with, malicious aforethought. If there 
is any evidence that the defendant was not acting intentionally and out of malice, he should 
not be convicted. 
 
LEGAL DEFINITIONS PROVIDED BY JUDGE STALEY 
 
Reasonable Doubt 
 Reasonable doubt is based upon reason and common sense, and not on speculation. 
Reasonable doubt may arise from careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or 
from a lack of evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing 
character that a reasonable person, after careful consideration, would not hesitate to rely 
and act upon that proof in life’s most important decisions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt. 
 
Evidence 
 Evidence includes the statements of witnesses, documents and other things received 
as exhibits, and any facts that have been stipulated. Certain things are not evidence. I will 
list those things for you now: 
1. Statements, arguments, questions, and comments by lawyers representing the 
parties in the case are not evidence. 
2. Objections are not evidence. Lawyers have a right to object when they believe 
something is improper. You should not be influenced by the objection. If I sustain 
an objection to a question, you must ignore the question and must not try to 
guess what the answer might have been. 
3. Testimony that I strike from the record, or tell you to disregard, is not evidence 
and must not be considered. 
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4. Anything you see or hear about this case outside the courtroom is not evidence, 
unless I specifically tell you otherwise during the trial. 
 
 Finally, some of you may have heard the terms “direct evidence” and “circumstantial 
evidence” You are instructed that you should not be concerned with those terms. The law 
makes no distinction between them, and you should give all evidence the weight and value 
you believe it is entitled to receive. 
 
Murder 
 Murder is defined as occurring when a person unlawfully and with malice 
aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.  
 
Malice 
Express malice is that deliberate intention to take the life of another human being 
which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied 
where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing 
show an abandoned and malignant heart. 
 
Intent 
Intent is an essential element of any crime and must be proved by the prosecution 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted intentionally. 
 
Use of Accidental Death as Justification 
No person can be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident in 
which there is no criminal scheme, undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence. An 
accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation, that takes place 
or begins without design.  
 
Credibility of Witnesses 
 In deciding what testimony of any witness to believe, consider the witness’ 
intelligence, the opportunity the witness had to have seen or heard the things testified 
about, the witness’ memory, any motives that witness may have for testifying a certain way, 
the general reasonableness of the testimony, and the extent to which the testimony is 
consistent with other evidence that you believe. 
 
Note on Transcripts 
 At the end of the trial, you must make your decision based on what you recall of the 
evidence. You will not have a written transcript to consult.  
 
One of the 3 pre-trial instructions (control, weak, or strong) will be inserted here 
according to random assignment.  
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PROSECUTION OPENING STATEMENT 
 
“Escape”, words of that defendant, Justin Ross Harris.  Words that reveal the motive 
of this man, for killing his child in the most horrific, imaginable way. This child sat in a car 
baking to death on June the 18, 2014. The evidence will show that this defendant, that day, 
messaged over 30 people. Women he met online and exchanged comments with about 
being unhappy in his marriage. “I love my son all, but we both need escapes”. This is what he 
was doing that day while his son died in the car, slowly, painfully. 
With this indictment, the question is, did he intend to kill this child or not? The 
evidence is going to show that he is undoubtedly guilty. You will see, the deception, the 
double life, how he behaved, and how he lied.  
That morning about 9:00 a.m., the defendant arrived at Chick-fil-A with Cooper, at 
breakfast, and at 9:20 a.m., they walked out of Chick-fil-A together.  At 9:25 a.m., the 
defendant pulls into the parking lot at Home Depot Treehouse. At 9:26 a.m. after he parked 
that car, it takes him 30 seconds to get out and close the door. At 4:16 p.m., he drives away 
from work to go to a movie with his friends. About 4:22 p.m. the defendant pulls into the 
Akers Mill shopping center. Right after he gets out of the car he is saying, ‘What have I done? 
What have I done?’ He then takes Cooper out, messes around with CPR for a second and 
then walks away. Everybody else tries to save his child.  
You’re going to hear him yell at the police initially, while they’re handcuffing him, 
and then you're going to hear the behavior, the demeanor, and manipulation start from 
there. In the back of the patrol car, he was calm, cool, and collected. What does he complain 
about? Is he screaming, “Can I see my son? What's going on?” No. He complains that it's hot 
in the back of the car. Occasionally, he yells out and says something and puts his head in the 
cushion. What's important to pay attention when you see this video is his behavior, 
demeanor, manipulation as they drive away to go to the Police Department. The defendant 
is in the back of the patrol car chatting officer Piper up like they were in a bar. Not the 
behavior of someone who unknowingly, negligently left their child in a car to die, gut-
wrenching pain, the worst pain imaginable. 
At the police station, once he's in that interview room, you're going to see him trying 
to work himself up, and up, and up. The defendant initially is asked who usually takes this 
child to daycare. Is it out of the ordinary for him? No, he says initially, “I usually take him.” 
But then you're going to hear him back off and say, “Well it’s kind of a coin toss, we never 
know who's going to do it.” Because the defendant worked a stone's throw away from that 
daycare, he would take the child around 80% of the time, that was his routine. The 
defendant went to Chick-fil-A all the time but at least two or three days a month he would 
take Cooper with him. He would go sit down and have breakfast with Cooper and then take 
him to daycare.  
The investigators went and looked at forensic evidence pulled from telephones and 
computers to see what he was doing that day. The defendant posted numerous times 
random things on an app called Whisper, “I hate being married with kids, the novelty has 
worn off” just a couple weeks prior to Cooper’s death. This was his obsession, taking risk 
after risk after risk. Meeting up with prostitutes, all the while his wife is texting him.  
Other testimony you’re gonna hear that the car was taken back to Home Depot 
parking lot couple weeks later for experts in the field to determine how hot it gets inside of 
the car. On this day, the defendant left Cooper in the car, it got up to 92 degrees outside. 
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Coincidence? It happened to be the hottest day of the year. You will see there's a web 
search on his phone, that he had gone to weather predictor.com “Why is it hazy on a hot 
day?”, the day before the murder. 
This case is about how the defendant wanted his friends and family see him. He was 
very worried about perception versus the real Justin Ross Harris. This is about the life he 
was forced to lead versus the life he wanted to lead. Friends and family, all say he seemed 
to love his wife and be a good father. Then you're going to hear from people who saw the 
other side. Trying to use his role of the church guitarist in his messaging with gals.  One of 
these gals asked him, “Does your conscience ever kick in?” two weeks before this murder. 
You know what his answer was? “Nope.” The only issue in this case is, was there malice? 
He's guilty, and when you hear the evidence in this case there will be no question that he’s 
guilty. 
During this trial remain focused. Focus on the defendant and what he did. This case 
about who is guilty. It’s the defendant versus the evidence. The defendant’s own words 
show that he’s guilty by incriminating and conflicting statements, texts, and emails. What 
he said before getting caught and his attempts to manipulate the situation show that he’s 
guilty. In this case, it is the State’s burden of proof to prove the defendant guilty, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Now the key word there is reasonable. From any reasonable view the 
facts you're going to see how the defendant murdered his child. The defendant is clearly 
guilty of malice murder. “I love my son and all but we both need escapes.” Death, deception, 
and a double life. At the end of the case ladies and gentlemen, we are going to ask you to do 
a couple of simple things, use your common sense with all the evidence in this case and 
hold this man responsible for trying to escape from one life into another by killing a child in 
the most unimaginable, horrible way. Thank you. 
 
DAY 2: DEFENSE OPENING STATEMENT 
 
The first thing that I want to tell you is that the State is right about one very 
important matter and that is that Ross Harris is responsible for his child’s death. From the 
moment he caught a glimpse of Cooper in the back, he knew what he had done. He had 
forgotten him. He whipped his car over into a parking lot and pulled his son out. He 
desperately attempted CPR but was too overwhelmed. He acknowledged that this was his 
fault, that he is responsible. But, responsible isn't the same thing as criminal.  
The evidence is going to show you that Ross loved that little boy more than 
anything. Cooper’s death was an accident and that's exactly what Ross told the police when 
they interviewed him. But because he said, “Listen this was an accident”, they said, “Well 
he’s setting up his defense.” What he did wasn’t willful, meaning he wasn't doing some sort 
of reckless act that would inevitably lead him to believe that his son would be injured. It 
was an accident. 
 You are going to hear bad things about Ross Harris regarding his sexually immoral 
behavior. Ross used social media apps to exchange very gross, graphic, and filthy sexual 
talk with people. And he was unfaithful to his wife. But Ross’s sex life, no matter how 
perverse, and nasty, and wrong that we think it is, doesn’t have a thing in the world to do 
with the fact that he forgot that little boy. The fact that he had a lot of filthy, sexual 
behaviors isn’t motive to murder the person he loved most.  
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 Mr. Boring kept saying yesterday that Ross was living a double life, but you’ll find 
out that Ross’s closest friends knew that he was dealing with sexual sins in his life. He 
reached out and asked for help. Over the years, Ross’s wife had seen things on his phone. 
They’ve been in marriage counseling. Just because you don’t go around telling everybody 
about your sins and about your private, sexual business doesn’t mean you’re living a 
double life.  
What you’re going to see is that Ross, at the scene, when he pulled Cooper out, was 
hysterical. The State’s witnesses will come in and suggest that he didn’t act right. He didn’t 
cry enough. How do we know how anybody is going to act under those circumstances? 
None of these police officers who stand up and say, “He was acting funny” or “He was acting 
suspicious”; knew Ross. None of them knew his eccentricities, his personality, his coping 
mechanism for trauma or tragedy.  
You are going to hear Ross’s routine was that he was responsible most mornings for 
taking Cooper to daycare. Most mornings he would drop Cooper off at daycare on his way 
into work prior to going to Chick-fil-A. He would get his breakfast, usually through the 
drive-thru. On days that Ross did not take Cooper to daycare, he would still go to Chick-fil-A 
and go through the same intersection to work. That was his typical morning routine.  
Occasionally, that pattern would be changed, and they would have their daddy-son 
time together at Chick-fil-A. When they would have their little daddy-son breakfast 
together, Ross did not follow that pattern of driving from the Chick-fil-A straight through 
the intersection to work. On those days, Ross was supposed to come out of the parking lot 
and make a U-turn when he gets to this intersection. It wasn’t every week and it wasn’t 
even every month. It had been about two months since the last time Ross and Cooper went 
to breakfast. 
Memory is amazing and a miraculous thing, but it’s not perfect and sometimes, it 
fails us. There are scientists who study memory failure and why and how parents can 
forget. Short-term memory is when we’re concentrating on something at that moment and 
that includes intentional or prospective memory. It is what we’re intending to do or a plan 
for future action. Long-term memory deals with the routine behavior that doesn’t require 
the planning and concentration because that’s what we do over and over and over  
Leaving Chick-fil-A and driving straight through that intersection is Ross’s pattern. 
On June the 18th, he intended to depart from that habit and that pattern. He had every 
reason in the world to take him to daycare. This is a very high traffic and very serious 
intersection. Navigating this intersection is something that he does every day but normally 
he goes straight through. It’s his habit, his pattern.  
Ross never forgot that he had a son. He just lost awareness that he was in the car. 
He’d gotten distracted somewhere along the way. His habit memory kicked in and he goes 
straight through that intersection to work. Why didn’t he remember Cooper during the 
day? Because there was nothing to specifically challenge his memory that he had forgotten 
Cooper.  
There’s one person in this world who has got every reason in the world to hate that 
guy. He took everything from her and cheated on her. His wife is going to sit right here and 
tell you that he was unfaithful. However, she’s going tell you that Ross loved that little boy 
more than anything in the world. She’s going to tell you they got it wrong. Thank you. 
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DAY 3: PROSECUTION WITNESSES TESTIFY 
 
Officer Piper: Cobb County police officer on the scene who questioned Harris at the scene 
and transported him to the police department for interrogation. EXAMINATION: Testifies 
that Harris’s demeanor did not appear consistent with someone who had just lost a child; 
he did not appear upset or distraught and tried chatting her up as if he was flirting with 
her. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Officer Piper testifies that she does not know anything about 
Harris, his occupation, personality, or how he deals with trauma when she wrote her initial 
incident report.  
 
J. Hawkins: Bystander who performed CPR on Cooper in the parking lot. EXAMINATION: 
Testifies that he saw Harris pull Cooper out of the car, lay him on the asphalt and tried to 
perform CPR. Harris did not appear to be doing it right, so he began to perform CPR on 
Cooper instead. NO CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 
B. Shumpert: Crime scene technician for Cobb County police who examined the scene and 
the Harris’s home. EXAMINATION: Testifies, “It was a young child, toddler age, lying on its 
back on the pavement, knees slightly bent, hands to its sides. He had some scratches on his 
face.” He testifies about the smell of the body, “I’d describe the smell as a hot, musty, urine-
soaked diaper. His shorts and shirt were noticeably wet.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies 
that he did not see any evidence of child neglect when he investigated the Harris’s vehicle 
and home. Shumpert testifies that he smelled a dirty diaper smell when he was close to 
Cooper’s body, but it was “unremarkable” so he did not note it in his report. 
 
A. Womack: A witness who called 911. EXAMINATION: Testifies that she pulled up to the 
parking lot, saw the scene, and called 911 after another person told her what happened. 
She saw Harris pacing back and forth and screaming while Cooper (who appeared dead) 
was on the ground with someone performing CPR on him. CROSS-EXAMINATION: She 
testifies that she saw Harris acting frantic; screaming, pacing, running his hand through his 
hair and he was on the phone. 
 
DAY 4: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
Officer Gallimore: Cobb County patrol officer, first on the scene. EXAMINATION: Testifies 
that when he arrived on the scene he saw Cooper on the ground, “I immediately saw the kid 
was not breathing. I could see his tongue sticking through his teeth. His eyes were wide open, 
and you could see a gray shadow toward the bottom of his eyes. From my experience, that’s a 
sign a child was deceased for quite a while.” He also testifies that he thought Harris was 
acting hysterical and wasn’t being genuine. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Gallimore testifies why 
he did not report that he thought Harris hysterical behavior was not genuine, “That’s why I 
used the word ‘acting’ in describing how hysterical Harris was.”  
 
P. Barwick: Paramedic on the scene. EXAMINATION: Testifies that no one was doing CPR on 
Cooper when he arrived at the scene and “His eyes were glazed over. Rigor mortis and 
lividity had both set in.” Barwick also states that Harris was "Very dry. Showed no emotion. 
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Was not crying.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris asked him if Cooper was dead 
and he replied, "Yes, sir, he's deceased." which was not included in his report.  
 
Captain Ferrell: Captain with the Cobb County police department.  EXAMINATION: Testifies 
that he inspected the vehicle and smelled death and decay. He described the smell, “It was a 
combination of odors. You could smell the odor of a diaper from a child, and child's sweat. And 
I smelled that unusual odor that I can only associate with something that's dead. There's an 
odor associated with death that's unique.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he did not 
mention or report the smell to anyone at the scene, and only mentioned to Det. Stoddard 
later that night. He also testifies that, “I failed to file a report on my observations from the 
scene, including the odor, until many months later, perhaps a year.” 
 
DAY 5: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
Detective Grimstead: Crime-scene investigator for Cobb Country. EXAMINATION: Testifies 
that he was assigned to process Harris's Hyundai Tucson, at the crime-scene processing 
shed. He testifies, “When I opened the car door, I smelled a heavy odor of like a sweat, urine 
type smell in the vehicle. It's an odor that I normally associate with death. It's very hard to 
describe the odor. Like a sickly sweaty smell.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he used 
very precise measurements on the car seat. He admitted that measurements as to where 
Cooper had his head, were not used when they replaced that car seat in July, the position of 
the carrying handle was different and the adjustment straps may have been different.  
 
D. Doerr: Escort. EXAMINATION: Testifies that she engaged in sexual acts with Harris for 
money three times and he was relaxed but strictly business. NO CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 
W. Milling: Harris’s college friend and co-worker at Home Depot. EXAMINATION: Milling 
testifies that it was Harris’s idea to go to the movie and that all the men’s wives were going 
except Harris’s wife. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he always had to talk to Harris 
on the left side because Harris is deaf in his right ear. 
 
A. Hall: Harris’s college friend and co-worker at Home Depot. EXAMINATION: Testifies that 
Harris interviewed at Chick-fil-A for a different job and was upset that he didn’t get it. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies he was the one who sent the “living child-free” Reddit 
thread to the group in a Google chat and that about 20 seconds later Harris responded, 
“Grossness.” 
 
DAY 6: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
B. Frist: Chief medical examiner with Cobb County medical examiner’s office at the time of 
Cooper’s death (now retired). EXAMINATION: Testifies that Cooper died of hyperthermia – 
excessive heat, “A hyperthermia death would have taken time, the person is going to go 
through various phases when they are getting heated. He probably would have struggled as 
he was becoming more and more uncomfortable which is probably what caused the abrasions 
on Cooper’s cheek, arm, neck, and knee.”  CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that there were no 
gasses or decomposition smells emanating from Cooper, per se, but, “I believe that 
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especially as it got to around 4 o’clock in the afternoon when the temperature in the car 
would have been hot, there would have the stale odor of someone who’s been breathing, 
sweating, urinating.  
 
D. Brani: An expert in thermodynamics and heat transfer science who works for a lab in 
Marietta. EXAMINATION: Testifies that he conducted testing on Harris’s car in July 2014 to 
see how hot it got in the car the day Cooper died. The highest temperature on the day 
Cooper died was 92 degrees. On the day Harris’s SUV was tested the outside temperature 
reached 91 degrees and inside the SUV the temperature peaked at 125 degrees. It was just 
over 120 degrees at 4:15 p.m., around the time Harris would have gotten back in the car to 
leave work. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he did not take humidity or body heat 
into account. 
 
R.B. Smith: An expert in surveillance footage investigation who works for Cobb County 
police in the high-tech crime squad. EXAMINATION: Testifies that he extracted data 
(messages, texts, searches) from Harris’s cell phones and iPad. He found messages 
exchanged including one that said, “I love my son and all but we both need escapes.” He 
found a Whisper post on Harris's phone, that read, '"I hate being married with kids. The 
novelty has worn off and I have nothing to show for it." Smith also testifies that Harris went 
to weatherpredictor.com on June 17, 2014, at 9:12 a.m., the day before Cooper died. CROSS-
EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris did not try to hide the Whisper app, or the messages 
exchanged. Smith testifies that he did not think Harris created the Whisper message about 
hating being married with kids but Harris had made a lot of searches including “Why is it 
hazy on a hot day?” and “child passport cost”. 
 
E. Smith: A woman whom Harris sexted. EXAMINATION: Testifies that she met Harris 
through Whisper in January 2014 and then continued their conversations on Kik. They 
talked or exchanged sexual texts almost every day for a couple months and spoke on the 
phone once or twice before meeting in person in a parking lot and having sex. They were 
exchanging sexual texts the day Cooper died. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris 
told her all about his son, Cooper, and talked to her about sexual problems he had with his 
wife but never talked about leaving her.  
 
J. Meadows: A woman whom Harris sexted. EXAMINATION: Testifies that she met Harris in 
person in August 2013 at a store. They kissed but it didn’t go any further. She testifies that 
she fell in love with Harris and he repeatedly sent messages telling her that he loved her. 
He told her that if his situation was different he would be with her instead of his wife. She 
testifies that in the weeks prior to Cooper’s death she had met someone and cut things off 
with Harris which he expressed extreme sadness about in his messages to her. CROSS-
EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris sent her a message that said, “If Cooper wasn’t in the 
picture, I probably would have left by now.”  
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DAY 7: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
Det. Stoddard: Cobb County police officer, lead detective on the case. EXAMINATION: Det. 
Stoddard authenticates a video of Harris in the interview room waiting to be interviewed, 
during the interview and when Harris’s wife was in the room with him.  
 
The video: He is visibly upset and begins crying, Harris is breathing heavy 
and sobbing with his head down. He is repeating "Oh God! My boy. Oh my God why? 
Why did I do that?" He is standing in the interview room alone, leaning against a 
wall, still crying, breathing very heavily, and is visibly shaken, almost hysterical. He 
sits back down, then stands up again and begins pacing the room. Det. Stoddard 
enters the room and begins questioning Harris about education, primary language, 
and medical conditions.  
Harris describes the morning of June 18, 2014: Harris said it was a normal 
day, his wife left for work about 7:15 and he left the house with Cooper about 8:30 
He and Cooper had breakfast at Chick-fil-A, “We do that about 2 to 3 times a month, 
have our daddy-son breakfast together.” Then, Harris says he put his son in his car 
seat. "I strapped him in. I tightened him up. I gave him a kiss and he gave me a kiss. 
That was our routine. I got in my car, and instead of going from here to here, I went 
straight to work. I didn’t even hear him because he falls asleep really easily when 
driving in a car.” 
 He said he had plans to go to a movie with his friends after work and that’s 
where he was going. “I was going to the movie, driving down Akers Mill when I caught 
a glimpse of him when I looked to my right to change lanes. Then I lost it. I pulled in 
and I pulled him out. For what felt like an eternity but was really a few seconds I tried 
CPR. I couldn’t compose myself to do it so…then there was a group there and they 
attempted. I had done what every parent fears doing and that’s leave their son in the 
car on a hot day. And I lost it, started screaming, started yelling. And then you guys 
arrived.”  
Harris says made two calls to the daycare and one to his wife. He says that he 
did not call 911 because 4 other people did.  
Harris says. “There are occasions in the morning after dropping Cooper off, I’ll 
go to Chick-fil-A because it’s on the way and all those times I always go through the 
drive-thru, and then turn on Cumberland, make that turn, and go straight to work. I 
don’t know if I was thinking it was one of those days and went straight to work. I’d 
never leave him in the car. One of my biggest fears was leaving my son in a hot car.”   
Det. Stoddard ends the interview and tells Harris that they are going to 
charge him with cruelty to a child. The video ends. 
 
Det. Stoddard testifies that Harris was then moved to a holding cell where his wife 
visited him and was videotaped. The video is entered into evidence, authenticated by Det. 
Stoddard and played for the jury.   
The video: Harris is in the interview room. Leanna enters and rushes to 
Harris. They embrace, and Harris starts crying, “I didn’t mean to. How could I forget 
him?” Leanna tells Harris that she knows he didn’t mean to, she loves him, and does 
not hate him. Harris tells Leanna, “I was dreading how he was going to look but he 
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looked peaceful. I wouldn’t bring him back even if I could, he’s in a better place now,” 
Det. Stoddard enters the room, tells Harris that he will be charged with a felony, he 
will be taken to jail tonight and booked. The video ends. 
 
DAY 8: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
Det. Stoddard continues: EXAMINATION (continued): Testifies and answers questions 
about the investigation process; collecting and analyzing evidence such as receipts, 
interviewing witnesses, and searching Harris’s vehicle, home, office, electronic devices 
(phones, computers, tablets). Det. Stoddard identifies Harris’s driving routes from Chick-fil-
A to Cooper’s daycare and to work on an aerial map. He authenticates GoPro videos of him 
driving the route five times and testifies that it took between 2 minutes, 13 seconds 
(shortest time) and 2 minutes, 48 seconds (the longest time). Det. Stoddard authenticates 
and reviews surveillance video of the parking lot of Harris’s employer on the day of 
Cooper’s death, June 18, 2014. The video was entered into evidence and played for the jury. 
The video: Harris’s car enters the lot at 9:24 a.m., finishes parking at 9:25 
a.m., and he leaves the car at 9:26 a.m. Then it shows Harris leaving his office around 
4:15 p.m., walk to and enter his car at 4:16 and drive away. 
 
 Det. Stoddard authenticates Harris’s phone call activity on the day of Cooper’s death. 
He testifies that Harris searched, "what is prison really like?” and "how to survive in federal 
prison" and provides a copy of the Google search results.  
Det. Stoddard testifies about emails Leanna sent to Harris about leaving kids in cars; 
one on Jan. 30, 2013, with a subject line "Don't be this dad.". A second email is a forward of a 
message headed "Look again" from a state agency. A third email sent on May 13, 2014, with 
a subject line, “A 2-year-old in Clarkston, Ga., died after being left in her mother's car." 
Det. Stoddard testifies about messages found on Whisper and Kik between Harris 
and various women. He complained to one woman about being married and his wife 
changed. When the woman asked why they don’t try counseling Harris told her, “We have. 
Plus, I kind of like being bad”. He told another woman, "my wife should divorce me." In 
another message he told another woman, "sometimes I want to be unmarried." On May 19, 
2014 (one month before Cooper’s death) he told another, "Wish I was single." On May 23, he 
told another, "I settled down. Kinda regret it." On May 28, he told another, "I'm a bit 
miserable, too . . . No sex (in my relationship). You?" On March 14, he told another, "I'm tired 
of living with my wife sometimes, lol." In January 2014, he told another, "I miss being single. ... 
I just want to (expletive) a lot of girls, drink a lot and have fun." In February he told another, 
"You don't need a baby. It's not easy, and expensive. I love my son, but that joker drains my 
paycheck." Also in February, he told another, "I have sex with strangers to block out a lot of 
my pain. ... I like it with strangers." He told another "I have a sex addiction I've acted on. I kind 
of regret that. I know it's not good, but I'm addicted to sex.” She replied, “Wow….so why don't 
you get divorced”? He says, “My kid is the glue holding it together”.  
Det. Stoddard testifies about Harris’s messaging various women on Whisper and Kik 
the day Cooper died. Harris started messaging a woman at 5:45 am, shortly after he woke 
up. He sent a few messages and then stops. At 7:22 am messaging resumes and continued 
all day until Harris leaves work for the movies. 
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DAY 9: PROSECUTION WITNESSES continued 
 
Det. Stoddard continues: CROSS-EXAMINATION: Confirms that they have not located any 
witnesses to whom Ross expressed malice or hatred toward his son Cooper. Testifies that 
on the morning of Cooper’s death Harris contacted a woman that he had previously met up 
with who gave him fellatio in his car, asking if she could come and do that to him again that 
day.  
Det. Stoddard testifies that he thought Harris’s behavior at the scene was strange. 
That Harris should have been crying more and should have had real evidence of crying like 
tears on his shirt and a stuffy/runny nose. He testifies that they originally detained Harris 
and put him in the police car because he was causing a disturbance at the scene. He testifies 
that Harris’s behavior in the back of the police car was strange, that he should have been in 
shock and staring straight ahead instead of turning around to see what was going on 
behind the car.  
Det. Stoddard testifies that at the scene he put his head in Harris’s car and did not 
smell any odor, but he did smell an odor in the vehicle 4-6 hours later at the evidence shed. 
Det. Stoddard authenticates reports from other first responders on the scene and agrees 
(with defense counsel) that none of the first responders reported an odor of death or 
decomposition. Det. Stoddard confirmed that only he, Lieutenant Farrell, and Detective 
Grimstead reported an odor of death, and that they had a meeting about it later.  
 
J. Persinger: Employed with PM Investigations Inc. & a certified police officer. 
EXAMINATION: Testifies about programs used to extract data from Harris’s phone and two 
computers. Testifies that there was a search on Harris’s laptop for "how to survive in 
prison", but this search had been deleted from the browsing history. He also found a 
webpage titled "Divorce/Legal Separation Checklist" that was accessed following a search 
for “name change”; and on June 17th two searches were conducted for vacation plans for 
two adults and no children. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that the applications Harris 
used to communicate with various women were not deleted and that during his 
investigation he tried finding several searches on Harris’s computer, such as "living child-
free” but did not find anything. Also testifies that there was evidence on Harris’s computer 
that the Harris were looking for homes. 
 
R. Webb: A real estate agent. EXAMINATION: Testifies that he began helping Ross and 
Leanna Harris to find a house to buy since February 2014 and their primary concern was 
being in a good school district. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he did not know about 
Harris’s “double-life” and did not know that Harris was looking for a different job. 
 
DAY 10: DEFENSE WITNESSES TESTIFY 
 
Leanna Taylor (formerly Harris): Mother of Cooper Harris and Ross Harris's wife at the 
time of Cooper’s death (now divorced). EXAMINATION: She testifies, "We were both very 
involved, diaper changes, baths, meals. Everything was very evenly split." She says that Harris 
was very proud of Cooper and loved to show him off. Taylor describes Harris’s personality, 
"He always had a large personality. He would talk to everybody. He was very outgoing, very 
vocal. He never met a stranger. He was very confident, very sure of himself, he liked to be the 
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center of attention." Taylor testifies that Harris never got angry and never expressed anger 
or hatred or malice toward Cooper.  
 Taylor says Ross took their son to daycare most days, and she picked him up most 
days. She testifies that most mornings Cooper had his breakfast at the daycare but 
occasionally Harris would take Cooper to Chick-fil-A for daddy-son breakfast, but not every 
week.  
Taylor testifies that she and Harris had marriage problems. “We got along, managed 
our home, and co-parented well. Everything was very normal. It all came back to the sexual. 
The first thing that came up was in 2008. He told me he had a problem with pornography. At 
that time, it shocked me, but I didn't think it was a huge issue. Two years after that, around 
2010, I found a message on his phone that you would describe it as sexting. Toward the end of 
2012 or the beginning of 2013, I discovered him viewing pornography on his phone, and got 
upset.” She testifies that before his arrest she did not know that Ross had engaged in 
meeting a woman at a park to have fellatio in a car; had sex in their home with multiple 
women; that he expressed love for other women; or that he had sex with prostitutes. She 
says that she eventually did ask Ross if he wanted a divorce and was prepared to give him 
one if he wanted, but his response was that it was the last thing he wanted. 
Taylor testifies about the day of Cooper’s death. She was working that day. She and 
Harris discussed his plans to go to a movie that afternoon and agreed that she would be the 
one to pick up Cooper from daycare. She received a text from Ross at 3:16 pm asking, 
“When are you getting my buddy?" She says she arrived at Little Aprons day car between 
4:30 pm – 5:00 pm. “They were telling me Cooper wasn't checked in that day. I was calling 
Ross every two or three minutes and believed that ultimately he would explain everything.” 
Taylor describes what happened when she finally saw Ross. “It was very difficult to 
see him like that. That's not a side of Ross that I'd seen. Just very broken. I have never seen him 
cry out like that before. He had tears streaming down his face and was crying enough that he 
needed a tissue. I remember his shirt being wet.” 
Taylor testifies that Cooper would fall asleep easily in his car seat, and that he was 
small for his age and weighed less than 30 pounds. Taylor testifies that Harris was deaf in 
his right ear due to a fireworks accident on New Year's Eve 2005. A bottle rocket went 
inside his ear and exploded. Harris had surgery to repair the damage but has been deaf in 
his right ear ever since. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that she thinks Harris would have seen Cooper in 
his car seat when he turned his head to change lanes if Cooper awake; but not if he was 
sleeping because he slumps down when he slept in his car seat. She confirms that Harris 
was unsatisfied with his salary at Home Depot and was trying to get a job with Chick-fil-A 
but did not get it so she (Taylor) had to work more hours at her job. Taylor testifies that 
money was tight, but they were not overly worried.  
 
DAY 11: DEFENSE WITNESSES continued 
 
J. Abdo:  A senior manager in web development and technology who worked with Harris at 
Home Depot. EXAMINATION: Testifies that he once asked Ross what it was like to have 
kids, “I didn't have a lot of friends who had kids already and wanted to know what it was like. 
He put it in a way I could understand, from a music context. ‘As much as you love music, you'll 
love your kid 100 times more.’" CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he wasn't aware of any 
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of Harris's sexual behaviors: meeting with prostitutes, texting images of genitals back and 
forth with multiple women, and that it would be completely counter to the person he knew. 
 
A. Brown: A systems engineer who worked on the same team as Harris for three or four 
years at Home Depot. EXAMINATION: Brown testifies about Harris’s work ethic. “Harris 
started as an intern and showed great promise but became less motivated as time went on. On 
June 17 (the day before Cooper’s death), I finally told him (Harris) to finish his project by the 
end of the day but he left work that day without it being done.” Brown testifies that it is not 
suspicious that Harris (a web developer) cleared his cache frequently and cleared it shortly 
before Cooper’s death. “It is not unusual to clear the cache on work computers or phones. The 
web development crew often ‘clear cache’ to make sure they could see the changes they made 
on the web site.” Brown also testifies that Harris was obsessed with Cooper, he brought 
Cooper into the office from time to time and often showed off photos of him. CROSS-
EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris’ work ethic was about forgetfulness not laziness, “He 
would forget something we had just talked about 15 minutes before.”  
 
M. Baygents: Harris’s brother. EXAMINATION: Testifies that he saw Harris interact with 
Cooper just weeks before Cooper’s death when the families were vacationing on the beach. 
“Ross was right there taking care of Cooper the whole time, setting up a big umbrella for him 
to play out of the sun and stuff like that. I think he loved Cooper more than life itself. Ross was 
kind to him; he played with him. He was very attentive. That was his little buddy.” Baygents 
testifies that Harris wanted the two families to go on a cruise. They were looking into 
Carnival Cruises because it was more family-oriented. Baygents also testifies that Harris 
and Leanna were starting to look at the future for Cooper’s schooling, “They were looking 
for houses with big backyards, in good neighborhoods with good schools for Cooper. 
Everything revolved around Cooper.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris didn’t do 
anything that would lead him to believe he (Harris) saw prostitutes or was sexting women. 
“I just don’t think that anybody would share that with their brother. I would never have 
expected that kind of behavior from Ross.” 
 
A. Baygents: Harris’s sister-in-law, (M. Baygents’s wife). EXAMINATION: Testifies Harris a 
good dad. “Ross was a very loving dad, attentive, played with Cooper a lot. He pushed Cooper 
in the stroller, carried him around, got ice cream. He always helped out with bedtime, bath 
time, feeding. Leanna and Ross were both very hands-on parents and seemed to both take on 
those responsibilities together.” CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that initially, she didn’t 
know about the problems Harris and Leanna were having in their marriage.  
 
H. Coyle: A travel agent. EXAMINATION: Testifies that on June 17, 2014, she received an 
email from Harris inquiring about family cruises for nine people, four adults and five kids. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that Harris did not follow up with her between the time he 
asked her about the trip at church a month before and when he emailed on June 17th.  
 
M. Simmons: Harris’s close friend. EXAMINATION: Testifies he and Harris are very close 
and spend a lot of time together. Simmons testifies that Harris never told him about his 
marital problems or extramarital sexual activities. CROSS-EXAMINATION: Simmons 
testifies that he was unaware that Harris had been having sex with women in public, going 
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to prostitutes, sexting with strangers, “I wouldn't describe Ross as a big risk taker. Taking 
risks like that is not in line with the Ross that I know.” 
 
DAY 12: DEFENSE WITNESSES continued 
 
Dr. Brewer: Professor of psychology at Arizona State University, studies human cognition 
and memory. Expert witness on memory and attention. EXAMINATION: Dr. Brewer testifies 
that he has a Ph.D. in psychology and specializes in human cognition. Dr. Brewer testifies 
about his area of research. “My research on memory has to do with memory and attention in 
terms of goal-directed behaviors.” 
Dr. Brewer explains the factors which contribute to or promote prospective memory 
failure. “There are three factors that are present in this case that I think hurt, and then there 
are two factors present in this case that I think can help. First is habit. Most of our lives we are 
just engaging in routine behavior. I wake up, brush my teeth, take a shower, and put my 
clothes on. I don’t really think much about it. These are routine behaviors that are done over, 
and over. In cases like this we can see prospective memory failures which are failures to 
remember to do something in the future. We know that if you have a prospective memory goal 
to remember to do something in the future and it is counter to your original behavior, people 
will lapse into their routine behavior, causing them to forget their prospective memory goal. 
This is because the thing that they are intending to do is not as powerful to them as this 
routine behavior.” 
“So, the evidence in this case is that this route that he takes is his routine behavior. 
That’s his habit. As far as I can tell, based on what I’ve seen, generally Harris would first take 
his son to the Little Apron Academy, then he would go to Chick-fil-A, and then he would go to 
work. So that’s a well-worn path. Also, that path is even more well-worn because I had been 
told that he would often eat at Publix which is along that same path. Instances where Cooper 
was with Ross are fewer in terms of their relative amount. So, Cooper did go to Chick-fil-A 
with Ross, but not as much as Ross went to Chick-fil-a on his own, and certainly not as much 
as when Ross was going to Publix for lunch. So, you have a disproportionate amount of times 
that Ross drove that route alone than with Cooper. His habit would be to naturally go to work 
in this case.” 
“The second factor that is present in memory failure is distraction. Distraction is partly 
why people fall back into routine behaviors. There are really two types of distraction. There is 
external distraction and there is internal distraction. External distraction just means that 
something is happening in your environment. In this case, a big distraction that comes from 
an external source is making this U-turn. In my experience in making that U-turn and in the 
GoPro videos that I’ve seen in making that U-turn, it’s a high traffic area. As soon as you make 
the U-turn, there are trucks pulling out of Home Depot and cars changing lanes so, there is 
lots of information that could be distracting.” 
“There’s another form of distraction and that comes from inside of your own mind and 
that’s internal distraction. In this case there were some things going on with Ross that could 
have caused internal distractions. I do know that Ross had sent an email about work the 
previous night, expressing some dissatisfaction with his own performance at his job. I also 
note that Cooper had woken him up early. So, I imagine that that was on his mind, thinking 
that Cooper had not been well or that Cooper had been sick. I certainly can’t know what Ross 
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was thinking. That’s the nature of internal distraction, unless somebody reports that they 
were distracted because they were thinking about this thing.” 
 “We know that fatigue has negative impacts on attention and memory, which are 
necessary for prospective memory. So, fatigue is going to have a negative impact on 
prospective memory. Because of the time of the email that he sent to work and the time that 
he reported that Cooper woke him, we know that he did not sleep for more than five or six 
hours. So, he had less sleep than usual.” 
Dr. Brewer testifies about false memory. “The topic here is called output monitoring, 
which is just a fancy way of saying how you know whether or not you successfully completed 
your prospective memory intentions. So, monitoring whether you behaved in a certain way. As 
you might imagine in these cases where children have been left in cars, the parents tend to 
report the experience of believing that the child was taken to daycare. An example specifically 
from this case is that when Ross was talking to the police officer at the scene he said 
something to the effect of ‘I thought my son was at daycare,’ And it’s not an issue that only 
happened in Ross’s case. In other cases where parents have had this tragedy happen to them, 
they report the exact same subjective experience.” 
 
DAY 13: DEFENSE WITNESSES continued 
 
Dr. Brewer: CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that in most of the cases where a child 
has been left and there’s been a failure of the memory system, the child is in the back seat, 
out of view of the driver. He also testifies that in a lot of these cases something stressful or 
distracting happens during the drive, but he is unclear about what happened during the 
drive from Chick-fil-A to his work. Dr. Brewer to confirms that he is not here to give this 
jury an opinion that this incident was a failure of memory systems, per say, and that if it is 
proven that the defendant intended to kill his child, the memory stuff that he told the jury 
wouldn’t have anything to do with it. 
Dr. Brewer testifies that the duration (shorter vs. longer) of the incident sometimes 
can make memory failure more or less likely depending on the factors. “Think about it, if 
you’re trying to remember something and I’m allowing you to sit here forever, you have a 
higher likelihood of remembering it just because you have more time. So, in one way, having 
more time helps. There are more opportunities for new cues. But in a longer time period, more 
forgetting can also happen. It’s not a very direct answer. There are a lot of factors that are in 
play when you’re thinking about time and memory.” 
 
S. Moulton:  A digital forensics expert works in computers and information technology.  
EXAMINATION: Testifies that he investigated allegations of web searches and web visits for 
the police found that Harris did not create the Whisper meme about hating being married 
with kids and he found no searches that would indicate Harris was seeking a divorce. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: Testifies that he did not produce a report of his investigation. 
Moulton testifies that he found the searches: "young and wild" and "Atlanta casual 
encounters classified" on Harris’s iPhone from June 17 and June 18 (the day of Cooper's 
death). 
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This is the end of Part 1. One of the 3 pre-trial instructions (control, weak, or strong) 
will be inserted here according to random assignment and participants will be 
excused for the day.  
 
DAY 14: PROSECUTION CLOSING ARGUMENT 
 
“I love my son and all, but we both need escapes.” Those words were uttered 10 
minutes before this defendant, with selfish, abandon, and a malignant heart, did exactly 
that. He drove Cooper to the Home Depot parking lot and left him there to die on that 
morning of June 18th, 2014. He closed the door on his little life because of his own 
selfishness, because of what was more import to him: his obsession, his other life and living 
a live free from his marital and parental responsibilities.  
Now throughout this trial, we have seen several videos and photographs of Cooper 
playing with his dad, on the beach. But we also saw that in this case, in the weeks before 
they returned from that Memorial Day weekend, a vacation the defendant originally did not 
want to take Cooper on, he had gone to the Home Depot website to a page with a 
divorce/separation checklist.  Then a couple days after that, he doesn’t get the job at Chick-
fil-A. The evidence shows the defendant’s behavior was escalating. In addition to being 
unhappy with his job, we know that in that time the number of photos the defendant took 
or sent out or received regarding his ‘other life’, far outnumbered anything that had any 
involvement with his son Cooper. We know that in these weeks leading up to June 18th, 
2014, he went to a hotel and had sex for money with a prostitute. That shows you the 
behavior, and how his priorities were set, and how this was escalating, leading up to June 
18th, 2014.  
We know that he was leading this double life because he told people numerous 
times, “I lead a double life”. And in that double life, two weeks before this child’s death, one 
of these gals he’s sexting with, after he’s bragging about ‘Oh well, I’m also a lead guitarist in 
a church band’, she asks him, ‘Does your conscience ever kick in?’ And what does that 
defendant say? ‘Nope.” He showed exactly who he is. The one that he was most emotionally 
attached to was slipping through his fingers, Jaynie Meadows. We know this woman that he 
professed love to, who he told that if it wasn’t for Cooper that he would leave Leanna, was 
gradually cutting him off.  
When we’re looking at the evidence in this case, we’re going to be talking about the 
facts as they apply. First, as we talked in opening, it’s a case about death, deception, and a 
double life. There is no doubt the defendant lived a double life and was obsessed with his 
bad side. There is no doubt that the defendant left Cooper in that car and in this case, 
contrary to what the defense told you in their opening, responsible is guilty.  
What does reasonable doubt mean? In this case, your job as a juror is to search for 
the truth. And as much as we may not want to believe that people are not capable of this 
type of evil, that’s exactly what the facts show. Beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean 
beyond all doubt or some mathematical certainty. We must have common sense and 
reason, ladies and gentlemen. The defense’s theory: ‘Oh, well, maybe it was a memory 
failure.’ Well, when you look at all the facts, if you use common sense in this case, the 
defendant is guilty.  
We hear about circumstantial evidence and direct evidence, they are equal. Now in 
this case, we’ve got evidence of both. We have a ton of direct and circumstantial evidence in 
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this case. First the direct evidence, which is something that points immediately, to the 
question and issue. In this case it is the video evidence. There’s no doubt the defendant left 
Chick-fil-A at a certain time. There’s no doubt he parked the car the way he did, and he left 
the child in that car. There’s no doubt he went back to the car and sped off that afternoon, 
with the windows up, within three seconds of the door closing. Direct evidence in the 
defendant’s own statements to the police and his wife. Remember some of those comments 
he made to his wife? “I was dreading how he was going to look. I wouldn’t bring him back 
even if I could,” hours after he’s pulled his son out of a car.  
Now, circumstantial evidence, which is a fact proven by inference. Circumstantial 
evidence in this case is showing Harris’s double life, and what his priority was in the days 
leading up to and especially on June 18, 2014. The departure from work, the route he took, 
which we heard from everybody that it was not the right route to take to the movie theater, 
the smell in that car: all circumstantial evidence. The video evidence, text messages, the lies 
about his relationships, with Leanna, and about what he was doing that day at Chick-fil-A 
and after, circumstantial evidence. He wasn’t truthful with the police about what he was 
doing. His demeanor, everybody says that his behavior was inconsistent. He’s doing at the 
scene exactly what was described by Detective Piper as acting like Will Ferrell; yelling a lot, 
and then he’s calm and looking around. It wasn’t until after he was detained and told he 
was going to be arrested for these charges did we see him hit real emotion. All of this is 
circumstantial evidence. 
Accident, you have heard that. It only applies if the person is not responsible at all. 
You cannot apply ‘accident’ if there is a criminal scheme, intention, or criminal negligence 
whatsoever. Accident in no way applies in this case because even if you believe the 
defendant, it’s criminal negligence. Accident? Throw that out. This isn’t an accident because 
there is, at a minimum, criminal negligence and the evidence shows there’s criminal intent.  
Let’s talk about what malice means. First, the judge is going to tell you the law is that 
it does not mean ill will or hatred. Ladies and gentlemen, this isn’t a case about an adult 
hating a child. This case is just like it was with his wife, he loved himself and his other 
obsession more than that little boy. That’s all it is. It’s not ill will or hatred. Malice, a 
forethought, causing Cooper’s death by leaving him alone in a hot car. Not ill will or hatred.  
Now, malice, as it’s defined, can be either expressed or implied and we have both of 
those in this case. Expressed malice is the deliberate intention to take a life which is shown 
by external circumstances capable of proof. Implied malice, is when no considerable 
provocation appeared and when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandon and 
malignant heart. What is the malice in this case? The distance the defendant drove from 
Chick-fil-A to that parking lot, 0.6 miles. Four minutes. Four minutes is about the time it 
took the defendant to get from Chick-fil-A to the first time he was seen pulling in that 
parking lot. The amount of time, 30 to 40 seconds, it took for him to pull out of Chick-fil-A, 
turn around, take a turn, and make that decision to not take Cooper to daycare, that’s 
malice in this case. And malice is shown in his two lives in this case. And his desire to 
escape from one of them, to lead the other. Ladies and gentlemen, it all comes back to this, 
when he left work at the end of the day he knew he had a dead child in the car beside him. 
The defendant is guilty of malice murder. Thank you.  
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DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT 
 
The Cobb County police made their decision on the scene and completely precluded 
the possibility that this was exactly what it was, an accident. It was never, ever a 
consideration that this was an accident. Detective Stoddard and his boss are wrong. It was 
an accident and no person can be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or 
accident in which there was no criminal scheme, under-taking, intention, or criminal 
negligence. An accident, is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation. 
If you find, from the evidence in this case, that Cooper’s death was the result of misfortune 
or accident, and not because of criminal undertaking, then it would be your duty to acquit 
the defendant.  
Mr. Boring told you in opening today that really the only thing to consider here is 
whether this was malice. He told you that based on Ross's words he's guilty of malice 
murder. That's not accurate because you heard the interview, and what Ross said to the 
detectives over, and over again, was “This was an accident.” Ross failed to take Cooper to 
daycare. He forgot him in that car. That has never been an issue. As I told you in the 
opening and as Ross explained from that very day, he is responsible. Nobody else, and he 
has acknowledged that fact from day one. The State has not disproven that this was an 
accident. It is their burden to do so, but they can’t because it was an accident.  
The State's theory in this case is that Ross intended to kill Cooper. Malice, that's been 
the State's theory from the beginning. It doesn't matter what he was thinking about, sports, 
politics, work, sex. Whatever, it doesn’t matter. Why? Because you don't anticipate that 
you're going to forget. When he got out of the car with Cooper at the Treehouse, he'd 
forgotten him.  
The State doesn't address quite a few enormous problems with their theory. There 
is no evidence of any kind of malice, or bad feelings, or anger. There is no evidence that 
Ross expressed that toward the son. Every single witness testified that he was a loving, 
proud father. Even his ex-wife and her best friend did. The State wants to suggest that Ross 
wanted to escape from Cooper so bad that he would destroy the treasure of his life. I 
submit to you this, to do what they're suggesting that he did, knowingly and intentionally, 
there's gotta be some serious hatred. Not just dislike, there's gotta be some real serious ill-
will and hatred toward that little boy. What evidence has the State shown to you that Ross 
Harris hated or had malice for that little boy?  
Ross really wanted a family cruise to happen with the two families; Leanna, Cooper, 
his brother and brother’s family. There's no way around the fact that in the hours before 
Cooper's death, in the weeks before Cooper's death, Ross was planning a cruise that 
included Cooper. To find Ross guilty of murder you basically have to just ignore it. Why? 
Because a person planning to do what they say that Ross did, that kind of person is not 
planning to take their child on the cruise.  
The realtor, Roger Web came in here and told you that the Harris’s were looking for 
a house in good school districts. Ross's computer was chock full of emails exchanged with 
Roger. Some of them we went over in court. So why, why didn’t the Cobb County police 
contact Roger Web? I think it's a fair question. And I also think it's a fair question to ask is 
whether this investigation is really a search for the truth or just those matters which would 
be consistent with the State's theory? It’s inconsistent. To find Ross guilty you've got to 
basically just ignore that. Just ignored it, like the police did. 
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The State's theory in this case is that Ross wanted to live life free of family, free of 
wife and child, to do whatever he wanted to do. The problem is that Ross was already doing 
whatever he wanted to do. The State has been very successful at proving that. So, ask 
yourself this, if the State is right about this cockamamie theory that he intended the killing, 
what in the world does he gain? What has he accomplished? What is his reward? He's 
already doing whatever he wants to do. You think he put himself under this kind of 
scrutiny, destroy his job, his new business and everything, for what?  
We talked a lot about Ross's routine. You heard testimony about Ross’s routine in 
the morning. His routine of going to Chick-fil-A. We know from the manager at Chick-fil-A 
that he’d seen Ross at least 11-12 times inside the store and the drive through but had 
never seen Cooper before. Why? Because Ross rarely took Cooper to breakfast. Taking 
Cooper for breakfast was clearly the exception, it wasn't the normal route. Dr. Brewer 
explained to you that in as little as seconds, we can lose awareness and slip into habit. You 
heard that when coupled with a distraction, something that requires our focus or 
concentration like a U-turn, further promotes that loss of awareness. Ross had been 
through that U-turn many times, but it's different every time you go through it. You must 
concentrate, and seconds is all it takes to lose that attentional memory and slip into that 
habit of going straight through that intersection to work. He already forgot, and by the time 
Ross pulled into work he was already in his daily routine.  
Dr. Brewer also explained that we all have false memories, and in this case, Ross had 
taken Cooper to daycare so many times that he had lots of memories of it. You remember 
what told Officer Piper, “I could have sworn I dropped him off.” The fact that we have 
memory failure in mere seconds. The fact that Ross would have had false memories. That's 
all unrebutted.  
You heard testimony about a stench of death in Ross's car. The suggestion obviously 
being that Ross had to know there was a dead child in his car, had to if there's a stench of 
death. You heard Detective Stoddard testify here in court that he noticed an odor that 
smelled like decomposition or death. And we know that a whole year after Cooper’s death 
and the initial investigation, Detective Grimstead finally wrote a report noting an odor of 
death. Their boss Lieutenant Ferrell wrote that he smelled a unique smell of a deceased 
body and gases coming off the body. Nobody else smelled this odor of decomposition and 
death they’re talking about. Not the CSI detective, the investigator from the medical 
examiner's office, the firemen, EMS, responding officers, bystanders, they all testified they 
smelled soiled diaper, urine. Most significantly Dr. Frist, the medical examiner who had 
examined tissues under a microscope in this case, told us that the smell is the stale odor of 
breathing, sweating urine, and flatulence, not of the decomposition of a dead body. After 
the medical examiner testified, Detective Stoddard reported what they wanted to smell. 
Why? Because it fit their theory.  
The center of the State’s case in their opening statement, “I love my son and all but 
we both need escapes”, what the State suggests Ross is saying is, “I love my son and all but 
I’m about to murder him in the next 15 minutes.” Of course, he doesn’t say that, he doesn’t 
suggest that. The State completely ignores the first part of the statement, ‘I love my son’ and 
focuses only on one word, ‘escape’, because it fits their theory. They want you to forget and 
ignore that Ross says he loves his son and wants you make this leap that one word, ‘escape’ 
means ‘murder’ because that’s the little bridge that must be built to get from the word 
‘escape’ to what they are trying to tell you.  
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The State's told you in opening and closing that their case is about death, deception, 
and double life, but the truth is this case has always been about demeanor and dirt. Ross 
didn't act the way they felt he should. Even though there's plenty of video of him weeping 
aloud when he’s alone. He didn’t cry while being interviewed by police so that was 
suspicious. He is inconsolable when allowed to speak with his wife, but I guess Stoddard 
didn’t see real tears, so that was suspicious. Ross reacted very differently than all of us 
would but no matter what he said or did, it was the wrong thing to say or do. Detective 
Stoddard doesn’t know Ross, officer Piper doesn’t know Ross, but Ross’s demeanor wasn't 
what they thought it should be. Is there any evidence that Ross Harris is guilty? No, he just 
exhibited more and less emotion than the State thinks he should.  
I'm going to ask you to very simply go into that room and write two words, not 
guilty. Because it’s the State's burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross is 
guilty. But more than that, it is also their burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt this 
was not an accident. They have to disprove it was an accident. And, remember he is 
presumed to be innocent unless the State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the 
indictment, and every essential element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
And the burden never shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence or to prove innocence. 
Two words, not guilty.  
Do you have any doubts? After considering all of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, if your minds are wavering, unsettled, or unsatisfied then that is a doubt, and you 
should acquit the defendant. The State failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, so it is your duty to acquit. The State hasn't disproven that this was an 
accident, so it is your duty under the law to write two words, not guilty. On behalf of Ross 
and all us, we trust you. 
 
JUDGE STALEY’S CLOSING STATEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
 
Members of the jury, the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial remain 
in effect. I now give you some additional instructions. You must continue to follow the 
instructions I gave you earlier as well as follow the instructions I give you now. The 
instructions I will now give you will be available to you while you consider your verdict. 
 It is your duty to find from the evidence what the facts are. You will then apply the 
law, as I gave it to you, to those facts. You must follow my instructions on the law, even if 
you thought the law was different or should be different. Do not allow sympathy or 
prejudice to influence you. The law demands of you a just verdict, unaffected by anything 
except the evidence, your common sense, and the law as I give it to you. 
 The indictment in this case charges the defendant with malice murder. The 
defendant has pleaded not guilty to that charge. The indictment is simply the document 
that formally charges the defendant with the crime and is not considered evidence.  
 At the beginning of the trial, I instructed you that you must presume the defendant 
to be innocent. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to find the defendant not 
guilty and can only be overcome if the prosecution proved during the trial, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each element of the crime charged. There is no burden upon the 
defendant to prove that he is innocent. Instead, the burden of proof remains on the 
prosecution throughout the trial. 
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This is the end of Part 2. One of the 3 pre-trial instructions (control, weak, or strong) 
will be inserted here according to random assignment and participants will be 
excused for deliberation.  
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Appendix C 
 
Cover Story:  
This study investigates whether the manner in which trial information is presented to 
mock jurors, (video or written transcript) influences their verdict decisions. Research shows that 
mock juror verdict decisions tend to differ according to whether the trial information was 
presented via a trial video or written transcripts (Baguley, McKimmie, & Masser, 2017). Some 
research shows that mock jurors’ verdict decisions tend to be less punitive when trial testimony 
is presented via video and more punitive when the same information is presented in written 
format. Some researchers speculate that the difference is due to the influence of visual and audio 
cues in trial videos such as body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice eliciting various 
emotional reactions. Other researchers argue that the difference in verdicts could be due to jurors 
not completely reading or understanding the transcripts when presented in written format. Some 
legal scholars have embraced this research and advocate for the use of trial transcripts with jurors 
reading the court proceedings on a teleprompter instead of live viewing in person or over closed-
circuit television.  
It is possible that mock jurors are taking shortcuts when reading which may lead to a 
different understanding of the trial information. However, it is also likely that jurors do not 
intentionally take shortcuts when reading but do so because of differences in motivation. We 
hypothesize that mock jurors are unintentionally less motivated because there is no incentive for 
jurors to reach a fair and accurate verdict in mock jury research. Mock juror verdicts in mock 
trials carry far fewer consequences than those of real jurors in real trials so the difference found 
in research may not be found in the courtroom. We propose that jurors may be more motivation 
to render a fair and accurate verdict in a real trial where the decision has a real and lasting impact 
on the life of another individual, rather than in the artificial environment of a mock trial. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that increasing the motivation of mock jurors by including incentives 
for paying attention and thoroughly reading the trial transcripts will result in more accurate 
verdicts that match those of jurors in a real court case. To test this, we are offering a bonus 
incentive as motivation to mock jurors for thoroughly reading the transcripts and rendering a 
correct verdict, one that matches the real verdict.  
In the current experiment, you will assume the role of a juror in a two-part jury trial of 
real-life murder case, Georgia v. Justin Ross Harris. You will read the trial transcripts that 
consists of the judge’s instructions, opening statements, the testimony and questioning of key 
witnesses, and closing statements. You will also then deliberate in your mock jury group to 
render a verdict decision. You will be asked to give your individual verdict decision both before 
and after the deliberation. If you thoroughly read the transcripts you should arrive at the same 
verdict decision as the real jurors in the real case. If your individual verdict matches the one in 
the real case, then you will be entered into a drawing to receive a $50 Amazon gift card.  
The Justin Ross Harris case is very controversial. It received a lot of media attention and 
was a trending topic on social media during the trial. Please indicate whether you have prior 
knowledge of this case or the final verdict reached please by marking “Yes” or “No” below. 
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Appendix D 
 
Control Jury Instructions 
 
 [Note: These instructions should be provided to jurors before trial, at the close of a case, at the 
end of each day before jurors return home, and other times, as appropriate.]  
 
Pre-trial: 
 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries, reference materials, 
encyclopedias, legal statutes, state laws, books, periodicals, newspaper articles, or use any other 
tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to 
find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the 
case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use telephones, and other manners of communication. You also 
must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use any tools to communicate with anyone 
about the case, in person or otherwise. This includes your family and friends. You may not 
communicate with anyone about the case on your phone, in messages, in writing, in 
conversations or in any way, for any reason during this trial. You may not answer questions 
about the case, ask anyone else about their knowledge, thoughts, questions, or opinions about the 
case; nor may you discuss your thoughts, questions, or opinions about the case. You may not 
consult any other people, companies, resources, or tools to communicate or research anything 
about this case, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as 
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  
 
Post-trial: 
 
 During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any device, reference materials or media, 
such as phones, written or verbal messages, dictionaries, legal statutes, state laws, books, 
magazines, newspaper articles, or use any other tools to communicate to anyone any information 
about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. In other 
words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone in writing, or 
communicate with anyone in person or otherwise about this case. You can only discuss the case 
in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as 
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
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You may not investigate or communicate about the case because it is important that you 
decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom and not use information 
obtained from outside individuals or sources. You are only allowed to discuss the case with your 
fellow jurors during deliberations for the have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In 
our judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of 
this courtroom. Your decision must be based only on information known by you, your fellow 
jurors and the parties in the case that has been presented during the trial process.  
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Appendix E 
 
Weak Jury Instructions 
 
[Note: These instructions should be provided to jurors before trial, at the close of a case, at the 
end of each day before jurors return home, and other times, as appropriate.]  
 
Pre-trial: 
 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, 
search the internet, websites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about 
this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the 
case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use cell phones, smart phones, the internet and other tools of 
technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use these tools to 
communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends. 
You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, smart 
phone, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including Facebook, 
Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not use any similar technology of social 
media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  
 
Post-trial 
 
 During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as 
the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, or computer, the Internet, any Internet 
service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website such as 
Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any 
information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. 
In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone, or 
electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can only discuss the case in the 
jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
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 You may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case 
because it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom. Information on the internet or available through social media might be wrong, 
incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors 
during deliberations because they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In our 
judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this 
courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and not 
your fellow jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the 
judicial process.  
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Appendix F 
 
Strong Jury Instructions 
 
[Note: These instructions should be provided to jurors before trial, at the close of a case, at the 
end of each day before jurors return home, and other times, as appropriate.]  
 
Pre-trial: 
 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. You should not look up terms, laws or other information. In other words, 
you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or 
use any other electronic tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. 
Please do not try to find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 You may not discuss this case with anyone, not even your fellow jurors, until you retire 
to deliberate. In deliberation you may discuss the case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot 
discuss it with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use cell phones, smart phones, tablets, computers the internet 
and other tools of technology. You must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use 
these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family 
and friends. You may not communicate with anyone about this case on your cell phone, smart 
phone, iPhone, through e-mail, text messaging, through any blog or website, including Facebook, 
Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not tweet, post, blog, 
instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss anything about this case. You may not use any 
similar technology or social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here.  
 
You need to fully comply with these instructions during this trial for many reasons. First, 
it is important that you decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this courtroom. 
Otherwise, you could be unfairly influenced or biased by online information. Second, online 
information has not been vetted by the court, so it might be wrong, incomplete or unreliable 
which could lead to invalid verdict decisions. Third, online information could be motivated by 
personal or political agendas that aim to bias public opinion. Fourth, failure to follow these 
instructions is an act of juror misconduct which can have serious consequences such as leading 
to a mistrial. A mistrial could make the current trial invalid and a new trial would be required. 
This is a tremendous expense to the parties, the court, and to you as taxpayers. Last, you could be 
held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, jail time, and paying the costs 
associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be declared.  I expect you will inform me 
as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions. 
 
  I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. 
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Post-trial: 
 
 During your deliberations, you must not provide any information to anyone by any means 
about this case. You may not tweet, post, blog, instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss 
anything about this case through any blog or website, including Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, 
YouTube, Reddit, Instagram or Snapchat. In other words, you must not communicate with 
anyone about this case on your cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, through e-
mail, text messaging, instant messaging or on social media until I accept your verdict. You may 
not use any similar technology or social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. 
You can only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations.  
 
 You may not use electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because 
it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom. 
Information on the internet and social media has not been vetted by the court. It might be wrong, 
incomplete, or unreliable. It could also be motivated by personal or political agendas that aim to 
influence or bias public opinion. This could lead to inaccurate and invalid verdict decisions. You 
can only discuss the case with your fellow jurors during deliberations because they have seen 
and heard the same evidence you have. In our judicial system, it is important that you are not 
influenced by anything or anyone outside of this courtroom. Otherwise, you could be unfairly 
biased, and your decision may be based on information known only by you and not your fellow 
jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the judicial process 
putting the defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial at risk.   
 
Failure to follow these instructions is an act of juror misconduct which can have serious 
consequences such as leading to a mistrial. A mistrial could make the current trial invalid and a 
new trial would be required. This is a tremendous expense to the parties, the court, and to you as 
taxpayers. Last, you could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, 
jail time, and paying the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be 
declared.  I expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation 
of these instructions. 
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Appendix G 
 
Jury Instructions Pilot Test 
 
Instructions: The following are three sets of jury instructions. Carefully read each set of jury 
instructions along with the three definitions. Choose the definition that best describes that 
instruction. If none of the definitions describe that instruction, then choose “none”. 
 
1.) Instruction set 1 
 
Pre-trial: 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries, reference materials, 
encyclopedias, legal statutes, state laws, books, periodicals, newspaper articles, or use any other 
tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to 
find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the 
case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use telephones, and other manners of communication. You also 
must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use any tools to communicate with anyone 
about the case, in person or otherwise. This includes your family and friends. You may not 
communicate with anyone about the case on your phone, in messages, in writing, in 
conversations or in any way, for any reason during this trial. You may not answer questions 
about the case, ask anyone else about their knowledge, thoughts, questions, or opinions about the 
case; nor may you discuss your thoughts, questions, or opinions about the case. You may not 
consult any other people, companies, resources, or tools to communicate or research anything 
about this case, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as 
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  
 
Post-trial: 
 During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any device, reference materials or media, 
such as phones, written or verbal messages, dictionaries, legal statutes, state laws, books, 
magazines, newspaper articles, or use any other tools to communicate to anyone any information 
about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. In other 
words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone in writing, or 
communicate with anyone in person or otherwise about this case. You can only discuss the case 
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in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as 
soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
You may not investigate or communicate about the case because it is important that you 
decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom and not use information 
obtained from outside individuals or sources. You are only allowed to discuss the case with your 
fellow jurors during deliberations for they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In 
our judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of 
this courtroom. Your decision must be based only on information known by you, your fellow 
jurors and the parties in the case that has been presented during the trial process.  
 
 
A.) Instruction Definition A 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions do not give reasons for prohibiting these actions. 
 
B.) Instruction Definition B 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
   
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and websites: 
“Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: The Post-trial instruction explain two (2) reasons for the instructions prohibiting internet-
based communication and research: 1) that the information might be wrong, incomplete, or 
inaccurate; and 2) that the information would not be known to other jurors or parties in the case 
so could unfairly and adversely impact the judicial process.  
  
C.) Instruction Definition C 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation. 
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And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited activities: “look up terms, laws or 
other information; tweet, post, blog, instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss anything 
about this case” 
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
  
And: The instructions give these specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and 
websites: “Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) reasons for the instructions 
prohibiting internet-based communication and research: 1) unfairly influenced or biased by 
online information, 2) online information has not been vetted by the court, so it might be wrong, 
incomplete or unreliable which could lead to invalid verdict decisions, 3) online information 
could be motivated by personal or political agendas that aim to bias public opinion. 
 
And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) consequences of violating the 
instructions, i.e., engaging in internet-based communication and/or research: 1) It could lead to a 
mistrial which would require a new trial; 2) A mistrial would be expensive; and 3) the juror 
could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, jail time, and paying 
the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be declared. 
 
D.) None  
 
 
2.) Instruction set 2 
 
Pre-trial: 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, 
search the internet, websites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about 
this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your 
fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your fellow 
jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the 
case is at an end.  
 
 
 
166 
 
 I know that many of you use cell phones, smart phones, the internet and other tools of 
technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use these tools to 
communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends. 
You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, smart 
phone, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including Facebook, 
Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not use any similar technology of social 
media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  
 
Post-trial 
 During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information to 
anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as 
the telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, or computer, the Internet, any Internet 
service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website such as 
Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any 
information about this case or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict. 
In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone, correspond with anyone, or 
electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You can only discuss the case in the 
jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. I expect you will inform me as soon as 
you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions.  
 
 You may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case 
because it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom. Information on the internet or available through social media might be wrong, 
incomplete, or inaccurate. You are only permitted to discuss the case with your fellow jurors 
during deliberations because they have seen and heard the same evidence you have. In our 
judicial system, it is important that you are not influenced by anything or anyone outside of this 
courtroom. Otherwise, your decision may be based on information known only by you and not 
your fellow jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the 
judicial process.  
 
 
A.) Instruction Definition A 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions do not give reasons for prohibiting these actions. 
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B.) Instruction Definition B 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
   
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and websites: 
“Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: The Post-trial instruction explain two (2) reasons for the instructions prohibiting internet-
based communication and research: 1) that the information might be wrong, incomplete, or 
inaccurate; and 2) that the information would not be known to other jurors or parties in the case 
so could unfairly and adversely impact the judicial process.  
  
C.) Instruction Definition C 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation. 
 
And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited activities: “look up terms, laws or 
other information; tweet, post, blog, instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss anything 
about this case” 
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
  
And: The instructions give these specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and 
websites: “Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) reasons for the instructions 
prohibiting internet-based communication and research: 1) unfairly influenced or biased by 
online information, 2) online information has not been vetted by the court, so it might be wrong, 
incomplete or unreliable which could lead to invalid verdict decisions, 3) online information 
could be motivated by personal or political agendas that aim to bias public opinion. 
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And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) consequences of violating the 
instructions, i.e., engaging in internet-based communication and/or research: 1) It could lead to a 
mistrial which would require a new trial; 2) A mistrial would be expensive; and 3) the juror 
could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, jail time, and paying 
the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be declared. 
 
D.) None  
 
 
3.) Instruction set 3 
 
Pre-trial: 
 You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any 
independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. You should not look up terms, laws or other information. In other words, 
you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or 
use any other electronic tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. 
Please do not try to find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.  
 
 You may not discuss this case with anyone, not even your fellow jurors, until you retire 
to deliberate. In deliberation you may discuss the case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot 
discuss it with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case is at an end.  
 
 I know that many of you use cell phones, smart phones, tablets, computers the internet 
and other tools of technology. You must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use 
these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family 
and friends. You may not communicate with anyone about this case on your cell phone, smart 
phone, iPhone, through e-mail, text messaging, through any blog or website, including Facebook, 
Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not tweet, post, blog, 
instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss anything about this case. You may not use any 
similar technology or social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here.  
 
You need to fully comply with these instructions during this trial for many reasons. First, 
it is important that you decide this case based only on the evidence presented in this courtroom. 
Otherwise, you could be unfairly influenced or biased by online information. Second, online 
information has not been vetted by the court, so it might be wrong, incomplete or unreliable 
which could lead to invalid verdict decisions. Third, online information could be motivated by 
personal or political agendas that aim to bias public opinion. Fourth, failure to follow these 
instructions is an act of juror misconduct which can have serious consequences such as leading 
to a mistrial. A mistrial could make the current trial invalid and a new trial would be required. 
This is a tremendous expense to the parties, the court, and to you as taxpayers. Last, you could be 
held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, jail time, and paying the costs 
associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be declared.  I expect you will inform me 
as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation of these instructions. 
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  I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. 
 
Post-trial: 
 During your deliberations, you must not provide any information to anyone by any means 
about this case. You may not tweet, post, blog, instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss 
anything about this case through any blog or website, including Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, 
YouTube, Reddit, Instagram or Snapchat. In other words, you must not communicate with 
anyone about this case on your cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, through e-
mail, text messaging, instant messaging or on social media until I accept your verdict. You may 
not use any similar technology or social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. 
You can only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations.  
 
 You may not use electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because 
it is important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this courtroom. 
Information on the internet and social media has not been vetted by the court. It might be wrong, 
incomplete, or unreliable. It could also be motivated by personal or political agendas that aim to 
influence or bias public opinion. This could lead to inaccurate and invalid verdict decisions. You 
can only discuss the case with your fellow jurors during deliberations because they have seen 
and heard the same evidence you have. In our judicial system, it is important that you are not 
influenced by anything or anyone outside of this courtroom. Otherwise, you could be unfairly 
biased, and your decision may be based on information known only by you and not your fellow 
jurors or the parties in the case. This would unfairly and adversely impact the judicial process 
putting the defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial at risk.   
 
Failure to follow these instructions is an act of juror misconduct which can have serious 
consequences such as leading to a mistrial. A mistrial could make the current trial invalid and a 
new trial would be required. This is a tremendous expense to the parties, the court, and to you as 
taxpayers. Last, you could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, 
jail time, and paying the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be 
declared.  I expect you will inform me as soon as you become aware of another juror’s violation 
of these instructions. 
 
 
A.) Instruction Definition A 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions do not give reasons for prohibiting these actions. 
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B.) Instruction Definition B 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation.  
 
And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
   
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and websites: 
“Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: The Post-trial instruction explain two (2) reasons for the instructions prohibiting internet-
based communication and research: 1) that the information might be wrong, incomplete, or 
inaccurate; and 2) that the information would not be known to other jurors or parties in the case 
so could unfairly and adversely impact the judicial process.  
  
C.) Instruction Definition C 
 
The instructions prohibit jurors from conducting independent research, consulting media or 
reference materials, and communicating with any other people about the case except other jurors 
during deliberation. 
 
And: The instructions specifically prohibit the use of electronic tools and devices to engage in 
internet-based research and communication about the case.  
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited activities: “look up terms, laws or 
other information; tweet, post, blog, instant message, conduct opinion polls, or discuss anything 
about this case” 
 
And: The instructions give specific examples of prohibited technology and electronic 
communication: “telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, tablet, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, e-mail, text or instant messaging service, Internet chat room, blog, or website” 
  
And: The instructions give these specific examples of prohibited social media blogs and 
websites: “Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube”  
 
And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) reasons for the instructions 
prohibiting internet-based communication and research: 1) unfairly influenced or biased by 
online information, 2) online information has not been vetted by the court, so it might be wrong, 
incomplete or unreliable which could lead to invalid verdict decisions, 3) online information 
could be motivated by personal or political agendas that aim to bias public opinion. 
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And: Both the Pre- & Post-trial instructions explain three (3) consequences of violating the 
instructions, i.e., engaging in internet-based communication and/or research: 1) It could lead to a 
mistrial which would require a new trial; 2) A mistrial would be expensive; and 3) the juror 
could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as fines, jail time, and paying 
the costs associated with conducting a new trial should a mistrial be declared. 
 
D.) None  
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Appendix H 
 
Juror Internet Research Scale 
 
Instructions: Listed below are a number of opinions. Read each item and decide whether you 
agree or disagree that this statement reflects your beliefs and to what extent. 
 
1. I would look up the parties in the case online to try to find additional information about them. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
2. Finding additional information about the case online would be more helpful than harmful. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
3. If I don’t understand something the attorneys have presented, I would look it up online. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
4. I would try to find relevant and helpful information online that may be withheld during the 
trial. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
5. If I can’t ask questions during the trial, I would look up the information online. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
6. I would use the internet to find out the forbidden information judges don’t want me to find. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
7. I would do extra research online because it would help me make the best decision in the case. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
8. It would be wrong to do even a quick internet search for additional information during the 
trial. (Reverse scored). 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
9. I would do additional research online if I thought it would help me better understand the case, 
even if the judge asked me not to. 
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Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
 
10. I would be curious to see what I could find online about the parties in the trial. 
Strongly           Somewhat       Somewhat            Strongly 
Disagree Disagree          Disagree           Agree           Agree            Agree 
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Appendix I 
 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS) 
 
Instructions: Please read each statement carefully. If you agree with the statement, choose True. 
If you disagree with the statement, then choose False. 
 
1.) I give in easily to people when I am pressured. 
a. True 
b. False 
2.) I find it very difficult to tell people when I disagree with them. 
a. True 
b. False 
3.) People in authority make me feel uncomfortable and uneasy. 
a. True 
b. False 
4.) I tend to give in to people who insist that they are right. 
a. True 
b. False 
5.) I tend to become easily alarmed and frightened when I am in the company of people in 
authority. 
a. True 
b. False 
6.) I try very hard not to offend people in authority. 
a. True 
b. False 
7.) I would describe myself as a very obedient person. 
a. True 
b. False 
8.) I tend to go along with what people tell me even when I know that they are wrong. 
a. True 
b. False 
9.) I believe in avoiding rather than facing demanding and frightening situations. 
a. True 
b. False 
10.) I try to please others. 
a. True 
b. False 
11.) Disagreeing with people often takes more time than it is worth. 
a. True 
b. False 
12.) I generally believe in doing as I am told. 
a. True 
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b. False 
13.) When I am uncertain about things I tend to accept what people tell me 
a. True 
b. False 
14.) I generally try to avoid confrontation with people. 
a. True 
b. False 
15.) As a child I always did what my parents told me. 
a. True 
b. False 
16.) I try hard to do what is expected of me. 
a. True 
b. False 
17.) When I was a child I sometimes took the blame for things I had not done 
a. True 
b. False 
18.) I am not too concerned about what people think of me. 
a. True 
b. False 
19.) I strongly resist being pressured to do things I don’t want to do. 
a. True 
b. False 
20.) I would never go along with what people tell me in order to please them. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
  
 
 
176 
 
Appendix J 
 
Case Knowledge Questionnaire 
Instructions: Please read each statement and indicate whether it is True or False based on your 
memory of the case. If you do not know or remember the statement, then please indicate that it is 
False. 
 
Questions 1 – 10 are target questions. They will be scored as one (1) for True responses and 
zero (0) for False responses. The scores will be added together to compose an overall score that 
will range from (0-10).  This information has been left out of the trial summary stimulus so more 
‘True’ answers will result in a higher overall score and indicates that it is likely the individual 
obtained information online (a.k.a. – more true answers/higher score = more likely engaged in 
internet-based misconduct).  
 
Questions 11-20 are filler/distractor questions and will not be scored. This is information has 
been left in the trial summary stimulus so all participants should mark those as ‘True”, 
depending on how good their memory is. However, since these questions are merely distractor 
questions they will not be calculated in the overall questionnaire score.    
 
1.) Justin Ross Harris was charged with felony murder.  
a. True 
b. False 
2.) Cooper Harris was 22 months old. 
a. True 
b. False 
3.) Justin Ross Harris was sexting (texting sexually explicit messages and exchanging nude 
photos) and trying to meet up with underage girls (under the age of 18). 
a. True 
b. False 
4.) On the day of Cooper’s death, Justin Ross Harris, went to his car on his lunch (around 
12:41pm) and threw a package of lightbulbs in the front seat. 
a. True 
b. False 
5.) Cooper Harris’s car seat was rear-facing. 
a. True 
b. False 
6.) Leanna Taylor (Justin Ross Harris’s ex-wife) asked Justin Ross Harris, "Did you say too 
much?" when they were alone were alone in the interview room. 
a. True 
b. False 
7.) According to the prosecution, the defendant, Justin Ross Harris conducted internet 
searches about hot car deaths and what happens when a person or animal is left in a hot 
car. 
a. True 
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b. False 
8.) The trial venue (location) was changed to another county due to excessive local media 
coverage in Cobb County which prevented obtaining an unbiased jury. 
a. True 
b. False 
9.) Justin Ross Harris’s ex-wife, Leanna Taylor (formerly Harris) was originally a suspect. 
a. True 
b. False 
10.) When Justin Ross Harris’s ex-wife, Leanna Taylor (formerly Harris) went to pick up 
Cooper from day care and was informed that he was brought in she said, “Ross must 
have left Cooper in the car.” 
a. True 
b. False 
11.) Cooper Harris was left in the car on June 18th, 2014 for approximately 7 hours. 
a. True 
b. False 
12.) Justin Ross Harris was sexting (texting sexually explicit messages and exchanging nude 
photos) and meeting up with multiple women and prostitutes for sex. 
a. True 
b. False 
13.) Justin Ross Harris was sexting (texting sexually explicit messages and exchanging nude 
photos) with women on the day Cooper died, June 18, 2014. 
a. True 
b. False 
14.) The State (prosecution) claimed that the defendant, Justin Ross Harris, led a double life 
and he murdered Cooper because he wanted to be free from his marriage and parenting 
responsibilities to pursue other relationships. 
a. True 
b. False 
15.) Cooper Harris died of hyperthermia (excessive heat). 
a. True 
b. False 
16.) Justin Ross Harris’s family, friends, coworkers and ex-wife testified that Harris was a 
good, loving father.  
a. True 
b. False 
17.) Justin Ross Harris’s defense counsel claimed that Cooper’s death was an accident, 
Harris forgot. He had a memory failure, automatic processes kicked in when he was 
driving, and he went straight to work instead of going to the day care. 
a. True 
b. False 
18.) According to the prosecution, the defendant, Justin Ross Harris conducted internet 
searches about "What is prison really like?” and "How to survive in federal prison,". 
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a. True 
b. False 
19.) On the day of Cooper’s death, June 18, 2014, the temperature outside reached over 90 
degrees. 
a. True 
b. False 
20.) The State (prosecution) claimed that the defendant, Justin Ross Harris is guilty because 
he did not act the way they thought he should have acted.  
a. True 
b. False 
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Appendix K 
 
Internet-Based Juror Misconduct Questionnaire (IBJMQ) 
 
Instructions: Please provide the following information. This information is important so that we 
may compare our sample to individuals selected for juries throughout the state. All information 
collected will be kept anonymous and confidential. 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
1.) How tempted were you to communicate about the case through any social networks, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube?   
Not at all                   Very 
   Tempted                  Tempted 
       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2.) Did you communicate about the case through any social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, or YouTube? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
If no, what prevented you from doing so? 
 I did not want to violate the Judge’s instructions. 
 I did not want to take the time. 
 I did not want to be biased. 
 It would not be right or legal. 
 Other: __________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTERNET RESEARCH 
3.) How tempted were you to conduct research or search for information about the case on the 
Internet? 
Not at all                   Very 
   Tempted                  Tempted 
       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
4.) Did you conduct research or search for information about the case on the Internet? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
If no, what prevented you from doing so? 
 I did not want to violate the Judge’s instructions. 
 I did not want to take the time. 
 I did not want to be biased. 
 It would not be right or legal. 
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 Other: __________________________________________________________________ 
 
ONLINE LEGAL RESEARCH 
5.) How tempted were you to look up legal terms, laws or other information on the Internet? 
Not at all                   Very 
   Tempted                  Tempted 
       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
6.) Did you look up legal terms, laws or other information on the Internet? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
If no, what prevented you from doing so? 
 I did not want to violate the Judge’s instructions. 
 I did not want to take the time. 
 I did not want to be biased. 
 It would not be right or legal. 
 Other: __________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DISCUSS CASE WITH OTHERS 
7.) How tempted were you to discuss the case with any other person besides your fellow jurors 
during deliberation?   
Not at all                   Very 
   Tempted                  Tempted 
       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8.) Did you discuss the case with any other person besides your fellow jurors during 
deliberation? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
If yes, why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
If no, what prevented you from doing so? 
 I did not want to violate the Judge’s instructions. 
 I did not want to take the time. 
 I did not want to be biased. 
 It would not be right or legal. 
 Other: __________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix L 
 
Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC-sf) 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) 
please choose "1"; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please 
choose the "5". Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes the 
best fit.  
 
Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely 
uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = 
extremely characteristic. 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something." 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
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*7. I only think as hard as I have to. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
183 
 
 
*16. 1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
*17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works? 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
Extremely Somewhat Uncertain Somewhat Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Uncharacteristic  Characteristic Characteristic 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Note. From "'The Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition," by J. T. Cacioppo, R. E. Petty, 
and C. F. Kao, 1984, Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, pp. 306-307. Copyright 1984 by 
Lawrence Erlbaum. Adapted by permission.  
 
The number of response options on the scales used across studies has typically ranged from five 
to nine, and the labels for these response options have varied from agreement—disagreement to 
extremely uncharacteristic-extremely characteristic. Although these variations across studies 
may influence the total scores obtained, they have not had dramatic effects on the relationships 
between interindividual variations in need for cognition and other variables in a given study. 
* Reverse scored. 
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Appendix M 
 
Media and Technology Usage and Attitudes Scale (MTUAS) 
 
Instructions: Please respond to each of the following items to the best of your ability. There are 
no “right” or “wrong” answers to the questions – we are only interested in your own personal 
thoughts and opinions, which will be completely anonymous.  
 
 
Please indicate how often you do each of the following e-mail activities on any device 
(mobile phone, laptop, desktop, etc.) 
 
 Never Once 
a 
month 
Several 
times a 
month 
Once 
a 
week 
Several 
times a 
week 
Once 
a 
day 
Several 
times a 
day 
Once 
an 
hour 
Several 
times 
an 
hour 
All 
the 
time 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1. Send, 
receive 
and read 
e-mails 
(not 
including 
spam or 
junk 
mail). 
          
2. Check 
your 
personal 
e-mail. 
          
3. Check 
your 
work or 
school e-
mail. 
          
4. Send 
or 
receive 
files via 
e-mail. 
          
 
 
Please indicate how often you do each of the following activities on your mobile phone. 
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 Neve
r 
Once 
a 
mont
h 
Severa
l times 
a 
month 
Onc
e a 
wee
k 
Severa
l times 
a week 
Onc
e a 
day 
Severa
l times 
a day 
Onc
e an 
hour 
Severa
l times 
an 
hour 
All 
the 
tim
e 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
5. Check 
for voice 
calls on a 
mobile 
phone.  
          
6. Make 
and receive 
mobile 
phone 
calls. 
          
7. Check 
for text 
messages 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
8. Send 
and receive 
text 
messages 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
9. Use 
your 
mobile 
phone 
during 
class or 
work time.  
          
10. Read e-
mail on a 
mobile 
phone.  
          
11. Get 
directions 
or use GPS 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
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12. Browse 
the web on 
a mobile 
phone. 
          
13. Listen 
to music 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
14. Take 
pictures 
using a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
15. Check 
the news 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
16. Record 
video on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
17. Use 
apps (for 
any 
purpose) 
on a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
18. Search 
for 
informatio
n with a 
mobile 
phone. 
          
 
 
How often do you do each of the following activities? 
 
 Neve
r 
Once 
a 
mont
h 
Severa
l times 
a 
month 
Onc
e a 
wee
k 
Severa
l times 
a week 
Onc
e a 
day 
Severa
l times 
a day 
Onc
e an 
hour 
Severa
l times 
an 
hour 
All 
the 
tim
e 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
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19. Watch 
TV shows, 
movies, etc. 
on a TV set. 
          
20. Watch 
video clips 
on a TV set. 
          
21. Watch 
TV shows, 
movies, etc. 
on a 
computer. 
          
22. Watch 
video clips 
on a 
computer. 
          
23. 
Download 
media files 
from other 
people on a 
computer. 
          
24. Share 
your own 
media files 
on a 
computer. 
          
25. Search 
the Internet 
for news on 
any device. 
          
26. Search 
the Internet 
for 
information 
on any 
device. 
          
27. Search 
the Internet 
for videos 
on any 
device. 
          
28. Search 
the Internet 
for images 
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or photos on 
any device. 
29. Play 
games on a 
computer, 
video game 
console or 
smartphone 
BY 
YOURSEL
F. 
          
30. Play 
games on a 
computer, 
video game 
console or 
smartphone 
WITH 
OTHER 
PEOPLE IN 
THE SAME 
ROOM. 
          
31. Play 
games on a 
computer, 
video game 
console or 
smartphone 
WITH 
OTHER 
PEOPLE 
ONLINE. 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have a Facebook or other social media account, then continue with item 32 below.  
If you do NOT have Facebook or other social media account, then skip to item 106 below.  
 
How often do you do each of the following activities on social networking sites such as 
Facebook? 
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 Neve
r 
Once 
a 
mont
h 
Severa
l times 
a 
month 
Onc
e a 
wee
k 
Severa
l times 
a week 
Onc
e a 
day 
Severa
l times 
a day 
Onc
e an 
hour 
Severa
l times 
an 
hour 
All 
the 
tim
e 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
32. Check 
your 
Facebook 
page or 
other social 
networks. 
          
33. Check 
your 
Facebook 
(social 
media) 
page from 
your 
smartphone
. 
          
34. Check 
Facebook 
(social 
media) at 
work or 
school. 
          
35. Post 
status 
updates. 
36. Post 
photos. 
          
37. Browse 
profiles and 
photos. 
          
38. Read 
postings. 
          
39. 
Comment 
on 
postings, 
status 
updates, 
photos, etc. 
          
40. Click 
‘‘Like’’ to 
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a posting, 
photo, etc. 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about your Facebook (social media) and other online 
friends.  
 
 0 1–50 51–
100 
101–
175 
176–
250 
251–
375 
376–
500 
501–
750 
751 
or 
more 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
41. How many 
friends do you 
have on 
Facebook or 
other social 
media? 
         
42. How many 
of your 
Facebook 
(social media) 
friends do you 
know in 
person? 
         
43. How many 
people have 
you met online 
that you have 
never met in 
person? 
         
44. How many 
people do you 
regularly 
interact with 
online that you 
have never met 
in person? 
         
 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement below using 
the provided scale: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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45. I feel it is 
important to be able to 
find any information 
whenever I want 
online. 
     
46. I feel it is 
important to be able to 
access the Internet any 
time I want. 
     
47. I think it is 
important to keep up 
with the latest trends 
in technology. 
     
48. Technology will 
provide solutions to 
many of our problems. 
     
49. With technology 
anything is possible. 
     
50. I feel that I get 
more accomplished 
because of technology. 
     
51. I get anxious when 
I don’t have my cell 
phone. 
     
52. I get anxious when 
I don’t have the 
Internet available to 
me. 
     
53. I am dependent on 
my technology. 
     
54. New technology 
makes people waste 
too much time. 
     
55. New technology 
makes life more 
complicated. 
     
56. New technology 
makes people more 
isolated. 
     
57. I prefer to work on 
several projects in a 
day, rather than 
completing one project 
and then switching to 
another. 
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58. When doing a 
number of 
assignments, I like to 
switch back and forth 
between them rather 
than do one at a time. 
59. When I have a task 
to complete, I like to 
break it up by 
switching to other 
tasks intermittently. 
     
60.* I like to finish 
one task completely 
before focusing on 
anything else. 
     
 
 
